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Abstract 
The study of social evolution is concerned with fitness consequences of interactions 
between individuals. It has proven to be an excellent area for relating theoretical 
predictions to empirical observations. I develop social evolution theory in several ways. 
(1) I demonstrate that limited male fecundity and small mating groups can select for 
extreme fertility insurance, curbing female biased sex allocation under local mate 
competition, which explains puzzling sex ratios in protozoan blood parasites. (2)1 
examine the underlying causes of an observed statistical invariant in the relative size at 
sex change in animals, revealing that it does not imply as much conservation of biology 
across taxa as previously imagined. (3) I extend recent theory regarding how local 
competition impedes the evolution of altruism to show that it also promotes the evolution 
of spite. This allows me to re-interpret several behaviours in terms of spitefulness, and 
predict where spite will occur in nature. (4)1 apply spite theory to the eyolution of 
chemical (bacteriocin) warfare in bacteria, and derive novel predictions for the evolution 
of virulence caused by bacterial parasites. (5) I formalize a verbal model for the evolution 
of costly punishment as a mechanism of promoting cooperation, revealing a logical flaw 
and the true source of its (potential) selective benefit. (6)1 develop a multi-locus 
methodology for arbitrary social interactions, and apply this to a dynamically-sufficient 
co-evolutionary analysis of cooperation and costly punishment, revealing when 
punishment is favoured by selection. (7) I apply this methodology to the evolution of 
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Social evolution: definitions and classification 
Social evolution theory is concerned with the fitness consequences of interactions 
between individuals. Classically, social behaviours are categorised according to their 
impact on the reproductive success of the 'actor' and any 'recipients' (figure 1.1; 
Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1985). The categories are: (1) mutualism, where both actor and 
recipient directly benefit from the behaviour; (2) selfishness, where the actor gains at the 
expense of the recipient; (3) altruism, where the behaviour is detrimental to the actor but 
beneficial for the recipient; and (4) spite, where the behaviour is harmful for both actor 
and recipient. Mutualism and selfishness, which enhance the reproductive success of the 
actor, are easily explained. Less easy to account for are instances where an individual acts 
to its own detriment. In particular, much attention has focused on the problem of altruism 
(for example, Hamilton 1963, 1964, Wilson 1975). 
Effect on recipient 
+ 
+ 	mutualism 	selfishness 
cz 
- 	altruism 	spite 
w 
Figure 1.1. A classification of social behaviours. 
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Altruism and Hamilton's rule 
The answer lies in the possibility of statistical associations between individuals. Hamilton 
(1963, 1964, 1970) developed two equivalent ways of thinking about fitness when social 
partners are correlated. If a positive correlation exists between the behaviours of social 
partners then altruists will tend to associate with altruists. Thus, altruists suffer a direct 
cost through their behaviour but benefit from the altruistic behaviour of their social 
partners. This is the neighbour-modulated view of fitness. Alternatively, if there are 
genetical correlations between social partners then an altruistic gene will reduce the 
actor's number of direct descendants, but it will also enhance the transmission of 
altruistic genes via the recipients of the altruism. This may result in a net benefit for the 
altruistic gene, in which case the actor is said to have maximized its inclusive fitness. 
Whichever of these two views of fitness are taken (Frank 1997a, 1998), the result is the 
following statement, known as Hamilton's rule: selection will act to favour the social trait 
when RB>C, where B is the direct benefit to the recipient, C is the direct cost to the actor, 
and R is the relatedness of the recipient to the actor. Positive relatedness might result 
from, for example, genealogical closeness. Since this is generally the cause of such 
associations, the special form of selection has often been referred to as kin selection 
(Maynard Smith 1964). 
Individual versus group 
The evolution of altruism has often been framed in terms of the tension between 
individual selection and group selection, with the former favouring selfishness and the 
latter favouring selflessness. A persistent problem which arises at all levels of biological 
organisation is the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968, Maynard Smith & Szathmary 
1995, Frank 1998), in which individuals would all benefit from existing in a cooperative 
group, yet there is an immediate incentive for each individual to behave in a less than 
cooperative way. Given that one's selflessness is liable to be exploited by another's 
selfishness, everyone behaves selfishly, and hence the group as a whole does badly. Self-
restraint can be favoured when there is a positive correlation between the social partners, 
so that when an individual agrees to act selflessly it can be sure that, to a certain degree, 
the rest of the group will behave accordingly (Frank 1998). Again, the rule RB>C applies, 
and group selection is found to be mathematically equivalent to kin selection (Price 
1972a, Hamilton 1975, Grafen 1984, Wade 1985, Frank 1986, 1998, Queller 1992). 
Spite 
Spite, the flip-side of altruism, has received very little attention. If an individual pays a 
cost (C>O) in order to inflict harm (B<0) on a negative relation (R<0), then its behaviour 
may satisfy Hamilton's rule (RB>C), and be favoured by selection (Hamilton 1970, 
Grafen 1985a, Foster et al. 2001). There are a number of reasons why spite has been 
neglected. There is a pervasive belief that relatedness is a probability measure, and 
logically rules out the possibility of negative relations. Within social evolution theory, 
negative relatedness is acknowledged as a possibility, but strong negative relatedness is 
regarded as biologically implausible (Hamilton 1970). Generally, behaviours which 
might be regarded as spiteful are usually re-expressed in terms of altruism or selfishness. 
Sex allocation 
Social evolution has proven to be an excellent field for relating theoretical predictions to 
empirical observations. Indeed, in some cases the strong empirical support is quantitative 
as well as qualitative (Wenen 1980, Charnov 1982a, Herre 1987, Godfray 1994). The 
astounding success of social evolutionary biology is partly because the field has firm but 
conceptually simple theoretical foundations, but also because there has been much focus 
on social traits which are well characterized biologically, are easy to measure, and are 
strongly tied to fitness (Seger & Stubblefield 1996). The model trait for social evolution 
theory has been sex allocation (Charnov 1982a, Frank 1998, 2002). This is well 
understood in terms of the fundamental trade-off between investment of resources into 
male and female function. Sex allocation is easily defined and measured. It is the 
proportion of resources invested into male as opposed to female function - for example, 
in a gonochoristic species it is the fraction of investment into sons rather than daughters - 
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and often this can be measured simply by counting the number of progeny of each sex. In 
some contexts, sex allocation theory works far better than it is expected to, with simple 
models generating accurate predictions for sex ratios acroSs taxa despite obvious 
variation in what are expected to be important biological details (Ailsop & West 2003a). 
However, there are also situations where the theory is relatively poor at explaining the 
variation in sex allocation, and such examples are worthy of further investigation, as it 
seems that here key biological details have been missed. 
Although sex allocation does not immediately appear to fit into the framework of figure 
1.1, it can be phrased in terms of kin selection and group selection (Hamilton 1967). For 
example, male fecundity is often effectively limitless, and a group's productivity will be 
related to the number of fertile females. An individual who contributes more daughters 
than sons improves the success of the group. Given that the total success of all the males 
in the mating group is equal to the total success of the females, individual males will be 
more successful than individual females in groups with an excess of females, so a mother 
who allocates more resources to sons will capitalise on the altruism of her female-
producing counterparts. Female biased sex ratios are predicted, and observed, within 
species where there is relatedness within mating groups, and when this is absent (i.e. 
random mating) then resources are allocated equally to the two sexes. Hamilton (1967) 
described female bias due to such local mate competition in terms of kin selection, but 
noted the group selection interpretation. Sex allocation theory, with its precise and readily 
testable predictions, has played a major role in cutting through the verbiage to show that 
the kin selection versus group selection debate is empirically empty. 
Evolution of virulence 
In recent years, there has been growing interest in applying social evolution theory to 
explaining the evolution of virulence, which is the damage done by a parasite to its host 
(Erank 1996a). Clearly, there are major economic and humanitarian gains from 
understanding how parasite population structure impacts on virulence. Again, the general 
principle is that there is a tension between the individual and the group, such that less 
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aggressive exploitation of the host will lead to a longer-lived infection and hence 
enhanced transmission for all the resident parasites, but those individuals who are more 
virulent will enjoy immediate transmission benefits. Thus, when there is high parasite 
relatedness (due to a small number of lineages constituting the infection) self-restraint 
and hence less virulence is favoured, but when.the parasites are less related (a larger 
number of lineages in the host) then exploitation and high virulence is predicted 
(Hamilton 1972, Bremermann & Pickering 1983). Unfortunately, virulence theory has 
enjoyed less success than the theory of sex allocation, suggesting that important aspects 
of infection biology are overlooked by current models (Herre 1993, 1995, Chao et al. 
2000, Read & Taylor 2001, Read et al. 2002, Griffin & West 2002, Davies et al. 2002). 
Scale of competition 
A topic that has recently been the focus of much discussion in social evolution research 
concerns the impact Of competition between social partners as a major obstacle in the 
evolution of altruism (reviewed by West et al. 2002a). Motivation for work on this topic 
stems from earlier suggestions that indiscriminate altruism should be looked for in low 
diffusive (or 'viscous') populations, such that social partners will tend to be genealogical 
kin (Hamilton 1964). Simulation studies were unable to verify this prediction, and 
beautifully simple mathematics (Taylor 1 992a, b) emerged to show that the effects of 
enhanced kinship were exactly countered by competition between kin over the whole 
range of dispersal rates in standard models. Essentially, with low dispersal there is high 
kinship between soéial partners but an inability for altruistic groups to export the 
enhanced productivity their altruism brings, thus leading to a competitive strain within 
such groups. With a higher dispersal rate there is the opportunity to inflict the increased 
competition on the population as a whole, but there is also lower kinship. This has 
spawned a variety of theoretical developments to account for the competition effect, 
either by adding extraterms into Hamilton's rule (Grafen 1984, Frank 1998) or by 
redefining relatedness itself (Queller 1994). 
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Repression of competition 
A growing body of literature now concerns itself with how altruism can be favoured at 
all, given the inhibitory effects of competition. One solution is that groups might evolve 
mechanisms of repressing competition between individuals, thus facilitating altruism, and 
hence the emergence of higher cooperative units (reviewed by Frank 2003a). Such 
repressive mechanisms - for example, worker policing in eusocial insects, and 
punishment in human societies - can often provide much stronger motivation for 
curtailing selfish behaviour than any pressure for kin selected self restraint. However, it is 
often unclear how these mechanisms could themselves be favoured. A rich literature on 
such themes has arisen in parallel in the social sciences (for example, Ostrom 1990), and 
this could fruitfully be related to the foundations of social evolution theory. 
Developments in the theory of social evolution 
In this thesis I will touch on and develop the above themes. Specifically: 
Chapter 2: The application of local mate competition to sex allocation in protozoan blood 
parasites represents one of the instances where the theory does not perform so well. 
Specifically, empirical observations give much less female-bias than is predicted by 
existing models (West et al. 2001a). I examine the interaction between two causes of 
reduced female bias - limited male fecundity and finite mating groups (collectively, 
"fertility insurance") - to show that adding these biological details brings the theory more 
closely in line with the observations. 
Chapter 3: I then move to the other extreme to examine a context where biological details 
do not seem to matter at all - the relative timing of sex change in sequential 
hermaphrodites, which is remarkably invariant (>90% of the variance explained by the 
prediction that sex change occurs at 72% of maximum.body size) across phyla and 
despite diverse biology and orders of magnitudes of body sizes (Allsop & West 2003a). I 
formalize the dimensionless theory underlying this observation, answer some recent 
criticism as to whether this really constitutes an invariant, obtain estimates of the mean 
and variance for key dimensionless life history parameters underlying the timing of sex 
change. This sheds some light on which aspects of the biology need to be conserved and 
which are less constrained. 
Chapter 4: I extend recent theory on the impact of local competition in the evolution of 
social behaviours. I show that since increased competition between social partners 
reduces relatedness, relatedness may plausibly take negative values. As well as inhibiting 
the evOlution of altruism, local competition favours the evolution of spite. I use this 
theory to show that spite is a general evolutionary phenomenon, to reinterpret several 
behaviours in terms of spite, and to suggest where spite is likely to occur in nature. 
Chapter 5: Spite theory is applied to the evolution of chemical (bacteriocin) warfare in 
bacteria. Bacteriocin production is modeled quantitatively as a function of bacterial 
kinship and scale of competition. The theory is then applied to bacterial parasites, 
generating novel predictions for the evolution of virulence, and highlighting how 
introducing some biological details can dramatically alter the predictions of virulence 
theory. 
Chapter 6: I formalize a verbal argument for the evolution of costly punishment, with 
special attention to humans (Sober & Wilson 1998). This involves extending standard 
social evolutionary methodology to encompass multiple non-independent co-evolving 
traits, namely cooperation and punishment. The formalism reveals a logical error in the 
verbal argument, and suggests how costly punishment might be favoured. 
chapter 7: The extension of social evolution methodology to include multiple co-
evolving traits is pursued in more general terms. A multi-locus methodology is borrowed 
from theoretical population genetics (Barton & Turelli 1991, Kirkpatrick et al. 2002) and 
its applications to social evolution are highlighted. The multi-locus methodology is 
integrated with the foundations of social evolution. 
Chapter 8: The multi-locus methodology is applied to the co-evolution of a mutational 
robustness gene and a linked mutating locus, for a range of recombination and inbreeding 
rates. I show that increased recombination and reduced inbreeding facilitates the 
evolution of costly robustness. Because robustness has no long term benefit, this process 
is detrimental to the mean fitness of the population. 
2. Even more extreme fertility insurance and the sex 
ratios of protozoan blood parasites 
Abstract 
Theory developed for malaria and other protozoan parasites predicts that the 
evolutionarily stable gametocyte sex ratio (z*; proportion of gametocytes that are male) 
should be related to the inbreeding rate (/) by the equation z = (1-f12. Although this 
equation has been applied with some success, it has been suggested that in some cases a 
less female biased sex ratio can be favoured to ensure female gametes are fertilised. Such 
fertility insurance can arise in response to two factors: (i) low numbers of gametes 
produced per gametocyte and (ii) the gametes of only a limited number of gametocytes 
being able to interact. However, previous theoretical studies have considered the 
influence of these two forms of fertility insurance separately. We use a stochastic 
analytical model to address this problem, and examine the consequences of when these 
two types of fertility insurance are allowed to occur simultaneously. Our results show 
that interactions between the two types of fertility insurance reduce the extent of female 
bias predicted in the sex ratio, suggesting that fertility insurance may be more important 
than has previously been assumed. 
Introduction 
One of the many successful applications of sex allocation theory has been the study of 
how competition for mates between related males can favour the evolution of female 
biased sex ratios (Charnov, 1982a; Godfray, 1994; Hamilton, 1967; West et al., 2000a). 
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in applying this theory (local mate 
Published as: Gardner A., Reece S.E., & West S.A. 2003 Even more extreme fertility 
insurance and the sex ratios of protozoan blood parasites. Journal of Theoretical Biology 
223, 5 15-521 (see Appendix). 
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competition; LMC) to malaria and related protozoan parasites (Read et al., 2002a; West 
et al., 2001a). Here, the appropriate prediction is that the evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS; Maynard Smith, 1982) gametocyte sex ratio (z*; proportion of gametocytes that are 
male) should be related to the inbreeding rate (/ by the equation z" = (1-j)/2 (Hamilton, 
1967; Nee etal., 2002; Read etal., 1992). When there is complete inbreeding (frl; i.e. a 
single lineage or clone is selfing), the ESS is to produce the minimum number of males 
required to fertilise the available female gametes and thus, maximise the number of 
zygotes. Conversely, when gametes in the mating pooi are of a mixture of lineages,f 
decreases and the sex ratio increases in order for each lineage to maximise its genetic 
representation in the zygote population. The relationship between the inbreeding rate and 
sex ratio has been able to explain a number of sex ratio patterns, in Apicomplexan parasite 
populations (reviewed by West etal., 2001a; Read et al., 2002a). However, there are a 
number of observations that cannot be explained by this equatiyn. In particular: (1) across 
Haemoproteus populations in birds the sex ratio does not correlate with an expected 
correlate of the inbreeding rate (prevelance; Shutler et al., 1995; Shutler & Read, 1998); 
(2) in malaria parasites, sex ratios within and between infections can be extremely 
variable (Osgood etal., 2002; Paul etal., 2002; Paul et al., 2000; Paul etal., 1999; 
Pickering etal. 2000; Schall, 1989; Taylor, 1997), and less female biased sex ratios can 
lead to greater transmission success (Robert et al., 1996). 
A potential explanation for these contradictory observations is "fertility insurance" - the 
production of a less female biased sex ratio to ensure that all female gametes are fertilised 
(West et al., 2002b). Before describing how fertility insurance can influence the ESS sex 
ratio it is necessary to describe the background biology. In malaria and related 
Haemospororin parasites, haploid sexual stages (gametocytes) are taken up from the host 
in the blood meal of a vector. Once inside the midgut, the haploid gametocytes 
differentiate into haploid gametes and fuse to form zygotes. These resulting diploid 
zygotes undergo meiosis and asexual proliferation before migrating to the vector's 
salivary glands where they wait to enter a new vertebrate host. Each female gametocyte 
(macro-gametocyte) will differentiate into one female gamete, whereas each male 
gametocyte (micro-gametocyte) will produce several motile male gametes. The number 
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of viable gametes produced per male gametocyte varies enormously across species: 4-8 in 
mammalian malaria parasites (Read et al., 1992); —2 in some lizard malarias (Schall, 
2000); 5-1000 in Eimeriorin intestinal parasites (West et al., 2000a). 
Fertility insurance can occur for two broad reasons - which are summarised here but 
discussed more fully in West et al. (2002b). First, the number of male gametes produced 
per gametocyte (c) may be a limiting factor (Read et al., 1992). If the mean number of 
viable gametes produced per male gametocyte is c, then the ESS sex ratio must be 
z*_>lI(c+l), otherwise there will not be enough male gametes to fertilise the female 
gametes. (fig 2.1 A; Read et al., 1992). Second, the ability of gametes to interact may be a 
limiting factor. West et al. (2002b) investigated this possibility by assuming that the 
number of gametocytes whose gametes can interact (q) is restricted. In this case a less 
female biased sex ratio is favoured to avoid the stochastic absence of males in a mating 
group of q gametocytes (figure 2. 1B; West et al., 2002b). A low q could occur for a 
number of reasons including low male gamete motility, high gametocyte or gamete 
mortality, low gametocyte density, or small blood meals (Shutler & Read, 1998; Paul et 
al., 1999, 2000, 2002; Reece & Read, 2000; West et al., 2001a, 2002b). Recent attention 
has focused on how the host immune response may influence and vary the importance of 
these factors (Paul et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; Reece & Read, 2000). 
In order to make their analyses mathematically tractable, previous studies have 
considered the influence of these two forms of fertility insurance separately. When 
examining the influence of male gametocyte fecundity (c), Read et al. (1992) assumed 
that the gametes from a large of gametocytes can interact (q - oo), and when examining 
the influence of the number of gametocytes whose gametes can interact (q), West et al. 
(2002b) assumed that male gamete fecundity was not a limiting factor (c - ; i.e. one 
male gametocyte is able to provide enough gametes to fertilise all of the female gametes 
in its mating group arising from q gametocytes). It has subsequently been assumed that 
the overall effect of these two factors can examined by seeing which is more 
constraining, and favours the least female biased sex ratio (West et al., 2002b). However, 
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Figure 2.1. The relationship between the predicted unbeatable sex ratio (proportion of 
gametocytes that are male; z*)  and the inbreeding rate (/). (A) shows the unbeatable sex 
ratio when the number of gametes produced by each male gametocyte (c) varies and 
gametes from all gametocytes in a very large group can interact (q —c;  Read et al. 
1992). (B) shows the unbeatable sex ratio when the number of gametocytes whose 
gametes can interact (q) is limited and the number of gametes produced by each male 
gametocyte (c) is not limiting (West et al. 2002b). 
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low, &ven if there are males in a mating group, these males may not be able to provide 
enough gametes to fertilise all the female gametes. Although this scenario could logically 
occur, it is not clear whether this interaction will significantly influence the ESS sex ratio. 
We use a stochastic analytical model to address this problem and consider how the 
unbeatable sex ratio is influenced by the interaction of finite values for both c and q. We 
use life history terminology associated with malaria parasites, but oui results are 
applicable to any Apicomplexan parasite with dimorphic sexual stages. 
Methods 
We consider a large population of vertebrates harbouring malaria parasites and 
supporting a large number of blood-feeding dipteran vectors (effects due to small 
numbers of vertebrate hosts is negligible unless the number of hosts is extremely small; 
Taylor & Bulmer, 1980). Every host contains a large pool of haploid gametocytes 
circulating in the peripheral blood, comprising n independent lineages (all notation is 
given in table 2.1). Within a lineage, all gametocytes are clonally derived from a single 
sporozoite founder individual. Each lineage produces a proportion z of male gametocytes 
and l-z of female gametocytes, where z is determined by a single biallelic nuclear gene. 
A common Null' allele exists at frequency 1-rn and has z = z, and a vanishingly rare 
'Mutant' allele exists at frequency rn and has z = ZM. We may assign each host individual 
to one ofn+1 classes on the basis of the number of Mutant lineages carried. Each host is 
fed upon by a large number of vectors, transmitting q gametocytes to each vector in the 
process. Once in the midgut of the vector, each male gametocyte giyes rise to c male 
gametes and female gametocytes each give rise to a single female gamete. Random 
syngamy ensues, and the resulting next generation of zygotes are, following Read et al. 
(1992), assumed to reflect the genetic composition of the next generation of infections. It 
is worth noting that although each vector contains a single mating group of size q the 
predictions of this analysis will hold for any number of such groups, provided that there 
is no exchange of gametes between mating groups. 
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Symbol Definition 
Bi(k,r) Binomial distribution: k trials and probability of success r 
c Number of viable male gametes per male gametocyte 
f Inbreeding coefficient; f = n1 
Number of X-allele male gametes remaining viable 
HypGeo(a,13,y) Hypergeometric distribution: a trials, and 8 potential successes out of y 
M The Mutant allele 
m Population frequency of the mutant 
N The Null allele 
n Number of independent lineages per vertebrate host 
p Probability of male gamete survival 
q Number of gametocytes whose gametes can interact in the vector 
S, Success of the X-allele in a host containing y Mutant infections 
w, Absolute fitness of the X-allele 
z Sex ratio (proportion male gametocytes per lineage) 
z Evolutionarily stable (ES) sex ratio 
Zx Sex ratio employed by the X-allele 
x Species-specific number of gametes released per male gametocyte 
OX Number of X-allele females in a mating group 
YX Number of X-allele males in a mating group 
Total number of X-allele gametocytes in a mating group 
X,y 
Frequency of X-alleles in successful male (y=l) or female (y=O) 
gametes 
w Relative fitness of the Null, WNI WM; Mutant invades if w < 1 
Number of zygotes produced by the mating group 
Table 2.1. Definition of parameters, variables and distributions referred to in chapter 2. 
The fitness of the Null is the mean success of a Null lineage from each host-class 
weighted by the number of NUll lineages in the host-class and the frequency of that host-
class. As the mutant is vanishingly rare, so that m - 0, the fitness of the Null is 
dominated by its success in vectors feeding upon hosts containing no Mutant lineages. 
WN 	 = f SNO 
	 [2.1] 
where SNO  is the mean number of zygotic Null alleles produced per vector feeding on a 
host harbouring zero Mutant lineages, and/is the degree of inbreeding. The Mutant 
never occurs in such hosts, and almost never occurs in hosts with other Mutant lineages, 
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¼ 
so its fitness is dominated by its success in vectors feeding upon hosts with one Mutant 
lineage and n-i Null lineages. 
WM 
	 [2.2] 
where SM.j  is the mean number of zygotic Mutant alleles derived from a vector feeding on 
a host containing one Mutant infection only. The Mutant invades if WM> WN and so the 
ESS sex ratio z is the value of ZN,  such that w = WNI WM is not less than unity for all 0 :5 ZM 
:!~ 1. Exact solutions for 5N0  and 5M,I  will be determined, so that for known q, c andf.pairs 
of sex ratio strategies may be compared. 
A vector feeding on a Null-only host is assured of obtaining q Null gametocytes in its 
bloodmeal. MN Bi(q, ZN,)  are male, where Bi(k,it) represents the binomial distribution 
with k trials and probability of success it, and the remaining ØN = q - /2N are female, so 
that there are c 4UN male gametes and ON female gametes able to interact in the midgut. 
The number of zygotes, , is the smaller of these two values, and since zygotes are 
diploid the number of Null alleles formed in that vector is 2 . 





A vector feeding on a host containing one Mutant and n-i Null lineage will obtain q 
gametocytes of which TM Bi(q,J) are Mutant and TN = q - TM are Null. These will 
comprise IM - Bi(TM  ZM)  Mutant males and 0, = TM - 4UM Mutant females, and /tN - Bi(rN  
ZN) Null males and ON = TN - UN Null females. The number of zygotes, , is then the lower 
of the two values c (UM  + jiN) and lM  + ON, meaning that there are successful male 
gametes and successful female gametes. Of the former, a proportion ZUMI - HypGeo(, 
c 12M'  c (1M  + /-N))I  will be Mutant, where HygGeo(ct,13,y) represents the hypergeometric 
distribution with a trials and P potential successes out of ', and of the latter a proportion 
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— HypGeo(, 'PM' 'PM + 'PN)/ will be Mutant. The success of the Mutant is simply 
(v7M1+ n7O) (Taylor, 1981; Charnov, 1982a). 
SMI = 	~'Tm 1- 	(ICIMM ZMM (1- zM)TMPM 
(q tMP 
	ZN)Za 
TMO1M..OpN..0) 	 ) 	 1\PN 	) 	
[2.4A] 
	





= /1M +/AN B] 
0 	 !tM+/2N — O 
- !2N 	







These expressions reveal whether the Mutant allele can invade a population fixed for the 
Null. We determined the ESS sex ratio iteratively, such that the value of ZN  in each round 
is the sex ratio of the successfully invading Mutant or successfully defending Null of the 
previous round, and ZM  is a randomly assigned value. After an indefinite number of 
rounds the Null will assume and subsequently retain the value of z, so that at any time 
the currently unbeaten z can be tested for evolutionary stability by plotting w for ZN  equal 
to the putative z against all 0 :5 ZM  :5 1 and rejecting if w < 1 for any ZM. 
To check our expressions, we will now derive expressions [2.3] and [2.4] for the special 
cases where q or c are infinite, i.e. corresponding to the analyses of Read et al. (1992) 
and West et al. (2002b). In both cases, we find that the results agree with these previous 
analyses. 
In West et al. (2002b) the implications of finite mating group size for fertility insurance 
were made amenable for mathematical treatment by assuming limitless male fecundity. 
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This represents a special case of our model, such that c - 	 and equations [2.3] and [2.4] 
reduce to: 
SNO = 	





1q -It, if /1 N >O [2.5B] 
and 
 ~ 2 1~ 
SMO = 	
(q fM (1- DrM NM  ZPM (1- ZMYMPM ~ JUN
q 
- zNPN(l -
_OUM.OUNO\M) 	) [2.6A] 
(E[vrMI J+E[vJMo I) 
where 
















Conversely, in the deterministic analysis of Read et al. (1992), the fertility insurance 
consequences of limited male fecundity were investigated under the assumption of large 
mating group size. This special case, q - °°, reduces equations [2.3] and [2.4] to give 
	
SNO = 2qmin{czN ,0 — zN )} 	 [2.7] 
and 
SMI = q min{c(zMf +ZN(l - f)),(1 - ZM )f+(1 - zN)(l - f)} 
ZMf 	+ 	(1 - ZM )f 	 [2.8] 
(
Z' f + Z'G  — f) ( 1— zM)f+( 1— zN)( 1— f) 
Although both SNO  and SMJ  are linear functions of q, and therefore have infinite solutions, 
the relative fitness of the Null allele may still be evaluated as w is the ratio of the two 
and hence is finite. The predictions converge with those of Read et al. (1992) for c~:1, 
but being more general, are able to predict the male biased ESS sex ratio when males 
fecundity is more limiting than that of females, so that c<1. 
We considered the possibility of stochastic male fecundity, specifically, how accurately 
do expressions [2.3] and [2.4] predict the ESS sex ratio when the value of c represents the 
expectation of a random variable? Assuming that males all produce the same species-
specific number (x) of gametes of which a proportion p will be viable for fertilization, 
[2.3] and [2.4] become 
SN0 = 
	~ (q ~ Z'P_ (l_ Z' )q -pN  (XLNpN (1— p)XMNSN  2min{g,q 	N} 





(q )fM (1 f)-tM 
(TM Z
M PM (1- ZM )TM M 
q - TM 
M) 	 (N 	I 
ZN (1- ZN 
)_TM tN 
tMO PM 0 N 0 M 0 8N0 M 	 [2. 1OA] 





if g + >0 	 [2.1 0 
= gM ~ gN 	
B] 
0 g+g=O 
= q - lAM - lAN 
if q - lAM - 12N > 	 [2. 10C] E[Mo] 
{_
Xf 
0 	 q-/A-u=O 
Results and Discussion 
We have discriminated between two types of fertility insurance, in response to (i) low 
male gamete fertility (low c), and (ii) the ability of gametes to interact (low q). Previous 
theoretical work has examined the effect of these two types of fertility insurance 
separately. Specifically, West et al. (2002b) assumed that when both of these factors are 
operating, the effect for sex ratio evolution can be determined by seeing which leads to a 
greater reduction in the predicted female bias (i.e. which of figures 2.1A and 2.1B 
predicts the least female biased sex ratio). In contrast, our model explicitly allows for 
both types of fertility insurance to act simultaneously, and hence allows for any 
interactions. In figures 2.2-2.4 we give example predictions when the two types of 
fertility insurance are allowed to act separately as previously assumed by West et al. 
(2002b) (part A of the figures) or simultaneously in our model (part B of the figures). Our 
results show that when both c and q are low, the ESS sex ratio may be higher than 
predicted when considering these two effects separately. 
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Figure 2.2. (A) shows the relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding rate, 
for given values of q when c = 2 assuming no interaction between the two types of 
fertility insurance and (B) shows the relationship betweenESS sex ratio and inbreeding 
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Figure 2.3. (A) shows the relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding rate, for 
given values of q when c = 4 assuming no interaction between the two types of fertility 
insurance and (B) shows the relationship between ESS sex ratio and inbreeding rate 
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Figure 2.4. (A) shows the relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding rate, for 
given values of q when c = 8 assuming no interaction between the two types of fertility 
insurance and (B) shows the relationship between ESS sex ratio and inbreeding rate 
arising from equations 2.1-2.4, for given values of q when c = 8. 
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Why does our model predict a less female biased sex ratio? It has been assumed that one 
male gametocyte will be able to provide enough gametes to fertilise all the female 
gametes in the mating group that arises from q gametocytes. This is not the case if (q- 
1 )>c. More generally, the male gametocytes will not be able to fertilise all the female 
gametes when (q-i)>c, where ,i is the number of male gametocytes in a mating group. 
This risk of not having enough males to fertilise the females in the group leads to less 
female biased sex ratios being favoured. Another way of conceptualising this is that a 
finite q increases the potential for low c to be a problem - when gametes can not interact 
as successfully (finite q), a mating group may contain only a single or small number of 
male gametocytes, and so the gamete fecundity (c) of these males is more likely to be a 
limiting factor. 
Our model shows that the interaction between the two types of fertility insurance can 
have a surprisingly large influence on the ESS sex ratio. In the examples that we give, the 
predicted sex ratio can be up to 0.1 higher (figure 2.2, when c=2, q=10 and j0.3). In this 
instance the sex ratio deviates from equality (0.5) by approximately half the amount 
inferred by West et at. (2002b). Although increasing c proportionally reduces the degree 
of female bias, the complex interplay between male fecundity and size of mating groups 
makes it difficult to relate the magnitude of this effect to q. In the limit, as q increases 
towards infinity, the effect dissipates as the predictions converge with those of Read et at. 
(1992). However, as q rises it increases the propensity for c to become limiting. The 
effect is therefore a dome-shaped function of q, although the exact relationship crucially 
depends upon the particular parameter values. 
We also extended our model to allow stochastic variability in the number of viable 
gametes per gametocyte (c) - see expressions [2.9] and [2.10]. This could occur through 
variation in the number of gametes produced per gametocyte, or through mortality. 
Adding in this stochasticity (for invariant E[c]) gives further reduction in the female bias 
predicted, although this effect is negligible in all but the smallest of mating groups. 
However, a novel prediction arises from this form of stochasticity, as it allows the 
investigation of the mean value of c< 1, so that male fecundity is lower than that of 
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females. In this case, a male biased sex ratio is favoured. For the case of q - 
equations [2.7] and [2.8] remain valid even for c<1, and male biased ESS sex ratios are 
easily demonstrated. Switching the roles of males and females in the classic LMC 
relation, the result of Read et al. (1992) can be extended so that, as before, for c > 1 z = 
max{(1-f)12,1/(c+1)}, yet now for c :5 1 z= min{(1+jI2,1/(c+l)}. This prediction 
contrasts with standard LMC models constructed for insects (e.g. Nagelkerke & Hardy, 
1998; West & Herre, 1998), where male biased sex ratios are never predicted, due to the 
assumption that one male can mate any number of females (analogous to assuming 
c—'-). Male biased sex ratios have been observed in some samples of lizard malaria 
(Paperna & Landau, 1991), although the necessarily small sample sizes mean that these 
observations should be treated with caution. 
To conclude, our analysis has revealed that fertility insurance can be a more potent 
evolutionary buffer to female biased sex ratios in malaria, and related parasites than 
previously suggested. Clearly, the outstanding problem is to obtain empirical estimates 
of c and q, and how their values are influenced by factors such as host immune responses. 
The existing literature has recently been reviewed (West et al., 2002b), and sadly very 
little is known. 
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3. A dimensionless invariant for relative size at sex 
change in animals: explanations and implications 
Abstract 
Recent comparative studies across sex changing animals have found that the relative size 
and age at sex change are strikingly invariant. In particular, 9 1-97% of the variation in 
size at sex change across species can be explained by the simple rule that individuals 
change sex when they reach 72% of their maximum body size. However, this degree of 
invariance is surprising, and has proved controversial. In particular, it is not clear why 
this result should hold given that there is considerable biological variation across species 
in factors that can influence the evolutionarily stable timing of sex change. Our overall 
aim here is to explain this result, and determine the implications for other life history 
variables. Specifically, we use a combination of approaches to: (a) formalise previous 
analytical theory in this area; (b) examine the robustness of the empirical invariance 
result; (c) carry out sensitivity analyses to determine what the empirical data imply about 
the mean value and variation in several key life history variables. Our results demonstrate 
the usefulness of the dimensionless approach for explaining empirical patterns, and 
making novel testable predictions. 
Introduction 
Sex change occurs in a variety of animals, including fish, echinoderms, crustaceans, 
molluscs and polychaete worms (Charnov 1982a; Policansky 1982; Ailsop & West 
2004a). Evolutionary theory suggests that sex change is favoured when: (i) the 
reproductive success of an individual varies with their age or size, and (ii) the 
Published as: Gardner, A., Ailsop, D.J., Charnov, E.L. & West, S.A. 2005. A 
dimensionless invariant for relative size at sex change in animals: explanation and 
implications. American Naturalist (in press). 
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relationship differs between the sexes. In this case, natural selection favours a strategy 
where individuals start as the sex whose fitness increases more slowly with age, and then 
change to the other sex at a later stage (Ghiselin 1969; Leigh et al. 1976; Charnov 1982a; 
Warner 1988a, b). Although there are considerable differences in details across species, 
this basic idea is well established and has been widely applied to numerous animals and 
plants. 
A recent development in the field of sex change has been the use of a dimensionless 
approach. Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000) pointed out that predictions for the 
evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) size or age at sex change could be 
expressed in terms of several dimensionless quantities. Specifically, their results depend 
upon kIM, aM and ô, which are the relative growth rates (k, the Bertalanify coefficient; 
Bertalanffy 1938), the adult instantaneous mortality rate (M), the age at first breeding (a), 
and the coefficient in the equation relating male fertility to size (6; where male fertility is 
proportional to L, and L is length (size)). Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000) showed that 
populations/species with the same values of these dimensionless quantities are predicted 
to have the same: (1) relative size at sex change, given by size at sex change / maximum 
size (L50I4 ax); (2) relative age at sex change, given by age at sex change / age at first 
breeding (t/a); (3) breeding sex ratio, defined as the proportion of breeders that are male. 
Several studies have suggested that aM and kIM can be invariant within and even across 
taxa (Charnov 1993; Gemmill et al. 1999). Consequently, an invariant relative size and 
age at sex change are predicted whenever 6 is also invariant. 
It could be expected that 6 would be roughly invariant within species, or across closely 
related species sharing a similar life history. Consistent with this, Charnov and 
Sküladóttir (2000; see also Sküladóttir & Petursson 1999) found an invariant relative 
size at sex change across populations of the shrimp Pandalus borealis in the waters off 
Iceland. However, the invariant relationship also holds across species. Alisop and West 
(2003b) found that the relative size and age at sex change were invariant across fish 
species. They then extended their study to include data from all sex changing animals, 
including data from 77 species of fish, echinoderm, crustacean and mollusc, and found 
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that the relative size at-sex change was invariant across all species (Ailsop & West 
2003a). Specifically, that 9 1-97% of the variation in size at sex change across species can 
be explained by the rule that species change sex when they reach 72% of their maximum 
size. This result holds despite huge variation in size and biology across species, from a 2 
mm long crustacean, to a 1.5 m long fish (figure 3.1). 
This extent of invariance in the relative size at sex change across species was relatively 
surprising, and has proved controversial (Millius 2004; Ailsop & West 2004c; Buston et 
al. 2004). The main reason for this is that there is considerable biological variation across 
species in factors that could influence the evolutionarily stable timing of sex change. In 
particular: (1) Sex change is from male to female (protandrous) in some species, female 
to male (protogynous) in others, and even in both directions in some (Nakashima et al. 
1995). Given that female fertility is likely to be proportional to body size cubed (L3 ; 
Charnov 1979, 1993), this means that for sex change to be favoured there must be 
variation in ô between protandrous (ô <3) and protogynous (ô > 3) species. (2) In some 
species there is a fraction of individuals who mature early as the second sex, termed early 
maturers, which is likely to correlate with or cause variation in ô (Charnov 1982a; 	- 
Charnov 1982b; Warner 1984; Ailsop & West 2004a, b). (3) There is a huge variation in 
mating system across species. For example, even within just the fish species, the range of 
mating systems includes harems, leks, monandry, and aggregation spawners (Warner 
1984; AlIsop & West 2003b). (4) The cues and mechanisms involved in sex change vary 
across species, dependent upon factors such social environment, size and parasitism 
(Shapiro 1980; Shapiro & Lubbock 1980; Shapiro 1981; Scharer & Vizoso 2003). (5) 
While aM is likely to be invariant across all sex changing species, with a value of 
approximately 2, it is not clear that kIM is similarly invariant (Charnov & Berrigan 1990; 
Charnov 1993; Gemmill et al. 1999). 
Our overall aim here is to determine how Alisop and West's (2003a,b) invariant results 
can hold in the face of so much biological variation across species, and the implications 
for other life history variables. Our paper is divided into three sections. In the first 
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Figure 3.1. Log-Log plot of L50 vs L for 77 species of sex changing animals with 
species as independent data points. Data split by taxa: LI = Echinodermata, 0 = 
Crustacea, • = Chordata, x = Mollusca. The regression has a slope fixed at 1 giving an 
intercept of -0.32 +1- 0.05 (95% CI), (r2 = 0.97, n = 77 species). The OLS slope is 1.05 
+1- 0.03 (95% CI) with an intercept of -0.55 +1- 0.07 (95% CI) (r2 = 0.98). The mean 
relative size at sex change (L50/LMax) is 0.72 (95% CI; 0.67-0.77), implying that 
individuals change sex when they reach 72% of their maximum size. Size (L50 & LMaX) is 
measured in mm prior to logarithmic transformation. 
Specifically, we: (a) provide a more formal analytical proof of Charnov and Sküladóttir's 
(2000) invariant predictions; (b) show that the sex change invariants can also be predicted 
by an alternative modeling approach, assuming that sex change occurs in response to 
social environment, as is known to occur in some fish (Shapiro 1981; Warner & Swearer 
1991; Ailsop & West 2004b), rather than in response to age or size, as assumed by 
Charnov and SkUladóttir's (2000) model. 
In the second section, we examine the statistical significance of Allsop and West's 
(2003a,b) empirical result showing that the relative size at sex change is invariant. Buston 
et al. (2004; Milius 2004) have criticised Allsop and West's analysis, and argued that an 
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alternative null model approach based upon randomization techniques does not support 
the invariant prediction. We: (c) assess the validity of Buston et al's analysis; (d) develop 
and test a more appropriate null model. This section quantifies and expands upon some 
issues we have raised in a previous short comment (Alisop & West 2004c). 
In the third section, we carry out a sensitivity analysis based on Charnov and 
Sküladóttir' s model to test how variation in the model's key life history parameters (aM, 
kIM and ô) influences the predicted relationship between size at sex change and 
maximum size, and hence the relative size at sex change invariant. Specifically, we: (e) 
use the existing information on aM, kIM and the relative size at sex change to estimate ô; 
(f) estimate how variation in aM, kIM and ö influences the extent and nature of the 
relative size at sex change invariant that would be expected; (g) estimate the amount of 
variation in aM and kIM that is consistent with the empirical data. 
When is an invariant relative size at sex change expected? 
Formalising Charnov & Skulladotir 's Invariant Predictions 
In this section we determine the conditions for invariance in relative age and size at sex 
change, as predicted by Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000). Assuming a stationary age 
structure, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price 1973) for 
timing of sex change maximizes the fitness function: 
w CX S1 
	 [3.1] 
where S 1 is the total reproductive success as the first sex and S2  is the total reproductive 
success as the second sex (Leigh et al. 1976, Charnov 1979, 1982). The reproductive 
success gained through the function of the first sex is given by integrating over all ages 
(x) from maturity (at age a) to sex change (at age t) the product of instantaneous 
reproductive rate (Q 1 (x)) and the probability (p(4) of surviving to age x: 
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S 1 = fp(x)Q 1 (x)dx 	 [3.2] 
Following Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000), we assume: (1) a constant instantaneous 
mortality rate (Al), such that the probability of survival takes the form p(x) = A exp(-Mx), 
where A is a constant; (2) that the instantaneous reproductive rate takes the form of the 
power law Q,(x) = B 1  L(x)o,  where L(x) is the size at age x•, B 1 is a constant, and ô is the 
fitness exponent relating reproductive rate for the first sex; and (3) that size is related to 
age according to the Bertalanffy function L(x) = LM aX  (1-exp(-k 1 x)), where LMax  is the 
asymptotic (maximum) size of the species and k is the Bertalanffy growth coefficient. 
This equation has been used successfully to model growth of indeterminate growers 
(Beverton 1963; Pauly 1980; Beverton 1992). Hence we can write 
Sl=ABlLMfeMx(1e —kx )à clx 
	 [3.3] 
and for the second sex, with fecundity given by the power law Q 2(x) = B2  L(x)ô2,  we have 
S =A'L ax 
52f —Mx 	—kx e 	(1—e ) dx 	 [3.4]. 2 	U2 M 
so that fitness may be written as a function of the age at sex change (t): 
[f. 
—Mx 	_kx)OIdr] [f 
—Mx —kx dx] 	 [3.5] wx 	e (1—e 	x 	e(1—e 
(Charnov & Skiiladóttir 2000). Since the exponents of the power laws relating 
reproductive rate to size may be different for the two sexes (e.g. ô # 62), fitness is a 
function of the direction, as well as the timing, of sex change. The sex with the larger 
power law exponent has the greatest relative improvement in reproductive rate as the 
individual grows, and so fitness is maximised by reproducing as this sex when large, and 
as the other sex when small. Sex change is therefore predicted to be in the direction of 
increasing power law exponent, i.e. 81 :5 82 (Leigh et al. 1976, Warner et al. 1975). 
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It is generally true that for indeterminate growers female fecundity scales approximately 
with the cube of size (ô fema le 3; references in Charnov 1979, 1993), so we may drop 
subscripts and, following the notation of Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000), set öfema lC  = 3 
and ômale = ô. From the above argument, we know that 8 1 = Min{3, ô} and 6 2 = Max{3,8}, 
i.e. sex change is predicted to be from male to female (protandry) when 6 <3, and from 
female to male (protogyny) when 6 > 3. Obviously when 6 = 3 sex change is not favoured 
(Leigh et al. 1976, Charnov 1982a). Hence, fitness can be expressed as 
[f:e_MX(I - e_) 6 th] x[f°° e_Mx(1 - e) 3 dx] ó <3 
w 0C . if 	 [3.6] 
[f:eMx(1 - e) 3dx] x [f.,°° 
eMx(1 
- e 	
)6] 6 > 3 
Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000) applied Buckingham's 7r theorem (Buckingham 1914, 
Stephens & Dunbar 1993), which suggests that the fitness function [3.6] could, in 
principle, be rewritten as a function of constants and the dimensionless life-history 
parameters -ila, aM, kIM and 6. Since -rand a have units of time, k and M have units of 
inverse time, and 6 is an exponent in a power function, then the values -na, aM, kIM and 
6 are all unitless. Being able to express fitness in these terms indicates that the fitness 
function [3.6] is invariant for circumstances where -n/a, aM, kIM and 6 are invariant, and 
hence fitness is predicted to be maximized (for example) at the same relative age at sex 
change (tla) in all contexts where the other values (al'vt, kIM and 6) are invariant. 
We will now derive an explicit fitness function in terms of the aforementioned 
dimensionless quantities, using the standard technique of switching variables. Where we 
see x in the fitness function, we can substitute in c y. The limits of the integrals also need 
to be rescaled, for instance the lower bound of the first integral is x = a time units, hence 
rescaling gives y = a/c time units. Finally, since x = c y, we can write dxldy = c, and 




)ody] x [f°e_M  (1— -kcy  dy] 	ô < 3 
w 0C. if 	 [3.7] 
[1::: eMCY(l - e )3 dyJ x [feM  (1— e)dy] 	>3 
The next step is to rescale so that a units on the x-scale (the time to maturity) is equal to 
1 unit on the y-scale, i.e. rescaled time is measured in units of 'maturation time' (y = x/a, 
and hence c = a). Substituting this into [3.7] yields 
[f,Tlae
M (1 e)dYJ x[feM(l _eY) 3 dy] 	ô< 3 tla 
w 0C. if 	 [3.8] [f,Tla 	 -ay e -May 	k (1—e 	)3dy]x 	 e e-MaY(l_ -kay 	1 
	
)dy] 	ó>3 
Finally, we can rearrange in terms of our dimensionless quantities: 
V na M(1e_M)M )Y)ody]X [f e1M)(1 - _M)(k/M) ) 3 dy] 	< 3 n/a  
woc 	 if 	 [3.9] 
[f:
/a 
e -am y ( I e M)(klM)Y)3dy]x [feaM(l - e aM)(k /M)y)O dy] 	ô> 3 
This is the fitness function that Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000) predicted but did not find 
an explicit expression for. We have confirmed that fitness can be written in terms of the 
dimensionless quantities tla, aM, kIM and ö, and have shown that it takes the form of 
expression [3.9]. We can check that these dimensionless quantities constitute a full set. 
Where there are v variables and u orthogonal units, the expression can be rewritten in 
terms of v-u dimensionless quantities (Buckingham 1914, Stephens & Dunbar 1993). 
Here, we have five variables (t, a, M, k & o ; v=5) and one unit (time; u=1) and hence a 
set of four dimensionless numbers. 
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Note that the marginal fitness dw/d(t/a) will have the same sign for all circumstances 
where -u/a, aM, kIM and 6 are invariant. This means that for all situations in which aM, 
kIM and 6 are invariant, the ESS relative age at sex change (.t*/a,  such that dw/d( -r/a) = 0 
and d2w/d(t/a) 2 <0 when evaluated at -u/a = -t */a) will be an invariant. Under these 
circumstances we also predict further invariants. The size at sex change (L 50) is given by 
the Bertalanffy equation L(-r*) = LMax  (1-exp(-k -t*)).  Since k -t = aM x kIM x .u*/a  is 
invariant, the size at sex change relative to asymptotic size (L50JLM ) is predicted to be 
invariant (Charnov & Sküladóttir 2000). The relative size at maturity (LMa/L = 1-exp(-
ak) is also expected to be an invariant, since ak =aM x kIM is an invariant. Finally, the 
ratio of the number of breeders of the first sex (N) and the number of breeders of the 
second sex (N2) is 
Y!= 	 e_Mt * 	e_ M) 




which, for invariant aM, kIM and 6 (and hence also invariant t*/a),  is predicted to be an 
invariant quantity. 
Sex Change Invariant Predicted by an Alternative Approach 
Charnov and Skülâdóttir' s (2000) model assumes that timing of sex change is determined 
by size or age. However, it has been shown in numerous fish species that the timing of 
sex change can be stimulated by the social environment (Robertson 1972; Shapiro 1981; 
Warner & Swearer 1991; Alisop & West 2004b). For example, in the cleaner fish 
Labroides dimidiatus, the largest females change sex to become male harem holders upon 
removal of the male from the social group (Robertson 1972). Here we consider the 
situation where social environment is assumed to be the primary determinant of when sex 
change occurs. Specifically, we model a protogynous species in which females change 
sex to males to maintain a constant sex ratio, following Shapiro and Lubbock (1980). 
This means that our model has Charnov and Sküladóttir's (2000) third invariant 
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prediction (that of a constant breeding sex ratio) as its underlying starting assumption. 
Despite this representing essentially the extreme opposite mechanism underlying sex 
change to that assumed by Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000), we are also able to predict the 
first two invariant predictions of Charnov and Sküladóttir (2000), those concerning the 
relative size and age at sex change. 
Consider a protogynous species in which the largest (oldest) males each have harems of F 
females. The largest female is selected to change sex when the ratio of breeding females 
to breeding males (N1 /N2) in the population is greater than F, and so the breeding sex 
ratio, defined as the ratio of mature females to males in the population will be invariant 
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[3.11] 
aM is known to be invariant within taxa (Charnov & Berrigan 1990, 1991; Gemmill et al. 
1999), and so for equation [3.11] to hold .r*M  must also be invariant. Sincek/M is also 
known to be invariant within taxa (Charnov 1993), the product .r*M x kIM = kt* is an 
invariant. Applying the Bertalanify growth equation, the relative size at sex change 
(LSfILMaX = 1 - exp(kt*)) is predicted to be invariant, giving the first of Charnov and 
Skdladóttir's (2000) invariance predictions. Dividing r*M  by aM yields an invariant 
relative age at sex change u*Ia,  which is the second of Charnov and Sküladóttir's (2000) 
invariance predictions. 
Is the Relative Size at Sex Change Invariant Across Species? 
Ailsop and West (2003a,b) tested for invariant relationships by using the standard 
methodology of whether a log-log plot gave a slope not significantly different from 1.0 
(Harvey & Pagel 1991; Charnov 1993; Brown et al. 2000). In particular, they tested for: 
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(a) an invariant relative size at sex change by examining the relationship between log 
mean size at sex change and log maximum size across all sex changing taxa (Allsop & 
West 2003a, b; figure 3.1); (b) an invariant relative age at sex change by examining the 
relationship between log mean age at sex change and log mean age at maturity for sex 
changing fish (Ailsop & West 2003b). In these analyses a significant positive relationship 
between maximum size (age at maturity) and size (age) at sex change is not surprising, 
and merely reflects that larger species change sex when bigger - the crucial point is 
determining the extent of variance in the relative size at sex change (Allsop & West 
2003a, b). 
Buston et al. (2004; Milius 2004) criticised this approach, and instead suggested the use 
of a null model based upon randomisation techniques. Specifically, they generated data 
for each species by randomly assigned a maximum body size, assumed the size at 
maturity to be 50% of maximum body size, and then randomly assigned a size at sex 
change between 50% and 100% of maximum body size (iaJ1Max = 0.5, L50/LMa,, U[0.5, 
1]). This analysis generated data that gave similar slopes to the real data when examining 
the slope between log size at sex change and log maximum size. Consequently, Buston et 
al. suggested that Alisop and West's invariant result was in fact non-significant. 
However, Buston et al.'s model can be rejected empirically, and alsobecause it is not a 
true null model. Empirically: (1) Buston et al.'s model cannot produce the observed sex 
change data, as 5 of the 77 species in the dataset (Allsop & West 2003a) change sex 
below their lower limit of 50% of the maximum body size (the crustaceans Acontiostoma 
marionis, Ichthyoxenusfushanenensis, Emerita analoga, and the gastropods Crepidula 
adunca and C. linulata). (2) The distribution of relative size at sex change in the actual 
data is significantly different from the uniform distribution Buston et al. assume (Allsop 
& West 2004c). (3) Buston et al. arbitrarily assigned the size at maturity a value which 
forces a good fit between the model and the data (Alisop & West 2004c). Since the size at 
maturity is set to 50% and size at sex change is uniformly distributed over the range 
between maturity and maximum size, the model predicts an average relative size at sex 
change of 75% which is very close to the observed 72%. However, previous work has 
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suggested that a more accurate average size at maturity is 65% (Charnov 1993), which 
would give a mean size of sex change of 83%, which is far from the observed data. (4) 
The assumption of a uniform distribution in relative size at sex change assumes no 
selection on size at sex change, which has been shown to not be the case in numerous 
studies over the last 35 years (Warner et al. 1975; Charnov et al. 1978; Charnov 1982a). 
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, Buston et aL's model is not null because it 
assumes an invariant relative size at maturity, which is intimately linked to an invariant 
relative size at sex change in the model of Charnov and Sktiladóttir (2000). An invariant 
relative size at maturity follows from two of the three dimensionless invariants required 
by the invariant sex change predictions, aM and kIM. If these are invariant then their 
product ctk is invariant, and so the relative size at maturity 	= 1 - exp(-ctk)) is 
also an invariant. We show in the third section of this paper that these are the crucial 
invariants for the Charnov- Sktiladóttir model (and that variation in ô is less important), 
so we would expect Biston et al.'s null model to produce an invariant relative size at sex 
change, and hence fit the empirical data. 
If an invariant relative size at maturity is not assumed, then more appropriate null models 
can be developed and the predictions of this differ significantly from the observed data. 
We examine a model in which maturation size is uniformly distributed from size zero to 
maximum size, and size at sex change uniformly distributed from size at maturity to 
maximum size (i.e. LMaJLM 	U[0,1], L50/LMD, - U[LMat/LM(,l]), and find that this more 
appropriate null model predicts significantly more variation in L50/L M than is observed in 
the dataset, and the r2 statistic for the observed data is significantly higher than predicted 
by the null model - see figure 3.2. 
Buston et al. (2004) have criticised this null model on the grounds that maturation at size 
zero is implausible. They suggest that altering the model so that maturation is bounded by 
40% and 80% of maximum size is more appropriate, and find that the associated variance 
in the relative size at sex change is not significantly different from that observed in the 
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Figure 3.2A. Testing the more appropriate null model: size at maturity (LMa) is a 
uniformly distributed random variable bounded by [0, L], and size at sex change is a 
uniformly distributed random variable bounded by [LMat, L], where ax is asymptotic 
size. The dots denote the distribution of variance in L50 / LM l,, for 10,000 replicates of a 
simulated dataset of 77 species of sex changers. The arrow indicates that the variance 
observed in the real dataset (0.017) is significantly lower (estimated P < 0.0001) than 
predicted by the null model. 
the basis for 40-80%; and why not any of infinite different possibilities? How much 
variation is required in the relative size at maturity before aM and kIM are not 
statistically invariant? What would be a suitable minimum size at maturity? These points 
are particularly important because a true null model should exclude any related factors, 
and this is not the case here, because theory predicts that the size at sex change should 
depend upon the size at maturity. Furthermore, invariance is statistical, and so the more 
appropriate question should be how much variance could there be in the different 
parameters to explain the data. We explore this approach in the next section. 
Before moving on to this next section, figure 3.2B also illustrates an important caveat 






• 	 (0.987) 
40 







•..•• 	 • 




s.t.is,st I 	 I 
0.80 	 0.85 	 0.90 0.95 	 1.00 
r2 
Figure 3.2B. Testing the more appropriate null model: size at maturity (LMa) is a 
uniformly distributed random variable bounded by [0, L], and size at sex change is a 
uniformly distributed random variable bounded by [LMaI, L], where Lm a., is asymptotic 
size. The dots denote the distribution of the r2 statistic for the best fit invariant relative 
size at sex change, for 10,000 replicates of a simulated dataset of 77 species of sex 
changers. The arrow indicates that the r2 observed in the real dataset (0.967) is 
significantly higher (estimated P = 0.0102) than predicted by the null model. 
variance explained when comparing against the null model of no relationship between the 
two variables. However, as mentioned above; we expect the mean size at maturity and 
mean size at sex change to be positively correlated, because both will be greater in larger 
species. Indeed our null model shows that this alone can produce an average 1-2 value of 
92.1% (figure 3.213). Assuming an invariant relative size at sex change explains 96.7% of 
the variation in the actual data (figure 3.1), suggesting that the invariant relationship 
explains 58.2% of the variation in the data not explained by our null relationship between 
size at maturity and sex change (0.582=(96.7-92.1)/(100-92.1)). This value is still very 
large compared to the average of 2.5-5.4% from evolutionary and ecological studies 













- Direction of sex change  
Taxa Both Both Male first Male Female Female 
directions directions Intercept first first first 
Intercept RSSC (+1- 95% RSSC Intercept RSSC 
(+1- 95% (+1- 95% CI) (+1- 95% (+1- 95% (+1- 95% 
CI) CI)  CI) CI)' CI) 
Arthropoda -0.42 0.66 -0.44 0.64 - - 
(Crustacea) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)  
Chordata -0.26 0.77 -0.29 0.75 -0.25 0.78 
(Fish) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) 
Mollusca -0.57 0.57 -0.57 0.57 - - 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10)  
Echinodermata -0.32 0.73 -0.32 0.73 - - 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
Annelida - - - - - - 
Table 3.1. Empirical values for the Relative Size at Sex Change (RSSC = L50/LMax) 
derived from Log-Log regression of the size at sex change (L50) against the maximum 
size (LMax) with the slope fixed at proportionality (ie. 1) The intercept for the regression 
is also given in the table. Data are split by Taxa and by direction of sex change. Empty 
cells represent instances where there are too few data points to perform the regression for 
these categories alone. Data obtained from Ailsop & West (2003a,b) 
Taxa 	kIM 	Source 	 aM 	Source 
Charnov 1993 
(from Beverton & Holt 
Chordata 	0.56 	1959, Beverton 1963) 
Charnov 1993 
Arthropoda 	0.39 	(from Charnov 1979) 
Echinodermata 	0.3 	Charnov 1993 (from 
Ebert 1975) 
Annelida 	No data 	 - 
Charnov & Berrigan 




2 	Charnov 1989 
No data 	Charnov 1993 
1.45 - 	Gemmillet a! 1999 
2.5 
Table 3.2. Summary of estimates for the key life history parameters kIM and aM for the 
major taxonomic groups containing sex-changing animals. Note there is no such data for 
the Mollusca. 
39 
Size at Maximum Size 
Species First Sex Maturity (L) (L MaX) in mm Reference 
in mm 
Acanthopagrus M 125 310 Tobin et al. 
berda 1997 
Bodianus rufus F 100 230 Warner & 
Robertson 1978 
Clepticus F 90 180 Warner & 
parrae Robertson 1978 
Cryptotomus F 20 70 Robertson & 
roseus Warner 1978 
Epinephelus F 438 1050 Marino et al. 
marginatus 2001 
Epinephelus F 509 895 Brule et al. 
mono 1999 
Epinephelus F 194 350 Mackie 2000 
rivulatus - 
Labroides F 15 90 Robertson & 
dimidatus Choat 1974 
Plectropomus F 340 600 Ferreira & Russ 
leopardus 1995 
Sarpa salpa M 185.5 375 Villamil et al. 
2002 
Lithognathus M 225 370 Lorenzo et al. 
mormyrus 2002 
Achoerodus F 245 620 Gillanders 1995 
viridis 
Mycteroperca F 826 1500 Crabtree & 
bonaci Bullock 1998 
Epinephelus F 275 500 Grandcourt 
chlorostigma 2002 
Let hrinus F 220 360 Grandcourt 
mahsena 2002 
Scarus ghobban F 150 370 Grandcourt 
2002 
Table 3.3 Empirical values for the size at maturity (LMa) and the maximum size (LM ) for 
17 species of sex changing fish. Also shown is the direction of sex change, with the first 
sex either male (M) or female (F) 
Sensitivity Analysis: Consequences of Variation in aM, kIM and ô 
Ailsop and West (2004a) observed that the relative size at sex change is statistically 
invariant (L5O/LMaX = 0.72) over sex changing animals ranging in size from 2mm to 1 .5m. 
This result is predicted by Charnov and Sktiladóttir' s (2000) model if aM, kIM and ö are 
also invariant. It has been shown that aM is likely to be invariant across sex changing 
species (Charnov 1993, Gemmill et al. 1999), and so Alisop and West's result suggests 
that kIM and ö are also invariant, or have relatively little influence on the ESS relative 
size at sex change. Determining the answer to this requires a sensitivity (elasticity) 
analysis of Charnov and Sküladóttir's (2000) model, and the examination of how 
variation in these different life history variables influences the evolutionarily stable size 
at sex change and the degree of invariance in the relative size at sex change. 
We will: (1) use published values for aM and klMto obtain an estimate of ô from the 
Charnov- Sküladóttir model, given the observed data for sex changing fish (Allsop and 
West 2003b); (2) estimate aM and kIM directly from the sex changing fish data; and (3) 
introduce variation into each of the dimensionless quantities aM, kIM and ô in turn, to see 
how much variation in each corresponds to the observed variation in LSOILM aX . We restrict 
our attention to fish only, since there is much more data on the relevant life history 
variables, than for other sex changers. 
Variation in ó 
Assuming aM = 2 (Charnov and Berrigan 1990, 1991; Charnov 1993) and kIM = 0.6 
(Charnov 1993), the optimal relative age (and hence size) at sex change can be 
determined numerically from equation [3.9]. We do this for a range of ô in figure 3.3. 
These results predict that: (1) the relative size at sex change (L 5o/L M ) is positively 
correlated with the male fitness exponent (ô), and (2) this positive correlation is very 
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Figure 3.3 The ESS relative size at sex change (L50/L) predicted by the Charnov-
Skuladottir model assuming the published estimates of aM = 2 and kIM = 0.6 and a range 
of ô. When male fecundity increases with size (&O) the model and published estimates 
predict a relative size at sex change which is higher than that observed for sex changing 
fish (L jIL Max=0.77). 
weak. The weakness of the correlation between the male fitness exponent (6) and the 
timing of sex change suggests that this life history parameter need not be particularly 
invariant in order for the relative size at sex change to show great invariance. 
The positive correlation between and the relative timing of sex change can be explained 
as follows. For protandrous species (6 < 3), an increase in 6 means that the relative 
success of the small males is reduced, and so the individual is selected to increase their 
reproduction as a male in order to make up this quota of their total reproduction, hence 
longer time is spent as the first sex. Conversely, for protogynous species (6 > 3), an 
increase in 6 means that the relative fitness of the large male is increased, so that less 
time need be spent reproducing as a male, and hence the individual spends longer 
EN 
reproducing as the first sex. In both instances, an increase in ô is associated with delayed 
sex change. 
With regards to this prediction that the relative size at sex change should increase weakly' 
with ô, the data do reveal a slight tendency for protogynous fish (ô > 3, E[L50/4] = 
0.79) to have a higher relative size at sex change than protandrous fish (ô <3, E[L50/L1ax] 
= 0.74). However, as might be expected given the weak predicted effect, this difference is 
not significant (P = 0.21). 
The results given in figure 3.3 also predict that the relative size at sex change is too high 
for it to explain the empirical observation L50/LM ax = 0.77 (data described by AlIsop & 
West 2003b; note that this is the best-fit invariant for the data, rather than the expectation 
of the data - the latter was employed in the cited paper, leading to a slightly different 
value, 0.79) for sex changing fish. This suggests that either the model is incorrect or that 
the values of aM and kIM published for fish in general do not correspond to those in our 
dataset. 
We investigate this possibility using the data sets compilea by Allsop & West (2003a,b) 
and find support for the suggestion that sex changing fish may have aM and/or kIM 
values different from those published for other species. The product ak determines the 
relative size at maturity ('rv1aJ1Max = 1 - exp(-ak)), so we may use size at maturity data 
(compiled in table 3.3) to estimate ak. Assuming an invariant relative size at maturity 
(i.e. a slope of unity on a plot of Log[L t] against Log [L], figure 3.4) we find that the 
least squares regression gives LM at/LMax = 0.46, and hence ak = 0.62. This value is 
approximately half of that published for other fish (aM x kIM = ak = 1.2), indicating that 
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Figure 3.4 Log-Log plot of 1laILMax  for 17 species of sex changing fish. Fixing the 
regression slope at 1, it has an intercept of -0.78 +/-(0.16 95%CI) (r 2 =0.90, n=17). The 
relative size at maturity invariant (1a/ax)  is 0.46, showing that sex changing fish 
mature at approximately 46% of their maximum body size, on average. Size (LMat and 
Lviax) is measured in mm prior to logarithmic transformation. 
Day and Taylor (1997) have warned against the use of von Bertalanffy's equation in 
relation to size at maturity. Since immature organisms do not reproduce and hence can 
allocate more of their energy budget into growth, the growth rate coefficient (k) may be 
somewhat higher pre-maturation than post-maturation. However, the associated bias in 
the estimation of the post-maturation growth rate from age at maturity data is' in the 
wrong direction to explain the discrepancy between the observed uk and that published 
for fish in general. In the next section we show that this reduced estimate of ak is more 
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Figure 3.5 The ESS relative size at sex change (L5t /LMax) predicted by the Charnov-
Skuladottir model assuming ô = 3 and aM x kIM = ak = 0.616, as estimated from the size 
at maturity data. By plotting for a range of aM to see where the model predicts the 
observed size at sex change invariant (L50/L MaX = 0.77), we can obtain an estimate of aM, 
and hence kIM. 
Estimating aM and kIM 
We now estimate values for aM and kIM for sex changing fish. As outlined before, we 
can numerically solve expression [3.9] to give a relative age (and hence size) at sex 
change given values for ô, aM and kIM. By exploring a range of these three parameters, 
we can determine which triplets give the observed L50/LM aX = 0.77. As we have seen, the 
male fitness exponent (ô) impacts very little on the relative size at sex change - we can 
essentially ignore this parameter, and restrict our attention to the two parameters aM and 
kIM. Recalling that some species in the dataset will have ô <3 while others have ô > 3 
(since there is a mixture of protandry and protogyny), we will proceed by assuming ö = 3 





invariant product of aM and kIM is approximately 0.62, and so the parameter set is 
effectively reduced to a single dimension: e.g. given aM, kIM will be given by 0.62/aM. 
In figure 3.5 we determine the impact on the relative size at sex change of variation in 
aM, by allowing it to take a range of values while satisfying the estimate of ak = 0.62. 
We find that the model predicts the observed invariant relative size at sex change 
(L 5O/LMaX = 0.77) when aM = 0.96. From this we also estimate kIM to be akiaM = 0.64. 
Assessing variation in 6, aM and kiM 	 - 
We have obtained estimates for the average values of ô, aM and kIM in sex changing 
fish, but it is unclear what degree of invariance in each of these is required to give the 
result that 97.5% of the variation in relative size at sex change is explained by the simple 
rule that they change sex at 77% of their maximum size. We may make a qualitative 
assessment of how variation in these life-history parameters translates into variation in 
the relative size at sex change by varying the value of each parameter in turn while 
holding the other two constant (at their estimated values; ô = 3, (XM = 0.96, kIM = 0.64). 
Our results are given in figure 3.6). As before we find that the value of the male fitness 
exponent (ô) has little impact on the relative size at sex change (figure 3.6A), while 
variation in aM (figure 3.613) and especially kIM (figure 3.6C) have a more dramatic 
effect. 
We find that the value of aM correlates positively with the relative size at sex change 
(figure 3.613), when the values of kIM and ô are held constant. One way to visualize this 
is to hold k, M and ô constant, and to vary the age at maturity, a. It makes sense for 
species that mature later to change sex later, in order to make up their quota of 
reproduction as the first sex. This means that species with a higher aM will, all else being 
equal, change sex at a greater size. 
We have also found that increasing kIM increases the relative size at sex change (figure 
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Figure 6. Having estimated the three dimensionless quantities (aM0.96, kJM3.64, ö3), 
we explore how variation in each of these translates into variation in the ESS relative size 
of sex change (L5OILM)X ). A (above) aM and kIM held fixed, ö varied. B (below) kIM and ö 
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Figure 6 (cont.). Having estimated the three dimensionless quantities (aM0.96, 
k/M0.64, ö3), we explore how variation in each of these translates into variation in the 
ESS relative size of sex change (L50/L). C (above) aM and ô held fixed, kIM varied. D 
(below) the relationship between kIM and the ESS relative age at sex change (t*Ia)  is 
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allow k to vary. As the Bertalanffy growth coefficient is increased, the size at all ages is 
increased, and so if we assume no impact on the ESS relative age at sex change (t*/a)  we 
would expect an increased relative size at sex change (L5 /L, ( ). In• fact, the ESS relative 
age at sex change is a decreasing function of k (figure 3.613). This is because the increase 
in size due to increased k is more pronounced at earlier ages, hence the reproduction of 
the first sex is improved the most by this increase, so that less time need be spent 
reproducing as that sex. This means that in increasing k the ESS age at sex change is 
reduced, but the size at that age is increased. The net effect is a positive correlation 
between kIM and the relative size at sex change. 
A more quantitative approach is to use the model to simulate sex change data for a range 
of variation in the underlying dimensionless quantities, to see how much variation 
corresponds to that observed in the real dataset. We simulate 52 species of sex changing 
fish, each assigned values for aM, kIM and 6. Within each dataset, two of these 
dimensionless quantities are held fixed at their estimates from the previous section, while 
the other takes a pseudorandom value independently drawn for each species from the 
normal distribution with mean given by the estimated value, and standard deviation o. 
Because it is biologically implausible for aM and kIM to take negative values, we draw 
these from a normal distribution truncated at the origin which, for the parameters we will 
explore, involves removing a trivial proportion of the probability distribution. Introducing 
the actual data on asymptotic size (L50), the Charnov-Sküladóttir model of sex change is 
then used to generate the ESS relative size (L50IL) at sex change for each of the 
simulated fish species. For each dataset, an r2 statistic can be generated to describe how 
well the simulated data conforms to the prediction of a slope of unity in a plot of Log[L 50 ] 
against Log[I ax]. This procedure is used to explore a range of variation (standard 
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Figure 3.7. Sensitivity analysis. Two of the three dimensionless parameters (aM0.96, 
k1Mz0.64 & 83) are held fixed at their estimates, while the third is drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean given by above estimate and standard deviation o, to generate size 
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Figure 3.7 (cont) . . . for best-fit invariant (i.e. slope 1 in plot of Log[L Ma ] against 
Log [LMaJ) is determined for each o and each of the dimensionless parameters in turn 
(each estimate based upon 200 replicates). Solid line is mean r2 , and dashed line 
delineates region in which 95% of replicates fell. A (previous page, top) variation in ô. B 
(previous page, bottom) variation in aM. C (this page, above) variation in kIM. 
From figure 3.7 we can read off the estimate of the standard deviation for each of the life-
history parameters by seeing what value of o corresponds to the observed r2 = 0.973. 
Figure 3.7A confirms that the invariant relative size at sex change is expected to hold 
even with extensive variance in the male fitness exponent (ô) when the other life-history 
parameters do not vary. Figure 3.713 reveals that variation in aM corresponding to a 
standard deviation of around 0.45 (47% of the estimated mean, E[ctM]=0.96) can account 
for the observed variation in the relative size at sex change - which is rather a lot of 
variation. Figure 3.7C reveals that a standard deviation in kIM of around 0.18 (28% of the 
estimated mean, E[k/M]=0.64) can account for the observed variation in L50ILM . It 
should be noted that these results are upper limits on the amount of variation, as they 





We have formally derived the life history invariants predicted by Charnov and 
Sküladóttir (2000), who modeled sex change conditional on an individual's size (and 
hence age). These are invariant: (1) relative age at sex change ( -na); (2) relative size at 
sex change (L50/L MaX); and (3) breeding sex ratio (N 1 1N2). Previously, Buckingham's 
(1914) t theorem had been invoked in order to show that, in principle, the appropriate 
fitness function could be expressed in terms of dimensionless quantities. We have noted 
that the units with which we measure time do not influence the dimensionless ESS 
relative timing of sex change, and thus employed a simple 'switching variables' 
technique to explicitly state the appropriate dimensionless fitness function. Additionally, 
we have shown that these invariants can be predicted with a different approach, when sex 
change is assumed to occur in response to social cues. 
Ailsop & West (2003a,b) showed invariance in the relative size at sex change across all 
sex changing organisms for which there is data, and the relative age at sex change in fish. 
These results where critisised by Buston et al. (2004), who argued that randomization 
tests should be used instead of standard methodology (Harvey and Pagel 1991; Charnov 
1993; Brown et al. 2000). We have argued that: (a) their randomization test was not truly 
null; (b) the data do not fit their model, and (c) more appropriate tests support the 
invariant conclusions of Allsop and West (2003a,b). Furthermore, we suggest that a more 
powerful approach and approach is avoid randomization tests based upon possibly 
arbitrary assumptions, and instead examine how much variance in the different 
parameters would explain the observed data. 
We then carried out a numerical sensitivity analysis in order to determine the relative 
consequences of variation in the dimensionless parameters that can influence the relative 
size at sex change. These results showed that the invariant prediction depends primarily 
upon invariance in aM and kIM, and that variation in ô has little consequence for the ESS 
size at sex change. This result illustrates clearly one of the major problems with Buston et 
52 
al.'s 'null' model - it was not null because it effectively assumed an invariant aM and 
kIM, and only allowed ô to vary, so we would expect it to predict the observed data. 
How much variation in aM and kIM are consistent with the observed data on relative size 
at sex change? We estimated the variation in each of these parameters that is consistent 
with the observed variation in the timing of sex change in the fish data set. We found 
that: aM 0.96 (with standard deviation +1- 0.45) and kIM = 0.64 (+1- 0.18). This 
suggests that there can be a relatively large amount of variation in aM, but less in kIM. 
These results are upper limits on the amount of variation, as they assume only one 
parameter is variable, whereas in reality, there will be some variation in each. More 
generally, Allsop and West (2003a) argued that their invariant result suggested a 
fundamental similarity across all animals in the underlying forces that select for sex 
change. Our results suggest that the fundamental similarities are: (a) the basic 
assumptions of the Charnov & Skulladotir (2000) model, and (b) the value of kIM, and to 
a lesser extent the other dimensionless variables. 
Our results also lead to the prediction that the value of aM differs in sex changing fish 
from other fish species. Specifically, the published values for fish in general give aM Z 2 
and kIM = 0.6. In contrast, we predict that aM = 1 for sex changing species. We have 
verified this prediction by estimating the product of these two putative invariants from 
the relative size at maturity data in sex changing fish, confirming that aM x kIM = ak 
0.6, around half of the value expected for fish in general. More investigation, both 
theoretical and empirical, is needed to explain this difference between sex changers and 
other fish. 
We conclude with two general points. First, the debate over the usefulness of applying 
the life history invariant approach to sex change cuts to the heart of the philosophy of 
statistics in the biological sciences. As we are dealing with biology it is clear that there 
are really no true invariants in the physical sense. However, there are a number of 
statistically invariant relationships that hold across taxa for reasons that are not 
immediately apparent, and these require explanation. Second, we have demonstrated that 
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invariant theory can be used to estimate the values of, and variation in, important 
biological parameters. This is especially useful when it allows us to get at parameters 
which would be difficult or laborious to measure directly. Another much studied example 
of this from evolutionary theory more generally, is using sex ratios and sex ratio theory to 
estimate inbreeding rates in protozoan parasites (Read et al. 1992; West et al. 2001; Nee 
et al. 2002). 
54 
4. Spite and the scale of competitiont 
Abstract 
In recent years there has been a large body of theoretical work examining how local 
competition can reduce and even remove selection for altruism between relatives. 
However, it is less well appreciated that local competition favours selection for spite, the 
relatively neglected ugly sister of altruism. Here, we use extensions of social evolution 
theory that were formulated to deal with the consequences for altruism of competition 
between social partners, to illustrate several points on the evolution of spite. Specifically, 
we show that: (1) the conditions for the evolution of spite are less restrictive than 
previously assumed; (2) previous models which have demonstrated selection for spite 
often implicitly assumed local competition; (3) the scale of competition must be allowed 
for when distinguishing different forms of spite (Hamiltonian versus Wilsonian); (4) local 
competition can enhance the spread of spiteful greenbeards; (5) the theory makes testable 
predictions for how the extent of spite should vary dependent upon population structure 
and average relatedness. 
Altruism and spite 
Social behaviours can be categorized according to the direct fitness consequences they 
entail for the actor and recipient (figure 1.1; Hamilton 1964, 1970, 1971). A behaviour 
increasing the direct fitness of the actor is mutualistic if the recipient also benefits, and 
selfish if the recipient suffers a loss. It is easy to see how such behaviours can be 
favoured by natural selection. Behaviours which reduce the direct fitness of the actor - 
altruism if the recipient enjoys a benefit, spite if the recipient suffers a loss - are less easy 
to explain. Hamilton (1963, 1964) introduced the concept of inclusive fitness and showed 
Published as: Gardner A. & West S.A. 2004. Spite and the scale of competition. Journal 
of Evolutionary Biology 17, 1195-1203 (see Appendix). 
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that while certain behaviours are detrimental to the individual, they may result in a net 
increase in the actor's genes in the population. Altruism can be favoured by natural 
selection despite a direct fitness cost (C) to the actor if the benefit (B) accruing to the 
recipient is sufficiently large and if the genetic relatedness (R) of the recipient to the actor 
is sufficiently positive. Specifically, when Hamilton's (1963, 1964) rule, R B> C, is 
satisfied. A spiteful behaviour, entailing a negative benefit (B <0) to the recipient and a 
positive cost (C >0) to the actor, is similarly favoured if R B > C, which would require a 
negative relatedness (R <0) between actor and recipient. 
Relatedness and spite 
Hamilton (1963) argued that under the assumption of weak selection the appropriate 
measure of relatedness (R) coincides with Wright's (1922) coefficient of relationship. 
Wright's coefficient is a'function of the correlation between individuals and the 
correlation within individuals with respect to their genes at a given locus. Since these 
correlations have popularly been interpreted in terms of Malécot's (1948) probability of 
identity by descent, and negative probabilities are not permitted, negative relatedness 
seems to be mathematically impossible (Hamilton 1970, 1996; although see Wright 1969, 
p178). Yet Hamilton (1963) understood that relatedness (R) was in principle a regression 
coefficient - a fact which is now generally appreciated (reviewed by Seger 1981, Michod 
1982, Grafen 1985a, Queller 1985, 1992, Frank 1998) - and this was first made explicit 
in his elegant reformulation of Hamilton's rule (Hamilton 1970) using Price's (1970) 
equation. Specifically, relatedness is the regression (slope) of the recipient's genetical 
breeding value on that of the actor (Hamilton 1970, 1972; Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 
1997a, 1998). Since regressions can be negative as well as positive (and zero), 
relatedness can feasibly take any real value (from negative infinity to positive infinity). 
Discussions with Price led Hamilton to acknowledge that negative relatedness can 
plausibly arise between social partners, and hence spite can be favoured by natural 
selection (Hamilton 1970, 1996, Frank 1995). 
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How does negative relatedness arise? Grafen's (1985a) geometric view of relatedness 
reveals that relatedness between an actor and a potential recipient depends crucially upon 
the genetical composition of the whole population. This can be illustrated by assuming 
that a recipient carries the actor's genes with average frequency p, and the population 
frequency of the actor's genes is j5. If the recipient carries the actor's genes at a 
frequency greater than the population frequency of those genes (p> ) then an increase its 
reproductive success translates into increased frequency of the actor's genes in the 
population, and hence a positive inclusive fitness benefit to the actor (R B >0; figure 
4.2A). Conversely, if the recipient carries the actor's genes at a frequency lower than the 
population frequency of those genes (p< ) then an increase in its reproductive success 
translates into decreased frequency of the actor's genes in the population, and hence a 
negative inclusive fitness benefit for the actor (R B <0; figure 4.213). The point here is 
that the difference between these two situations can arise purely due to variation in the 
frequency of the actor's genes in the population (variable ), even with a fixed 
proportion of genes shared between the actor and recipient (fixed p): relatedness is 
relative, with the population as a whole providing the reference. 
This also illustrates how negative relatedness can arise. Since both situations described 
above involve a positive benefit (B >0) to the recipient, the coefficient of relatedness 
which transforms recipient success into inclusive fitness of the actor must be positive in 
the former instance (R > 0; figure 4,2A) and negative in the latter (R <0; figure 4.213). 
The other possibility is that relatedness is zero when the recipient carries the same 
frequency of the actor's gene as does the population as a whole (p = ), so that 
relatedness to the average population member (and hence to the population itself) is zero 
(figure 4.2C). 
But, how large a negative relatedness is likely to arise? Consider an individual who lives 
in a population of size N, and who is then related to a fraction 1/N of the population (i.e. 
itself) by an amount 1 and is related to the other fraction (N - 1)/N by an amount R. The 
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Figure 4.2. The geometric view of relatedness. The actor's genes (shaded) are present in 
the recipient at frequency p and in the population as a whole at frequency T . Enhancing 
the direct fitness of the recipient (B >0) pushes the population gene frequency towards p, 
and so if p> 1 (as in 4.2A) the frequency of the actor's genes increase, giving a positive 
inclusive fitness benefit (R B > 0) which implies positive relatedness (R > 0) between 
actor and recipient. If p < 5 (4.213) then the population frequency of the actor's genes 
decreases, giving a negative inclusive fitness benefit (R B <0) and hence negative 
relatedness (R <0). When p = T (4.2C) thç population frequency does not change, 
giving no inclusive fitness benefit (R B = 0) and hence zero relatedness (R = 0). 
satisfy (1/N) + ((N— 1)/N)R = 0. Rearrangement gives R = - 1/(N— 1), i.e. the average 
relatedness between the actor and its social partners is negative (Hamilton 1975, Grafen 
1985a, Pepper 2000). If the focal individual can identify, and refrain from being spiteful 
to, a number of positively related genealogically-close social partners (kin 
discrimination), then the relatedness to recipients becomes even more negative (Hamilton 
1975). For very small populations (small N; figure 4.3), negative relatedness can be 
nontrivial, and hence individuals might be expected to pay reasonable costs in order to 
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Figure 4.3. The average relatedness (R) between population members as a function of 
population size (N), when there is no kin discriminalion. Since relatedness by any 
member to the population as a whole is zero, and this includes positive relatedness to 
itself, relatedness to the other individuals is necessarily negative, specifically R=-1I(N-1). 
This is minimised at R = -1 when N = 2, but quickly tends to zero as N increases towards 
more plausible values. 
possible, but this tiny-population condition caused Hamilton (1971) to regard spite as 
merely the "final infection that kills failing twigs of the evolutionary tree", and not a 
general phenomenon contributing to adaptive evolution (Hamilton 1996). 
Scale of competition 
However, the situation may not be so bleak for spite. There has recently been much 
interest in how local competition between relatives can reduce and even remove selection 
for altruism between relatives (reviewed by Queller 1992, West et al. 2002a). This work 
was spuned by the possibility that with limited dispersal in a viscous population, 
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individuals would tend to associate with kin, so that kin selection theory might suggest 
positive relatedness between social partners, and hence conditions favourable for the 
evolution of altruism (Hamilton 1964, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1996). However, this relies on 
the implicit assumption of density-dependent regulation being global (hard selection; 
Wallace 1968), with no increased competition, due to increased productivity, within more 
altruistic groups (Boyd 1992, Wade 1985). In contrast, if density-dependent regulation 
occurs at the level of the social group (soft selection, Wallace 1968; see also Haldane 
1924), then the increased success of the recipient must be paid for by the group. Without 
kin discrimination, the relatedness of the actor to the other members of the group will 
have been equally raised by population viscosity. Hence, population viscosity will not 
necessarily favour indiscriminate altruism (Hamilton 1971, 1975, Taylor 1992a,b). 
This effect of local competition between relatives can be incorporated into Hamilton's 
rule in a number of ways (Grafen 1984, Queller 1994, Frank 1998, West et al., 2002a). 
Queller (1994) reformulated the coefficient of relatedness in order to take this into 
account, giving a new measure which he described as "not just a statement about the 
genetic similarity of two individuals, it is also a statement about who their competitors 
are". Here, relatedness between actor and recipient is a regression as before, however it is 
now defined relative to a reference population of competitors, a proportion which are 
locals, and the remainder being average members of the global population. Obviously if 
all competition is global, the reference population is the global population, allowing for 
positive relatedness between social partners. At the other extreme, if all competition is at 
the level of the social group, relatedness to the average member of the social group will 
be zero. Frank (1998) chose not to redefine relatedness, but instead introduced a separate 
scale of competition parameter to be incorporated into the benefit component of 
Hamilton's rule in order to predict when social behaviours will be favoured by selection. 
This parameter (a) is simply the proportion of competitors which are local as opposed to 
global. Soft selection (local competition) had been relatively neglected in social evolution 
theory prior to these developments, and this contrasts with population genetics, where it 
has received much attention (Roughgarden 1979). 
Although the importance of the scale of competition in the application of kin selection to 
altruism issues is now acknowledged (see West et al. 2002a for a recent review, and 
Griffin et al. 2004 for an empirical example), its implications for spite are 
underappreciated. Increasingly local competition, as well as disfavouring altruism, can 
enhance selection for spite. Hamilton was correct when he stated that spite should be 
restricted to tiny populations, however the 'population' of interest is that of the 
competitive arena. If competition is global, so that there is hard selection at the level of 
the social arena, then relatedness is measured with respect to the population as a whole. 
But as competition becomes increasingly local, the reference population shrinks towards 
the size of the social arena, which may contain only a few individuals (small N) and/or a 
significant proportion of identifiable positively related kin, such that the negative 
relatedness towards the other potential recipients is non-trivial, enhancing the selective 
value of spite. 
Another way of seeing this is by considering a crucial difference between altruism and 
spite. Within a social group, individuals with greater altruism than the group average 
have reproductive success lower than the group average, but if more altruistic groups are 
more productive, altruists may have higher absolute success than nonaltruists when 
averaging over the whole population. When competition is global, fitness is proportional 
to absolute success, so that altruism can be a winning strategy. Increasingly local 
competition means that fitness is increasingly dominated by success relative to the social 
group average, and so altruism is less favoured. Conversely, spiteful behaviour incurs a 
direct cost and reduces the success of social partners, so that more spiteful individuals 
can have higher success relative to the group average, but suffer a reduction in absolute 
success. When competition is global and fitness is proportional to absolute success, spite 
cannot be favoured, but as competition becomes increasingly local fitness is increasingly 
determined by success relative to social partners, so that spite can be a winning strategy. 
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Illustrative overview 
So far we have employed the standard approach of taking Hamilton's rule to be a given 
(for example, see Orlove 1975) and using this as an entry point into the analysis of social 
evolution. However, it is often more appropriate and rigorous to derive the rule using a 
direct fitness approach, particularly when the aim is to resolve problematic conceptual 
issues. We use the direct (neighbour-modulated) fitness maximization techniques of 
Taylor & Frank (1996) and Frank (1998) to derive Hamilton's rule, in order to (1) 
distinguish two different forms of spite, and (2) address the suggestion of Boyd (1982) 
that spite is often actually selfishness because it indirectly increments fitness through 
reducing the intensity of competition. The key to this is to distinguish possible direct 
benefits of spite that might accrue to positively related third parties, and indirect effects 
due to relaxed competition. 
Let social groups comprise n equally abundant 'families', with kin recognition allowing 
discrimination of the proportion 1/n = k of the social group which are 'kin' from the 
remaining 1-k which are 'non-kin'. Spite directed at non-kin carries a cost (some function 
c), inflicts a negative benefit upon the victim (b), and also potentially directly benefits (d) 
individuals within one's family, so that personal success might be written as 
Siocai = 1 +b[(1 - k)z] - c[x] + dk(1 - k)y], 
	 [4.1] 
where x is the focal individual's spite strategy, y is the average strategy of its kin 
(including itself), and z is the average strategy played by the non-kin members of its 
social group. The local average and the average for the whole population are given by 
Siocai = 1 + k(b[(l - k)zI - c[y] +d[k(l - k)yI)+ (1— kXb[(l - 2k)z+ ky] - c[zI + d[k(1— k)zI) 
[4.2] 
Sgloba! = 1 + b[(1 - k)1] - c[i] + d[k( 1— k)1], 
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where is the average spite strategy played in the whole population. Following Frank's 
(1998) approach to including competition in models of social evolution, fitness can be 




a Siocai + (1 - a)Sg,01,0, 
where the scale of competition parameter (a) is defined as the proportion of competition 
which is occurs locally, i.e. at the level of the social group. Selection favours more spite 
whenever marginal fitness is positive (dw/dx > 0). As outlined by Taylor and Frank 
(1996, and Frank 1998), marginal fitness is given by the chain rule: 
dw aw ow Ow 
dx Ox "Oy 	oz  
where a denotes a partial derivative, and ry = dyldx and r = dzldx are the slopes of social 
partner phenotype on own phenotype (for kin and non-kin respectively). Assuming only 
minor variants (x z y = z ), and denoting b' = db[o]/do, c' = dc[o]/do and d' = dd[o]Ido, 
we find that marginal fitness is positive (dw/dx >0) when 
(r - a(kr +(l - k)r))(l - k)b' +(, - a(kr +(l - k)1))k(l - k)d'> (i - a(kr + (I— k)r))c'.  [4.5] 
Note that the relatedness to the average competitor relative to the whole population is 
F= a(k1 +(l—k)r), and the marginal costs and benefits of spite are B = (1-k) b', c= c', 









The r terms denote relatedness of individuals with respect to their spite phenotypes, 
relative to the population average, Z. If R is used to denote relatedness sensu Queller 
(1994), i.e. measured relative to the average competitor, then [4.6] is simply 
R1B+R2D>C. 	 [4.7] 
This is the three-party extension to Hamilton's rule for spiteful interactions given by 
Foster et al. (2000), although here it is the consequence of an analysis rather than the 
starting point. R 1 is the relatedness to the victims of spite, and R 2 is the relatedness to the 
third party which receives any direct benefits. A major source of confusion over 
Hamilton's rule involves the meaning of the terms B and C (and in the above expression, 
D), and so it is worth pointing out that these are not fixed parameters - they are marginal 
values. 	 - 
This form of the rule can be used to discriminate Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of 
spite (Hamilton 1970, 1971, Wilson 1975, Foster et al. 2000, 2001). Feeling that negative 
relatedness was implausible, Wilson (1975) proposed that spite directed against non-
negatively related individuals could be favoured if it also delivered a benefit to a 
sufficiently positively related third party. In terms of the above notation, such Wilsonian 
spite occurs when D > 0 and R2 >0, and does not require a negatively related victim (R 1 < 
0). Hamiltonian spite occurs when the victim is negatively related (R 1 < 0, and hence R 1 B 
>0; Hamilton 1970, 1971), and hence a direct benefit to positive relations (D > 0) is not 
always required in order for the spite to be favoured. From expression [4.6] we can see 
that: (1) negative relatedness depends on the ability to discriminate individuals who are 
less related than the average competitor (so that r <); and (2) the magnitude of this 
negative relatedness increases as competition becomes more localized (increasing a, and 
hence increasing P). Clearly, there is potential for spiteful behaviours to involve both 
negative relatedness to victims and positive benefits to positive relations, and hence a 
mixture of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian spite (Foster et al. 2000, 2001). 
Related to this distinction, we can address the suggestion of Boyd (1982) that spite is 
actually less likely to occur under local competition, since the resulting relaxed 
competition gives an indirect benefit to spiteful individuals, so that many cases of spite 
would in fact be selfishness. The expression [4.7] reveals that the relaxation of 
competition due to spite is absorbed into the negative relatedness term, when relatedness 
is measured relative to the average competitor. Boyd's indirect benefit to the spiteful 
individual does not make the action selfish, in the same way that this indirect benefit 
accrued to other positive relatives does not mean that the spiteful behaviour is Wilsonian. 
It is important to note that the above is not a general model for spite, but is rather an 
example included for the purpose of illustration. For instance, we have assumed 
additivity of fitness components, and equally abundant families. For this reason, it is 
always more rigorous to do a direct fitness analysis for particular models of interest in 
order to obtain the appropriate Hamilton's rule, rather than using the rule as a starting 
point. 
Biological applications 
Applying the theory to biological examples, we show: (1) that previous models which 
have successfully demonstrated selection for spite have tended to implicitly assume local 
competion; (2) behaviours previously interpreted as indirect altruism or Wilsonian spite 
might turn out to involve negative relatedness and hence Hamiltonian spite; (3) spiteful 
greenbeards are more likely to reach their threshold frequency, above which they are 
favoured by selection, when competition is localized; (4) there are several general 
predictions which will help us identify situations where spite is likely to be found, and (5) 
these predictions are amenable to empirical testing. 
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Spiteful models assume local competition 
Theoretical models that show that spiteful behaviour can be favoured often assume that 
some or all of competition is local. However, this has rarely been acknowledged as an 
important factor contributing to the success of spite. For example: 
1. Reinhold (2003) used an inclusive fitness analysis to investigate fatal fighting in fig 
wasps. This model shows selection for spite when competition is completely local. Some 
fig wasps have a lifecycle, such that wingless males hatch, mate and die within the 
confines of the fruit, and the mated females disperse to be the foundresses of new figs 
(Hamilton 1979, Cook et al. 1997). This leads to an asymmetric scale of competition, 
such that males compete locally (for mates) and females compete globally (for figs in 
which to lay eggs), the consequences of which for sex allocation theory have been much 
studied (Herre et al. 2001): In some species, this local competition for mates is 
accompanied by lethal combat between heavily armoured males, which have mandibles 
capable of decapitating each other (Hamilton 1979, Murray 1987, West et al. 2001b). 
Reinhold (2003) predicted that if males could discriminate between relatives and non-
relatives (kin recognition) then they would be selected to fight with males who are non-
relatives. This cannot be explained simply as selfishness because the there is generally a 
net direct fitness cost of fighting (the difference in the direct fitness component of - 
Reinhold's equations 2.1 & 2.2 for the terms T 1 & T2). However, it can be explained as 
Hamiltonian spite, because the local competition means there is a negative relatedness 
towards opponents. Following Reinhold's notation, n males compete locally for matings, 
including a focal actor who is related to a proportion y of the other males (his brothers) 
by r and to the remaining (n - 1) (1 - y) males (nonkin) by zero. Rescaling such that the 
focal individual is related to competitors on average by zero, we find that the relatedness 
to his brothers is [n (1 —y) r— (1— ry)]I[(n - 1) (1 - ry)] and to the unrelated males is - 
[1 + (n - 1) r y]/[(n - 1)(1 - r y)],  i.e. a negative quantity. The importance of spite in this 
system depends upon the possibility of kin discrimination between male fig wasps, which 
has yet to be tested for. 
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Gardner et al. (2004) presented a model of chemical (bacteriocin) warfare between 
microbes. Bacteriocins are the most abundant of a range of antimicrobial compounds 
produced by bacteria, and are found in all major bacterial lineages (Riley & Wertz 2002). 
They are a diverse family of proteins with a range of antimicrobial killing activity 
including enzyme inhibition, nuclease activity and pore formation in cell membranes 
(Reeves 1972, Riley & Wertz 2002). They are distinct from other antimicrobials in that 
their lethal activity is often limited to the same species of the producer, suggesting a 
major role in competition with conspecifics (Riley et al. 2003). Since bacteriocin 
synthesis is energetically expensive and release can entail death of the producer cell (for 
instance, colicin production by Escherichia coli) production of bacteriocins is costly (C> 
0). Bacteriocins kill susceptible bacteria, and hence these recipients suffer a negative 
benefit (B < 0). Hence bacteriocin production can be regarded as a spiteful trait. Since kin 
of the producer cell are immune to its bacteriocins, there is effective kin discrimination, 
and the potential for recipients to be negatively related to the producer. Specifically, this 
relatedness is R = - (a k)/(1 - a k) where k is the proportion of the social group which are 
clonal kin of the producer, and a is the proportion of competition which occurs locally. 
This reveals the importance of local competition in the evolution of spiteful behaviour. 
Specifically, (a) spiteful bacteriocin production is only selected for when there is some 
local competition (a>O; since R = 0 when a = 0), and (b) as the degree of local 
competition (a) increases the evolutionary stable strategy (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) 
is to increasingly allocate resources to spiteful bacteriocin production (Gardner et al. 
2004). 
Cytoplasmic Incompatibility (CI), the phenomenon whereby maternally-transmitted 
Wolbachia (and other) bacteria occurring in male hosts sterilize uninfected female hosts 
upon mating (O'Neil et al 1997), has been interpreted as a form of spite (Hurst 1991, 
Foster et al. 2001). Infected females are compatible with infected males, and so there is 
effective discrimination of carriers and non-carriers of the parasite. The question of 
whether it can be favoured by selection has received much attention (Prout 1994, Turelli 
1994, Frank 1997b). Frank (1997b) demonstrated that selection can favour Cl in 
structured host populations. In his model, the sterilization of uninfected females relaxes 
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competition for the infected progeny produced by the group. In particular, Frank 
highlighted the importance of kin associations, so that related bacteria are carried by 
several hosts within the group. Less emphasis was given to the assumption of density 
dependent regulation at the group level, so that all competition is local (a = 1). Similar 
reasoning can be applied to the evolution of such selfish elements as maternal-effect 
lethal distorter genes (Beeman et al. 1992, Hurst 1993, Hurst et al. 1996, Foster et al. 
2001), in which the killing of non-carriers relaxes competition among the carriers of the 
killer allele. 
Hamiltonian and Wilsonian spite 
Inequality [4.7] can be used to discriminate between Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of 
spite, and assess their relative importance when both occur (i.e. when spite is directed at 
negatively related individuals but also accrues a net inclusive fitness benefit by directly 
enhancing the success of positive relations). In particular, using measures of relatedness 
that take into account the effects of competition, we can reinterpret many putative 
examples of Wilsonian spite as Hamiltonian spite or a mixture of the two. For instance, 
Foster et al. (2000, 2001) present two spiteful behaviours presented by the eusocial 
insects which they describe as Wilsonian: worker policing and sex allocation 
manipulation. 
Often in eusocial hymenopteran societies, worker individuals do not have the opportunity 
to mate, but nevertheless have functioning ovaries, and can therefore produce unfertilized 
eggs which may develop as haploid males (Wilson 1971, Bourke 1988). Worker policing, 
the phenomenon whereby workers eat the eggs of other workers in their colony (Ratnieks 
1988), is well documented (Ratnieks & Visscher 1989, Foster & Ratnieks 2000, 2001, 
Foster et al. 2002, Barron et al. 2001). Foster et al. (2000, 2001) argue that this costly 
policing behaviour enhances the inclusive fitness of the actor as it frees up resources for 
the queen's Sons (their brothers), to which they are more related than the sons of other 
workers (their nephews), and hence the spite is of the Wilsonian form. However, given 
that competition between the progeny for resources is within the colony, it is appropriate 
ME 
to measure relatedness with respect to this local competitive arena when assessing the 
inclusive fitness consequences for this particular behaviour. This means that the victim of 
the policing (a nephew) is less related than average (all brothers and nephews) and hence 
negatively related to the actor (i.e. R 1 <0). Consequently, if relatedness is measured at the 
scale of competition, worker policing can be interpreted as involving Hamiltonian spite. 
The haplodiploid genetics of the hymenoptera means that in eusocial species the workers 
can be more related to their diploid sisters than their haploid brothers. This means that, 
while the queen prefers equal sex allocation among reproductives, the workers would 
rather there was a female bias (Trivers & Hare 1976). In some species the workers create 
this bias by killing of male progeny (Sundström et al. 1996, Passera & Aron 1996, 
Chapuisat & Keller 1999, Hammond et al. 2003). Foster et al. (2000, 2001) suggest this 
killing of male progeny is Wilsonian spite that benefits the colony's female progeny. 
However, the local competition for resources within the colony, plus the fact that males 
are devalued relative to females in terms of relatedness, means that the recipient of the 
spite is negatively related to the actor (R 1 <0). Agaifl', this behaviour may be reinterpreted 
involving Hamiltonian spite. 
Application of the theory should also allow reinterpretation of behaviours which have not 
been considered spiteful (Hamiltonian or otherwise) in the past. Precocious larval 
development in polyembryonic parasitoid wasps (Godfray 1992, Grbic et al. 1992, Hardy 
et al. 1993, Ode & Strand 1995) seems to constitute a previously overlooked example of 
spite. Typically, two eggs, one male and one female, are laid on or in the body of the host 
insect, which then divide asexually to produce a brood of genetically identical brothers 
and genetically identical sisters. Local competition for resources limits the number of 
adult wasps emerging from the host, suggesting that there is scope for negative 
relatedness between the sexes within the brood. Upon inspection, some of the larvae that 
have not emerged as adults are found to have developed precociously, giving up their 
own future reproduction in order to murder opposite-sex siblings developing in the same 
host. Asymmetric dispersal (which generates a sex difference in the scale of competition), 
and asymmetric relatedness (brothers are more related to sisters than vice versa) seem to 
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be responsible for evolutionary resolution of this conflict in favour of the sisters, such 
that most precocious larvae are female. 
Local competition can enhance the success of spiteful greenbeards 
Greenbeards are phenotypic markers for genetic composition that allow individuals to 
identify positive relations more effectively than through discrimination of genealogical 
kin from nonkin (Hamilton 1964, 1971, Dawkins 1976). A greenbeard gene causes three 
things: (1) a phenotypic trait, (2) recognition of this trait in others, and (3) preferential 
treatment of those recognized - see Queller et al. (2003) for an example of a single gene 
which satisfies these three conditions. From the perspective of the greenbearded actor, 
social partners displaying the phenotype carry his gene and hence are positively related to 
him, and those who do not display the phenotype do not carry his gene, and are therefore 
negatively related to him, with respect to that locus. Greenbeards can therefore increase 
in frequency either by directing altruism towards the positive relations or else by 
directing spite towards the negative relations. However, nontrivial negative relatedness is 
only possible when the greenbeard allele is at a substantial frequency in the population, 
as Hamilton (1971) understood, making it difficult to imagine how a spiteful greenbeard 
could initially be selected. This problem is not felt by altruistic greenbeards, who have 
maximal relatedness between bearers of the gene even when the greenbeard is at low 
frequency in the population. The understanding that it is the arena of competition that 
provides the appropriate reference, rather than,the population as a whole, means that the 
spread of spiteful greenbeards can be more easily understood, and the attainment of the 
threshold frequency does not have to rely upon assumptions such as extreme stochastic 
fluctuations. 
Foster et al. (2000, 2001) discuss the example of the red fire ant (Solenopsis invicta; see 
also Keller & Ross 1998 and Hurst & McVean 1998), in which workers with genotype 
Bb, under the influence of their greenbeard (b) gene, murder negatively related BB 
queens and hence increase the frequency of the b gene in the population (homozygotes 
for the greenbeard gene are absent as the bb genotype is lethal). It is easy to see how the 
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frequency of the b allele in among the small number of locally competing queens could, 
through sampling error, exceed the threshold even as the global frequency approaches 
zero. 
Where should we expect spite? 
The extensions to spite theory, and biological examples of spite discussed above, suggest 
several clues as to where we should expect such behaviours to occur. Hamilton (1970, 
1971) noted that spite should be more prevalent when actors are in a position to inflict 
damage to others at little cost to themselves, and so it is unsurprising that many examples 
turn up among non-reproductives in the eusocial insects, those individuals who have little 
or nothing to lose with respect to their direct fitness (Foster et al. 2000, 2001). A major 
factor which has received much attention is the ability to identify one's negative 
relations. This can be achieved through recognition of genealogically close individuals 
(kin discrimination) or by means of phenotypic markers for genetic composition 
(greenbeards). We also emphasize that spite should be looked for in situations where 
competition is mostly local (among social partners), and in viscous populations. 
Empirical testing of spite theory 
Previous debate over spite has focused primarily on whether it occurs. However, some of 
the more recent examples, such as worker policing in the eusocial insects and bacteriocin 
production by bacteria, provide possibilities for testing whether the relative occurrence of 
spite varies as predicted by social evolution theory. Indeed, much of the data from the 
eusocial insects fits well with the predictions of theory (Chapuisat & Keller 1999, 
Ratnieks et al. 2001). Here we emphasise two general points. 
We have used Hamilton's rule to give an overall conceptual view. However, if 
particular cases are to be analysed then it is often much easier and more rigorous to start 
with an equation for direct (neighbour-modulated) fitness based upon the relevant 
biology, and then derive predictions (Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998). Hamilton's rule 
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in some form usually appears as a consequence of such an approach, and provides a 
conceptual tool that can be used for interpretation of the results (Frank 1998, Pen & 
Weissing 2000, West & Buckling 2003). 
2. A relatively general prediction that arises from different models is that the incidence of 
spite should be dome-shaped in relation to the degree of kinship within a social group. If 
the proportion of kin (including oneself) in the group is vanishingly small then no spite is 
favoured, since the non-kin recipients of spite will have the same relatedness, on average, 
as the average group member (i.e. zero). Similarily, when the actor associates solely with 
clonal kin, spite is also not favoured, as there are no negatively related individuals 
present. However, when the degree of kinship takes intermediate value, some degree of 
spite might be favoured because some individuals will necessarily be less related to the 
actor than others, such that some will have below-average (and hence negative) 
relatedness. This result was found in both the bacteriocin (Gardner et al. 2004) and fig 
wasp mortal combat (Reinhold 2003) examples discussed above. The relatedness 
differential also selects for spiteful sex allocation manipulation (brothers are less related 
than sisters) and worker policing (nephews are less related than sons and brothers) 
discussed above. As well as suggesting where we might find spite occurring in nature, 
these models give predictions that could be tested with observational or experimental 
studies. 
Sum mary 
Spite has been neglected by social evolution theory because a common, implict 
assumption (global competition) in evolutionary models tends to diminish its selective 
advantage. We have demonstrated that many previously analysed behaviours can be 
readily interpreted as involving spite. Furthermore, theory has been developed to such a 
degree that we can make testable predictions about where spite is likely to be found and 
how it relates to the degree of competition and kinship between social partners. 
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5. Bacteriocins, spite and viruIence 
Abstract 
There has been much interest in using social evolution theory to predict the damage to a 
host from parasite infection, termed parasite virulence. Most of this work has focused on 
how high kinship between the parasites infecting a host can select for more prudent 
exploitation of the host, leading to negative relationship between virulence and parasite 
kinship. However, it has also been shown that if parasites can cooperate to overcome the 
host, then high parasite kinship within hosts can select for greater cooperation and higher 
growth rates, hence leading to a positive relationship between virulence and parasite 
kinship. We examine the impact of a spiteful behaviour, chemical (bacteriocin) warfare 
between microbes, on the evolution of virulence, and find a new relationship: virulence is 
maximised when the frequency of kin among parasites' social partners is low or high, and 
is minimized at intermediate values. This emphasises how biological details can 
fundamentally alter the qualitative nature of theoretical predictions made by models of 
parasite virulence. 
Introduction 
There is a large theoretical literature applying evolutionary theory to explain the damage 
that parasites cause to their hosts (van Baalen & Sabelis 1995, Frank 1996a, Gandon et 
al. 2001, Day & Burns 2003). Parasite virulence presents a fundamental trade-off in that 
parasites must deplete host resources in order to grow and transmit to new hosts, yet 
over-exploitation can result in host mortality and associated reduction in resource 
availability (Frank 1996a). This is the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968), in which 
Published as: Gardner A., West S.A. & Buckling, A. 2004. Bacteriocins, spite and 
virulence. Proceedings of The Royal Society of London Series B - Biological Sciences 
271, 1529-1535 (see Appendix). 
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individuals are expected to display altruistic self-restraint only if they are sufficiently 
related to their group (Frank 1998). A classic result of virulence theory is that intensity of 
exploitation and hence damage to hosts correlates negatively with kinship among the 
parasites infecting a host (Hamilton 1972, Bremerman & Pickering 1983, Frank 1992, 
1996a). This occurs because a lower relatedness leads to greater competition for 
resources, which selects for faster growth rates to obtain a greater proportion of the host 
resources, and these higher parasite growth rates lead to higher virulence. 
However, empirical support for this prediction is severely lacking (Herre 1993, 1995, 
Chao et al. 2000, Read & Taylor 2001, Read etal. 2002, Griffin & West 2002, Davies et 
al. 2002). One possible explanation for this is that variation in the underlying biological 
details can lead to alternative relationships (Frank 1996, Schjorring & Koella 2003, 
Ganusov & Antia 2003). In particular, it has been shown that if parasites can cooperate to 
overcome their hosts defenses then the opposite prediction is favoured - a positive 
relationship between parasite kinship and virulence (Chao et al. 2000, Brown et al. 2002, 
West & Buckling 2003). For example, West & Buckling (2003) modeled the evolution of 
the production of costly public goods (siderophores) which promote bacterial growth 
during iron-starvation in an infection. Not surprisingly, the altruistic production of 
siderophores is expected to be maximised when kinship is highest, yet this leads to 
enhanced growth and therefore host damage precisely where previous theory predicted 
self-restraint and hence low virulence. 
Just as altruistic behaviour can promote parasite growth and hence enhance virulence, it 
is reasonable to assume that spiteful interactions (interference competition) between 
parasites could reduce the vigour of an infection and associated host damage. Here we 
consider such a spiteful trait: bacteriocin production. Bacteriocins are the most abundant 
of a range of antimicrobial compounds facultatively produced by bacteria, and are found 
in all major bacterial lineages (Riley & Wertz 2002). They are a diverse family of 
proteins with a range of antimicrobial killing activity, many of which can be produced by 
a single bacterium, including enzyme inhibition, nuclease activity and pore formation in 
cell membranes (Reeves 1972, Riley & Wertz 2002). Unlike other antimicrobials, the 
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lethal activity of bacteriocins is often (but not always) limited to members of the same 
species as the producer, suggesting a major role in competition with conspecifics (Riley 
et at. 2003). Intraspecific competiton may also help to explain the observed variation in 
the types of bacteriocins produced by different strains of the same species. For example, 
at least twenty-fivebacteriocins (colicins) have been identified in populations of 
Escherichia coli, with different populations producing unique combinations (Riley & 
Gordon 1999). Clone mates are protected from the toxic effects of bacteriocins as a result 
of genetic linkage between the bacteriocin gene and an immunity gene that encodes a 
factor that deactivates the bacteriocin (Riley & Wertz 2002). 
In addition to the benefits of bacteriocin production (killing competitors), there are also 
costs (Chao & Levin 1981, Kerr et al. 2002, Reeves 1972). This cost may simply be 
diversion of resources from other cellular functions, but in many gram-negative bacteria, 
such as Escherichia coli, cell death is required for the release of bacteriocins (Reeves 
1972, Riley & Wertz 2002). Such costs (and costs associated with bacteriocin immunity) 
are critical for coexistence, between bacteriocin-producing, sensitive and resistant strains 
(Czárán et at. 2002, Kerr et at. 2002, Czárán & Hoekstra 2003). Here, we investigate how 
key parameters affect the relative costs and benefits of bacteriocin production, hence the 
level favoured by natural selection, and the impact this has on disease virulence. 
Specifically, we consider how bacteriocin production evolves in response to the average 
kinship (r) of competing bacteria and the scale of competition relative to the effective 
range of bacteriocins (a) 
Models, methods & analyses 
Equal abundance model 
We first consider a social arena, defined as the spatial range of bacteriocin warfare, 
comprising n equally abundant lineages drawn independently from the asexually 
reproducing bacterial population. A proportion r = 1/n of the bacteria within a focal 
bacterium's social arena are its clonemates, or 'kin'. The remaining 1 - r are derived 
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from the other n - 1 lineages, and are 'non-kin'. Using a game theoretic approach, we 
consider the fitness of a vanishingly rare mutant which allocates an amount of resources y 
into bacteriocin production within a population with average allocation z, in order to 
determine the 'unbeatable' (Hamilton 1967) or 'evolutionarily stable' (Maynard Smith & 
Price 1973) allocation strategy y. An amount of bacteriocin r y within the social arena is 
attributable to the focal lineage, and r z to each of the other lineages. The focal lineage is 
then subjected to an amount (1 - r) z of unrelated bacteriocin to which it is susceptible, 
and for each of the n - 1 other lineages, (1 - r) z + r (y - z). A lineage picked at random 
from the population as a whole experiences, on average, (1 - r) z unrelated bacteriocin. 
Lineages are immune to their own bacteriocins, and although resistance 
(nonsusceptibility of a lineage to a bacteriocin which it does not itself produce) is not 
explicitly discussed in this model, the resulting reduction in susceptibility can be 
regarded as included in the general growth functions. The growth rate of a lineage, G, is 
given by the sum of two components, H and I. H reflects the cost of bacteriocin 
production, being a positive, decreasing function of the focal lineage's allocation to 
bacteriocin production, y. Our predictions rely on no specific form for H; when a specific 
relationship is required for illustrative purposes (figures 5.1 - 5.3), we use H = 1 - y. I 
models the reduction in growth due to mortality by unrelated bacteriocins, being a 
positive, decreasing, linear or decelerating function of the amount (1') of unrelated 
bacteriocin it is subjected to. Our predictions rely on no specific form for I; when a 
specific relationship is required for illustrative purposes (figures 5.1 - 5.3), we use I = 1 - 
y 12 We combine the terms H and I additively to give overall growth (G = H + I) for 
mathematical convenience, as it permits greater tractability than using a multiplicative 
scheme (G H x I), and does not qualitatively change the results (see General model). 
Using the construction of Frank (1998), fitness is determined by the growth of the lineage 




a G1001  +(l— a)Ggjobal  
[5.1] 
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The parameter a defines the (spatial) scale at which competition for resources takes place. 
This model therefore allows competition for resources and bacteriocin interaction to take 
place at different scales. Specifically, a proportion a of competition for resources occurs 
locally, within the scale of bacteriocin interaction, and the (1 - a) remainder occurs 
globally. At the extremes: if a=1 then competition for resources and bacteriocin 
interaction occur at the same scale (soft selection at the level of the social group); if a=O 
then competition is at the global level (hard selection at the level of the social group). 
G cai , Giocai  and Ggba/  are respectively the growth rate of the focal lineage, the local 
average, and the global average. These are, in full 
Gjocai = H[y]+I[(1— r)z] 
Giocai = r(H[y] + I[(1 - r)z]) + (1— r)(H[z] +I[(1 - r)z +r(y - z)]) 	 [5.2] 
Gglobal = H[z]+I[(1— r)z] 
Equations [5.1] and [5.2] illustrate the fundamental trade-off in our model. Bacteriocin 
production by the focal lineage is: (a) costly, because it lowers the growth rate of the 
focal lineage (G 001), and (b) beneficial, because it lowers the growth rate of competitors 
Giocai . 
Substituting [5.2] into [5.1] we obtain fitness function w[y,z].  If we assume only minor 
variants (y = z; Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998) the marginal fitness is found to be 
dw 	- (1—ar)H'[z] — ar(l — r)I'[(l — r)z] 
dy - 	H[z]+I[(1— r)z] 
[5.3] 
where H' <0 is the derivative of H with respect to its parameter (e.g. y in the instance of 
the mutant), and may be interpreted as the marginal cost (- C) of producing bacteriocins. 
1' <0 is the derivative ofT with respect to its parameter (e.g. (1 - r) z for the amount of 
bacteriocin attacking the focal mutant), and is the negative 'benefit' accrued by the 
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recipient of spiteful behaviour - summing over all the recipients, the benefit is B = (1 - r) 
- r) z]. Increased bacteriocin production (y) is favoured whenever dwldy > 0 is 
satisfied, yielding Hamilton's (1963, 1964, 1970) rule: 
- ar B>C 	 [5.4] 
1—ar 
As is often the case (Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998), inspection of the direct marginal 
fitness (equation [5.3]) yields a form of Hamilton's (1963) rule RB>C (equation [5.4]). In 
this: (a) relatedness is negative and given by R = —(a r)I(1 - a r); (b) the negative 
'benefit', summed over all recipients, is B = (1 - r)I'[(l - r)z] where I'[Y] is the derivative 
dI[Y]/dY and represents the marginal reduction in growth of a lineage which is poisoned 
by an amount Y of foreign bacteriocins. To understand how a negative relatedness can 
arise, we will use the result of Queller (1994) that average relatedness to one's 
competitors is zero. Recalling that the scale of competition (a) is defined as the 
proportion of competition which is local, consider an arena of competition in which are 
proportion of competitors a are social partners, and of these a proportion r belong to the 
focal lineage. Then a proportion a r of competitors are clonally related to the spiteful 
actor by 1, and a proportion 1 - a r are related by some unknown coefficient R. Applying 
Queller's insight, we know that a r x 1 + (1 - a r) x R = 0, and rearranging we obtain R = 
- (a r)/(1 - a r). Hence: 
RESULT 1. The evolution of bacteriocin production involves a negative relatedness 
between actor and recipient, and hence fits Hamilton's (1970) original definition of a 
spiteful behaviour. Relatedness between non-kin social partners is given by R = - (a r)I(1 
- a r), where a is the proportion of competition which is local, and r is the proportion of 
social partners which are clonal kin. This equation gives negative values for relatedness, 
except when either of (or both) a and r are zero, in which case relatedness equals zero. 
We now ask how the ESS bacteriocin production (y*)  changes over a range of bacterial 
kinship (r) and intensity of local resource competition (a). Substituting r = 0 into [5.3] 
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obtains H'[z]I(I-J[z]-,-I[z]), which is negative and hence y'' = 0. When r = 1, [5.3] becomes 
(1 —a)H'[z]/(H[z] -i-IIiz]) which is negative and soy = 0. When a =0, [A1.1] gives H', 
which is negative so that y = 0. Therefore the presence of more than one lineage (0 < r < 
1) and some degree of local competition (a >0) are essential for nonzero allocation to 
bacteriocin production. If we denote the RHS of [5.3] by J, then the ESS z = y* satisfies J 
= 0. .Using implicit differentiation, we can write 
dy* 	c5JI5r 	 [5.5] 
dr 	ôJIôy 
where ô denotes partial derivatives. For y to be convergence stable (i.e. in a population 
close to y', mutants closer to y'' are favoured by selection), the denominator on the RHS 
of [5.5] must be negative (Taylor 1996). Hence, assuming convergence stability, dy */dr  
has the same sign as ôJIör (Pen 2000). Evaluating the partial derivative at r = 0 (and 
hence y = 0) yields —a(H[0]+I[0])(H'[0]+l'[0])I(H[0]+I[0])2 which is positive when a> 
0. If we assume no discontinuities in y*,  then this indicates that when there is some 
degree of local competition, and intermediate relatedness, ESS bacteriocin production 
(y *) will be nonzero. 
RESULT 2. Enhanced bacteriocin production is favoured at intermediate kinship (r). 
The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is y = 0 at r = 0 & 1, and is maximized 
somewhere in the range 0 <r < 1 (figure 5.1 for numerical examples). When the focal 
lineage occupies only a tiny proportion (r - 0) of the social arena, its impact on 
competitor growth is negligible, and hence the benefit through competitor-killing does 
not outweigh the cost of bacteriocin production. When the focal lineage dominates the 
social group (r - 1), the density of cells susceptible to its bacteriocin is too low for the 
benefit of competitor killing to outweigh the production costs. 
Using the same procedure, we may find the partial derivative of J with respect to the 
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Figure 5.1. The ESS production of bacteriocins (y*)  as a function of the average kinship 
(r) between bacteria. Values are obtained numerically using the equal abundance model, 
assuming that bacterial growth is the sum of growth components H = l-y and I = l-Y 
(where the focal bacterium produces an amount y of its own bacteriocins, and receives an 
amount Y from its social partners) and the proportion of competition which is local is a = 
0.5 (filled squares) and 0.6 (filled circles). Intermediate kinship (r) and increasingly local 
competition (high a) favour enhanced bacteriocin production. 
ÔJ 	rH'[y*]+r(l_r)F[(l_r)y*] 	 [5.6] 
ôa H[y*]+I[y*] 
which is positive for all 0 <r < 1, and hence bacteriocin production is an increasing 
function of the scale of competition (a) when kinship is intermediate. 
RESULT 3. Enhanced bacteriocin production is favoured as the scale of competition a is 
increased (and hence competition for resources becomes more local) for all 0 <r < 1. 
This occurs because fitness can be enhanced in two ways: (1) maximizing own growth 
(Giocai) and (2) reducing the growth of local competitors (Giocaj). When competition is 
entirely global (a = 0), there is no benefit in reducing growth of local competitors, so that 
the ESS is the strategy that maximizes focal growth (by reducing bacteriocin production). 
Ell 
As competition becomes more local (a > 0), production of bacteriocin is increasingly 
favoured in order to reduce the growth of the local competitors. 
Variable abundance model 
We now relax the assumption of equally abundant lineages, looking at the situation where 
only two lineages occupy the social arena, so that the focal lineage comprises a 
proportion r or 1 - r of the bacterial cells with equal probability. The appropriate fitness 
function is then 
Giocaji 	 Gf a!2 
w=r 	 ~ (l—r) 	 [5.7] 
a G10011  + (1 - a) GgIoba! 	a G iocajZ  + (1 - a) GgIobal 
where 
Giocaii = H[y] + I[(l - r)z] 
Gjoca12  H[y]+I[rz] 
Giocaii = r(H[y] +I[(1 - r)z]) +(l - r)(H[z] +I[ry]) 
	
[5.8] 
G,0012 = (1 - r) (HEy] + I[rz]) + r(H [z] + I[(1 - r)y]) 
GgIobal =H[z]+rI[(1— r)z]+(1— r)I[rz] 
Following the same procedure as before, we obtain 
F:" 
ar(1—r) r(H[z] + I[(1 - r)z])J'[rz] 
dw 	- 	+ (1 - r)(H[z] + F[rz])I'[(l - r)z] 
dy , 	(H[z] + rI[(l - r)z] + (1 - r)I[rz] 
(1 - a(l - 2r(l - r)))H[z] 1 	 [5.9] 
+ r(l - ar)J[(l - r)z] 	H'[z] 
+ (1 - r)(l - a(l - r))J[rz] 
+ (H[z] + rI[(l - r)z] + (1— r)I[rz] 
Setting r - 0 yields (l-a)H'[z]I(H[z]-il[O]) which is always negative and hence y = 0 at 
r = 0. Setting r - 1 yields (1-a)H'[z]1(H[z]+I[O]) which is always negative, so y = 0 at r 
= 1. And when a - 0, we obtain H'[z]I(H[z]+rI[(l-r)z]+(l-r)I[rz]) which is always 
negative, so that y* = 0 when a = 0. 
As before, if we define J as the RHS of [Al .8] when z = y* , then it is possible to show 
that for a >0, ôJIôr = dy */dr = 0 is only satisfied for r = 1/2. Since y = 0 at r = 0 & r = 
1, and assuming no discontinuities over the range of r, we can conclude that y'' 
monotonically increases over the range 0 <r < 1/2 and montonically decreases over the 
range 1/2 <r < 1. Thus, we recover the prediction that ESS bacteriocin production will be 
maximized at intermediate bacterial kinship (0 <r < 1) - see figure 5.2 for numerical 
examples. 
The partial derivative of J with respect to the scale of competition is ÔJ/öa =-(r( 1-
r)(r(H[y*]+I[(lr)y*])I' [,y*]+( 1 r)(H[y*]+I[ry*])I' [(1 r)y*])+(  1-2r( 1 r)H[y *]+r2I[(l - 
r)y *]+( 1 _r) 21[ry*])H' [y*])/(H[y*] +rI[( 1 _r)y*]+(  1 _r)I[ry*] )2 which is positive for all 0 <r 
<1, and hence bacteriocin production is an increasing function of the scale of 
competition (a) at intermediate kinship. 
* 
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Figure 5.2. The ESS production of bacteriocins (y*)  as a function of the average kinship 
(r) between bacteria. Values are obtained numerically using the variable abundance 
model, assuming that bacterial growth is the sum of growth components H = l-y and I = 
1- Y 112  (where the focal bacterium produces an amount y of its own bacteriocins, and 
receives an amount Y from its social partners) and the proportion of competition which is 
local is a = 0.5 (solid line) and 0.6 (dotted line). Intermediate kinship (r) and increasingly 
local competition (high a) favour enhanced bacteriocin production. 
Host mortality 
The above model is appropriate for free living bacteria, bacteria grown on agar plates, or 
parasitic bacteria in which host mortality doesn't influence the ESS production of 
bacteriocin. For parasitic bacteria, this would be appropriate when the extra host 
mortality due to the infection impinges very little upon bacterial success, or when there 
are a large number of social groups within the host, such that any lineage's growth rate 
has negligible impact on the mortality of the host. A simple model, relaxing these 
assumptions, considers that direct fitness of the focal lineage is given by the product S x 
T where S represents host survival (i.e. the time over which transmission is possible) and 
is a linearly decreasing function of the average growth rate of lineages in the host, and T 
is the transmission rate achieved by the focal lineage, i.e. its growth rate relative to 
competitors, the fitness measure given by equation 5.1. A parameter b is introduced to 
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denote the proportion of the bacterial population within the host which are in the focal 
arena of social (bacteriocin) interaction. b = 0 corresponds to when the social arena 
comprises a vanishingly small proportion of the total infection, and b = 1 corresponds to 
the arena of bacteriocin interaction being the entire infection. As in our first model, we 
assume n equally abundant lineages. The appropriate fitness function is 
Giocai 	 [5.10] w = S[GhOSI I 
aGiocaj +(l–a)Ggio,,aj 
Where the growth rate of a random lineage within the host is on average 
GhOSt = bGiocai +(1 - b)Gg/obal 	 [5.11] 
Virulence (v) can be defined as the reduction in S relative to a host with zero bacterial 
growth 	= 0), i.e. v = S[0] - S[G,10 ,]. 
If b = 0, so that the social arena comprises a vanishing proportion of the bacterial 
population within the host, then G, 05, = Ggjoi  and S is a constant with respect to y, so that 
marginal fitness is given by [A1.1]. For b >0, and assuming only minor variants (y = z, 
Gjocai = Giocai Gg !oba l 	G), marginal fitness is 
dw ____________________ 




The second component on the RHS is proportional to the marginal fitness [5.3], and 
represents the trade-off between the cost and competitor-killing capabilities of 
bacteriocins. When a = 0, this component reduces to (S[G] H'[z])/G,  which is always 
negative, reflecting the disadvantage of spite when competition is global. The first 
component, positive and proportional to r b, is the selection pressure for enhanced killing 
and costly production when growth of the focal lineage and its neighbours impact 
nontrivially upon host mortality. As r tends to zero, marginal fitness is negative (S[G] 
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H'[z]IG) as the behaviour of the focal lineage has no impact on host mortality and there is 
no advantage to be had from directing spite at local competitors (relatedness to non-kin in 
the social arena is zero). At r = 1, the second component is negative (S[G](1 - a)H'[z]/G) 
reflecting the fitness cost of bacteriocin production, and the first component is positive 
(S'[G]H'[z]) reflecting the enhanced fitness due to the reduction in host mortality. Note 
that this positive pressure is due entirely to the costs of bacteriocin production, and not 
through its bacteriocidal activity; this is due to an artificiality in the model such that the 
bacteria have no means of reducing own growth other than producing costly bacteriocin. 
Since no gain in terms of competitor killing is to be had from producing bacteriocins at r 
= 1, we expect y* = 0. 
If y* = Oat r = 0 & 1, then since Hand Iare decreasing functions of y,  it is here that 
G,,0 , = H + I is maximised. Since S decreases with increasing GhQ ,, S is minimised at r = 
0, 1. If we define virulence as the reduction in host survival relative to that for a host in 
which bacterial growth is zero (v = 	- 5), then virulence is maximised when S is 
minimised 	= S,,,, - Smm), i.e. at the extremes of relatedness, r = 0 and r = 1. 
When a and b are both zero, so that there is no selection for spite nor for reduced 
virulence, [5.12] reduces to (S[G] H'[z])IG  which is negative and hence y = 0 
RESULT 4. Virulence (v) is maximised at the extremes of kinship (r = 0 & r = 1), and is 
minimised at intermediate values (0 <r < 1) - see figure 5.3 for numerical examples. 
This is due to the maximization of bacteriocin production at intermediate kinship, such 
that absolute growth of bacteria is reduced here but not at more extreme values, so that 
virulence is more pronounced whenever bacteria tend to socialize mostly, or not at all, 
with their kin. 
General model 
Relaxing the assumption of additive growth components, and making no further 
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Figure 5.3. The virulence (v) as a function of the average kinship (r) between bacteria. 
Values are obtained numerically using the host mortality model, assuming that bacterial 
growth is the sum of growth components H = l-y and I = 1-Y 2 (where the focal 
bacterium produces an amount y of its own bacteriocins, and receives an amount Y from 
its social partners), host survival is S = 3- GhOSC (GhOSL  is the overall bacterial growth in the 
host), the intensity of local competition is a = 0.5, and the range of bacteriocin warfare 
with respect to the whole infection is b = 0.1 (filled circles) and 0.2 (filled squares). 
Virulence is minimized at intermediate kinship (r) and when the range of bacteriocin 
warfare (b) is large. 
the growth of the focal lineage (Giocai) and its nonkin social partners (Gsociaj), we can 
recover the major predictions made in this study. Consider the fitness function [5.1]. 
Marginal fitness can be written 
(aG,ocai + (1 - a)G 	) 
dGfocal 	d(aGioca, + (1 - a)Gg,o,,, 1 ) 
dw 	 global 	dy - 
Gjocai 	
dy 
-- 	 2 	 [5.13] 
dy - (aG joca , +( l_a)Gglobal ) 
Assuming only minor variants, so that y = z, and  Gjocai  = Gsocjai  = Giocai  = Ggioi  = G, we 
have 
me 
dGiocai 	______ -Lw = ((I — ar) 	- a(1 - r) dGsociai  )IG 
dy 	 dy dy 
[5.14] 
Fitness increases with enhanced bacteriocin production when dw/dy >0. dG1ocai/dy is 
negative due to the production costs of bacteriocin, and dG 5ojai/dY is negative because 
non-kin social partners experience higher mortality as bacteriocin production by the focal 
lineage is increased. [5.14] therefore demonstrates the tradeoff between the direct cost of 
bacteriocin production and the benefit of competitor killing. The benefit is zero when a = 
o and/or when r = 1, so that marginal fitness is {(1 - a r) dGjocaj/dY}/G < 0 for all y, 
meaning that the ESS bacteriocin production is at y = 0. Also, the impact of the focal 
lineage's bacteriocin on competitor growth approaches zero as the focal lineage accounts 
for a vanishing proportion of the social group, i.e. at r = 0, dG 01Idy = 0, and so here the 
marginal fitness is negative, and y* = 0. Regardless then of the precise details describing 
how the growth of the focal lineage and its nonkin social partners decline with enhanced 
bacteriocin production, provided that they do decline, we can state that the ESS is y = 0 
when kinship is zero or complete (r = 0, 1) and when competition is entirely global (a = 
0). 
Discussion 
We have shown that the production of bacteriocin is expected to be enhanced when 
kinship (r) is of intermediate value (result 2, figures 5.1 & 5.2). Since bacteriocin 
production is expected to correlate with low bacterial growth rates, virulence will tend to 
be minimized at intermediate r and maximised when bacteria compete only with non-kin 
(r = 0) or only with kin (r = 1). We therefore predict a U-shaped relationship between 
virulence and kinship (result 4, figure 5.3), contrary to previous models that variously 
predict monotonically increasing or decreasing virulence as kinship is increased. This 
emphasizes that the qualtitative outcome of virulence evolution crucially depends on the 
biological details, such as whether parasites are able to improve their success through 
prudent growth (Frank 1996a), or cooperative contributions to public goods (Brown et al. 
2002, West & Buckling 2003), or through anti-competitor toxin production. 
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Our result is intuitive if we consider that when kinship (r) is low the influence of the 
focal lineage on the growth of its social partners will be negligible, and so reduced 
allocation of resources into bacteriocin production is favoured. Conversely, when kinship 
is high, the proportion of cells in the social arena which are susceptible to bcteriocin-
killing is small, and so the benefit of producing bacteriocin is less than the cost that this 
entails. At intermediate kinship bacteriocin production is favoured because competition 
with non relatives is important, and bacteriociri production by the focal lineage can 
significantly decrease the growth of the non-competitors. The result (3) that the ESS 
bacteriocin production is an increasing function of the degree to which competition is 
local (a; figures 5.1 & 5.2) is also intuitive in that when competition is increasingly local 
the benefits accrued by reducing the growth of local competitors are enhanced. 
The costly allocation of resources into bacteriocin production qualifies as an example of 
Hamiltonian spite (Hamilton 1970, 1996, Hurst 1991, Foster et al. 2001, Gardner & West 
(in press)). It is well accepted that altruism can be adaptive despite a direct fitness cost so 
long as the beneficiary of altruism is sufficiently positively related to the actor (i.e. a 
positive R and a positive B, and RB>C). Hamiltonian spite is when a costly behaviour is 
favoured because it has a cost to the recipient (negative B), and the recipient is negatively 
related to the actor (negative R, and RB>C). How can negative relatedness arise? 
Negative relatedness to some individuals is inevitable when positively-related individuals 
exist in the same competitive arena. The reason for this is that since the relatedness of an 
actor to a randomly chosen individual from its competitive arena is on average zero 
(Queller 1994), the existence of positive relations within that arena implies the existence 
of negatively-related competitors (result 1). In this situation, spiteful behaviour will be 
favoured if it can be preferentially directed at these negatively-related competitors, and 
RB>C is satisfied. The specificity of bacteriocin action allows it to potentially fill this 
criterion, because it will preferentially harm non-relatives who are not resistant to that 
particular bacteriocin - i.e. bacteriocins harm individuals who are negatively related to 
the producer. Although the anti-competitor function of the bacteriocins suggests that this 
M. 
is selfishness at the level of the clonal lineage, it is certainly spiteful at the level of the 
self-destructing bacterium producing the toxins. 
To conclude, we have shown theoretically how kinship and the scale of competition 
determine levels of bacteriocin production favoured by natural selection. Contrary to 
previous work, we find a U-shaped relationship between kinship and virulence. The 
results are qualitatively the same whether bacteria have fixed strategies for bacteriocin 
production or if bacteriocin production is facultatively adjusted in response to kin 
recognition. These predictions could be tested by: (i) correlating bacteriocin production 
with average kinship in natural populations; or (ii) experimentally evolving bacteria 
under different degrees of kinship and scales of competition. Furthermore, our 
predictions are not limited to bacteriocin production by bacteria. A variety of microbes, 
including yeasts (Schmitt & Breinig 2002) and halophilic archea (Cheung et al. 1997) are 
known to produce toxins that tend to target conspecifics. 
6. Cooperation and punishment, especially in humans 
Abstract 
Explaining altruistic cooperation is one of the greatest challenges faced by sociologists, 
economists, and evolutionary biologists. The problem is determining why an individual 
would carry out a costly behavior that benefits another. Possible solutions to this problem 
include kinship, repeated interactions, and policing. Another solution that has recently 
received much attention is the threat of punishment. However, punishing behavior is often 
costly for the punisher, and so it is not immediately clear how costly punishment could 
evolve. We use adirect (neighbor-modulated) fitness approachto analyze when 
punishment is favored. This methodology reveals that, contrary to previous suggestions, 
relatedness between interacting individuals is not crucial to explaining cooperation 
through punishment. In fact, increasing relatedness directly disfavors punishing behavior. 
Instead, the crucial factor is apositive correlation between the punishment strategy of an 
individual and the cooperation it receives. This could arise in several ways, such as when 
facultative adjustment of behavior leads individuals to cooperate more when interacting 
with individuals who are more likely to punish. More generally, our results provide a clear 
example of how the fundamental factor driving the evolution of social traits is a 
correlation between social partners and how this can arise for reasons other than 
genealogical kinship. 
Introduction 
Explaining cooperation at all levels of biological complexity remains one of the greatest 
problems for evolutionary biology (Hamilton 1964; Buss 1987; Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995). The question is: why would an individual perform acostly altruistic 
behavior that benefits another individual? The solutions to this problem that have attracted 
Published as: Gardner, A. & West, S.A. 2004. Cooperation and punishment, especially 
in humans. American Naturalist 164, 753-764 (see Appendix). 
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the most attention are when social partners are related (kin selection, in a general sense; 
Hamilton 1963, 1964, 1970) or when there is some mechanism for repressing competition 
between groups, such as through repeated interactions/reputation (reciprocity; Trivers 
1971; Alexander 1979, 1987; Frank 2003a), policing (Ratnieks 1988; Frank 1995b, 
2003a), and systems of rewards or punishments (Oliver 1980; Sigmund et al. 2001). Th 
fundamental similarity between all these mechanisms is that they involve positive 
correlations between the behaviors played by social partners, which are crucial for the 
evolutionof social behaviors (Hamilton 1975; Grafen 1985a; Nee 1989; Frank 1998; 
Woodcock and Heath 2002). 
Here, we are concerned with whether and how punishment can favor cooperation and how 
this translates into a selective benefit for punishers. The possible role of punishment has 
recently attracted much theoretical attention, especially with respect to its possible role in 
favoring cooperation among humans (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989; Boyd and 
Richerson 1992; Soberand Wilson 1998; Sell and Wilson 1999; Fehrand Gächter 2000). 
However, the mechanism underlying these previous models is often not clear, and the 
models have been developed with little reference to related theory such as in the animal 
punishment literature (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Clutton-Brock 1998) and Frank's 
(1998, 2003a) recent synthesis of social evolution theory. The basic idea is that if 
punishment is sufficiently frequent and harsh, it can successfully maintain cooperative 
behavior. However, this solution forces us to consider the motivation of the punisher. 
Since a behavior that promotes a public good such as cooperation is in itself a second-
order public good and is not expected to be without cost to the actor, punishment is open 
for exploitation by second-order free-riding individuals who cooperate but who fail to 
punish defectors (Oliver 1980). Punishmentof second-order free riders can be invoked, 
butthis opens up the possibility of third- and higher-order free riding (Ostrom 1990). 
Failure to maintain participation in a high-level public-goods game unravels participation 
in the lower levels. At first glance, punishment seems not to be a helpful addition to the 
problem of cooperation because all that is achieved is the replacement of one public-goods 
dilemma for another. However, it is generally true that punishment is cheap relative to the 
cost of cooperation. Consequently, it has been argued that any mechanism invoked to 
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explain participation in public-goods games will more easily favor punishing (and hence 
also cooperation) than it would cooperation alone (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
A Darwinian account of the evolution of cooperation through punishment requires that the 
punisher directly or indirectly receives anet benefit through punishing. Although costly 
punishment can ultimately enhance the direct fitness of the punisher if interactions tend to 
be extended or repeated with the same social partner (Frank 2003a; e.g., sanctioning in 
plant-rhizobium mutualisms: Denison 2000; West et al. 2002c, 2002d; Kiers et al. 2003), 
animals including humans punish even when there is no mechanism ensuring repeat 
encounters (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Genealogical relationship between social partners is 
often considered low or absent, and so kin selection is given little attention in the existing 
literature. The favored Darwinian mechanisms that have received the most attention are 
group selection (Gintis 2000) and cultural group selection (Heinrich and Boyd 2001). A 
recent simulation study (Boyd et al. 2003) has suggested that since the incidence of 
defection declines as punishment becomes more frequent, the costs of punishment decline 
as it becomes common, so that even modest group selection may plausibly maintain 
punishment in humans. 
In this chapter, we show that the evolution of punishment and cooperation may be 
investigated using the powerful direct fitness maximization techniques of Taylor and 
Frank (1996b) and Frank (1998). This allows us to clarify the mechanisms at work and 
link previous theory to Frank's (1998, 2003a) general framework. In particular, we link 
kin selection, group selection, and cultural group selection in terms of a generalized view 
of relatedness. We then reveal that it is not the relatedness between social partners per se 
that facilitates the evolution of punishing behavior. What is crucial is that there is a 
positive correlation between the punishment strategy played and cooperation received by 
an individual. Although such an association could arise from viscous population structure 
and interactions between kin, it may arise for other reasons. In particular, we demonstrate 
that even in the absence of relatedness it is possible for such an association, due to 
facultative adjustment of cooperative behavior, to maintain punishment through selection 
acting at the level of the individual, rendering group selection and elaborate cultural 
practices unnecessary. More generally, the fact that a positive correlation between the 
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behaviors of social partners is the fundamental factor favoring cooperation has been 
obscured by a focus on how this correlation can be produced by kinship, through the 
interactions of close relatives (Hamilton 1975; Frank 1998). Our results provide a clear 
example of how such positive correlations can arise without kin association. 
Models and Analyses 
Basic Model 
We now present a simple model describing the co-evolution of cooperation and 
punishment. This is intended to elucidate the general selection pressures involved—it is 
the simplest model that captures the essentials of the problem. We discuss our model in 
terms of humans because this is where much of the recent theoretical literature has been 
focused. However, the implications are general and could be applied to a variety of 
Organisms. A role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation has been suggested in a 
variety of animals, including insects, birds, primates, and other mammals (Clutton-Brock 
and Parker 1995). We give some specific examples in the discussion when considering 
how our model may be tested empirically. 
For simplicity, we suppose that individuals interactin pairs, with one (random) member of 
the pair being denoted player 1 and the other player 2. Player 1 may choose to cooperate 
(e.g., sharing food), in which case she loses fitness c and player 2 gains fitness b, or to 
defect (e. g., refusi n g to share food), such that neither playerloses nor gains fitnessfrom 
the interaction. Player 2 may respond to defection in two ways: either she punishes (e.g., 
by physically injuring player 1) at a cost a to herself in order to reduce player l's fitness 
by d, or else she forgives (e.g., does nothing) in which case neither player gains nor loses 





where the constant a is baseline fitness, xis the frequency with which that individual 
cooperates, X is the mean frequency of cooperation among her social partners, y is the 
frequency with which the individual punishes, given that her partner defects, and Y is the 
mean punishment strategy played by her social partners, that is, the probability that the 
focal individual is punished given that she defects. We assume that all competition is 
global. An important point is that punishment acts to directly reduce both the fitness of the 
actor and the fitness of her social group. Punishment is therefore fundamentally different 
from the policing models of Frank(1995b, 1996b, 2003a) because policing directly 
reduces actorfitness but increases group fitness. 
Coevolution of Cooperation and Punishment 
We will consider the simultaneous evolutionary optimization of cooperation and 
punishment analogous to the evolution of policing analysis of Frank(1995b), using the 
direct (neighbor-modulated) fitness maximization method of Taylor and Frank (1996) and 
Frank (1998). A small increase ma behavior is favored by selection if the derivative of 
fitness with respect to that behavior (termed "marginal fitness") is>O and disfavored when 
this derivative is <0. Differentiating the focal individual's fitness function [6.1] with 
respect to her cooperating (x) and punishing (y) strategies obtains: 
dw 	dX 	dy 	dY 
- = –c+Yd+--(b+ya)--(l X)a —(l–x)d 	 [6.2A] 
dx dx dx dx 
dw 	 dY 	dx 	dX 
- = –(1– X)a ---(1– x)d + —(Yd - c)+ —(b + ya) 
dy dy dy dy 	 [6.2B] 
The terms dX/dx and dY/dy are the coefficients of relatedness, with respect to cooperation 
and punishment, respectively, between the focal individual and her social partners (Taylor 
and Frank 1996; Frank 1998). Technically, the derivative isof the conditional expectation 
of the social partner's strategy, given the strategy played by the focal individual, with 
respect to the latter. The other derivative terms are dyidx and dx/dy, which are the 
regression of an individual's punishing strategy on its own cooperation strategy, and vice 
versa, and dY/dx and dX/dy, which are the regressions of a partner's punishing strategy on 
its own cooperation strategy and a partner's cooperation strategy on its own punishment 
strategy, respectively. 
Let us consider first the origin of cooperation and punishment in a population that is 
otherwise fixed for defection ( Y -. 0) and forgiveness ( 3i - 0). In such circumstances 
the traij-on-trait regressions are always nonnegative, which is important for interpretation 
of the analytical results that follows. To see why, consider the regression of cooperation 
received on cooperation strategy played: dXidx = (X - )I(x -1) Xix. Since cooperation 
strategies are nonnegative, the numerator (X) is nonnegative, and since the variant by 
definition plays a different cooperation strategy from the wild type (which plays zero 
cooperation), the denominator (x) is positive. Hence, dX/dx–>0. The same argument can be 
used to show that this is true for the other trait-on-trait regressions. Assuming only minor 
variants (x = X = Y , y =Y = j; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998) and making the 
substitutions Y - 0 and y -, 0, the marginal fitness with respect to cooperation 
(equation [6.2A]) reduces to: 
dw 	dX dy dY 
+ —b - —a - —d. 
dx dx 	dx 	dx 
[6.3] 
This shows there is a direct cost (c) and a kin-selected benefit (dX/dx x b) of cooperation, 
plus costs relating to the associated increase in costly punishing (dy/dx x a) and also in 
being punished (dYidx x d); see figure 6. 1A. Cooperation is maintained even in the 
absence of punishment when Hamilton's (1964) rule dX/dx x b > c holds, so we will 
consider the more interesting situation where it does not, such that] is always negative. 
Similarly, the marginal fitness with respectto punishment (equation [6.213]) is: 
95 
dw 	dY dx dX 
—d - —c + —b. 
dy dy 	dy dy 
Again, this is easily understood. Punishing incurs a directcost (a) and indirect costs (dY/dy 
x dfrom being punished by related individuals and dx/dy x c from the correlated 
commitment to cooperation). The benefit dX/dy x b is gained through the association 
between the punishment strategy played and the cooperation received (see figure 6. 1B). 
Only when this is sufficiently large may a rare variant with some small frequency of 
punishing behavior be able to invade. In other words, a positive association between the 
punishment strategy played and the cooperation received by a focal individual is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the evolutionary origin of punishment. 
Result 1. A positive association between punishment strategy played and cooperation 
received is crucial for the evolutionary origin of punishing behavior. 
We will now investigate the evolutionary maintenance of cooperation and punishment by 
considering Y - 1 and 5 –'1. Again, the trait-on-trait regressions will all be nonnegative: 
for example, dX/dx =(X - )/(x -) = (X - 1)1(x - 1). Cooperation received (X) cannot be 
>1, so the numerator(X - 1) is:5 0. Since the cooperation variant does not play the wild-
type strategy (always cooperate) and cannot play a more cooperative strategy than that, 
the denominator(x - 1) is always negative. Hence, dXldx ~t 0. Making the substitutions 
1 and Y - 1, the marginal fitness with respect to cooperation (equation [6.2A]) is 
now given by: 
dw 
= —c + d+(b+a). -  
dx 	dx 
[6.5] 
Here cooperation carries a direct cost (c) and a benefit (d, due to avoiding punishment) 
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Figure 6.1. (A) Selective value of cooperation (dwldx) as a function of relatedness and the 
resident punishing strategy () when there is no association between traits (dwldy = 
dY/dx = 0); dw/dx>O indicates that enhanced cooperation is favoured, and dwldx<0 
indicates that it is disfavoured. Increasing relatedness (r) enhances selection for 
cooperation; in the absence of punishment, cooperation is favoured when rb>c. 
Increasing punishment also favours cooperation, so cooperation may be favoured even 
when relatedness is 0, if 7 >c/d. (B) Selective value of punishment (dw/dy) as a function 
of relatedness and the resident cooperation strategy (i);  dw/dy>O indicates that enhanced 
punishment is favoured, and dw/dy<0 indicates that it is disfavoured. Assuming no 
association between traits (dr/dy = dX/dy = 0), we see that :punishment is always. 
disfavoured; increased relatedness enhances the selective disadvantage of punishment; 
and increased cooperation reduces the selective disadvantage of punishment. Punishment 
may be favourable if there is a positive association between the punishment strategy 
played and the cooperation received by an individual (dX/dy > 0); the broken line 
indicates dX/dy = 0.2. For (A) and (B) we assume a = 0.1, b = 2, c = 1, and d = 3. 
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dX/dx x a) due to the correlated cooperation received from social partners and the fitness 
saved from not having to punish defectors. Punishment cannot be an effective deterrent 
when the fitness of a punished defector is greater than that of a cooperator, so that we will 
restrict attention to the situation d > c. Here, the marginal fitness will always be positive, 
and so selection will act to maintain cooperation. The marginal fitness with respect to 
punishment (equation [6.2B]) is: 
dw- dY - 	dx 	dX 
= -(1- x)a ---(1 –x)d + —(d –c)+ —(b + a). 	 [6.6] 
dy 	 dy 	dy dy 
The costs of punishment include the direct cost ([1 - ] x a) and the kin-selected cost ([1 - 
] x dY/dy x d) plus the cost incurred by the associated cooperation (dr/dy x c). The 
benefits of punishment are due to the correlated decrease in one's own defection and hence 
the frequency with which the focal individual is punished (dx/dy x d) and also the 
correlated increase in cooperation received from social partners (dX/dy x b) and, 
conversely, the fitness saved by not having to punish partners (dXldy x a). If dx/dy = 
dX/dy = 0 sø that there is no correlation between the punishment and cooperation played 
by an individual, nor between the punishment played and cooperation received, then the 
marginal fitness with respect to punishment is small but negative, and hence full 
punishment is not stable. It is interesting to note that relatedness dY/dy works to 
undermine the stability of punishment; as an individual's punishment strategy is increased, 
so too is the punishment received from social partners. If the between-trait associations 
are positive and of sufficient magnitude, then full punishment can be evolutionarily stable. 
Otherwise, selection will act to reduce punishment in the population. 
Result 2. A positive association between punishment strategy played and cooperation 
received is crucial for the evolutionary maintenance of punishing behavior. 
We now check to see whether punishment is easier to maintain than it is to initially invade 
an otherwise forgiving population, by evaluating dw/dyl 	- dw/dyl 	that is, 
subtracting the right-hand side (RHS) of equation [6.4] from the RHS of equation [6.6] to 
obtain: 
(dY dx 	I dX 
di— ~ — +ail+— 
kdy dy I 	dy 
[6.7] 
which is positive, so that the RHS of equation [6.4] is lessthan the RHS of equation [6.6], 
and hence the condition for increased punishment to be favored (dw/dy >0) is more easily 
satisfied in a population of cooperators and punishers than in a population of defectors and 
forgivers. Similarly, the RHS of equation [6.3 ]is always negative under the relevant 
circumstances (i.e.,when dX/dx x b< c), and theRHS of equation [6.5] is always positive, 
so that the condition for enhanced cooperation to be favored (dw/dx >0) is also more 
easily satisfied in punishing populations than in populations rife with defection and 
forgiveness. 
Result 3. Punishing behavior is more easily maintained than it is originally evolved. Note 
that this assumes that relatedness and the between-trait regressions are constants. A fully 
dynamic analysis relaxing this assumption would require that we specify a more detailed 
(and hence less general) model and so is not pursued here because we aim only to abstract 
and elucidate the selection pressures involved in the evolution of punishment and 
cooperation. 
Example: Cooperation as a Facultative Response to Punishment 
The Model. We have found that relatedness between social partners is not crucial for 
costly punishment to be favored (indeed, increasing relatedness disfavors punishment) and 
that it is another association, the regression of the cooperation received on the punishment 
strategy played, that provides the benefit of punishment. To illustrate these findings, we 
examine the evolution of punishment when there is no relatedness between individuals 
(dY/dy = 0) and when cooperation is facultatively adjusted to one's punishment 
environment (which we will see can give dX/dy> 0). 
We assume that individuals are randomly organized into social groups of size N, such that 
relatedness between group members is 0. In each social encounter, individuals pair with a 
random member from their group, with one of the partners playing the role of player 1 and 
the other being player 2. In contrast with the previous model, we consider the cooperation 
strategy of player 1 to be facultative and hence a function of her punishment environment. 
Assuming no partner recognition and therefore no adjustment of cooperation to her 
current partner's punishment strategy, the cooperation strategy played by the focal 
individual (in half of her social interactions) is expressed as a function of the average 
punishment strategy played by all of her social partners:x =J1J].  Since each of her social 
partners experiences a punishing environment that includes the focal individual (and 
hence average punishment strategy among their social partners is + [y - y]I[N - 1]), they 
will play cooperation strategy X =J[ + (y - )/(N - 1)]. 
If individuals cooperate optimally, we expect the functionJ[Y] to be such that it 
maximizes the fitness of player 1 when player 2 plays punishment strategy Y. It is easy to 
show that this optimum is given by: 
0 	c>Yd 
f*[JT] = 	 , 	 [6.81 
c<Yd 
such that defection is favored when the cost of cooperation outweighs the threat of 
punishment (c> Yd), and cooperation is favored when the cost of cooperation is 
outweighed by the threat of punishment (c < Yd). This step function is both 
mathematically inconvenient and biologically unreasonable, so we will use the model of 
McNamara et al. (1997; see also Kokko 2003) to describe nearly optimized cooperation 
as: 
f[Y] = 	
1 	 1 
 = [6.9] 
1+exp[—AIE] l+exp[—(Yd—c)/r} 
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where E is the degree of behavioral error and A = dw/dx = Yd - c ensures that the frequency 
of non-optimal behavior declines as its impact on fitness becomes more important. The 
facultative cooperation function (equation [9])  approaches the step function (equation 
[6.8]) for vanishing behavioral error ( - 0), and for larger error(E >0), it takes a 
continuous sigmoidal form which flattens out to a constant 1/2 as the error tends to infinity 
(figure 6.2). For mathematical convenience, we will assume vanishing (but nonzero) 
behavioral error (c - 0). 
Altering fitness function (equation [6.1]) for this example model, we have the fitness of an 
individual who plays punishment strategy y, in a population with mean punishment 
strategy Y , given by: 
w = a cf[—y]+bf [+_
] 
a(1f[i+ YY ])Yd(lfE 	 [6.10] 
The mean fitness of the population is: 
= a - cf L]+ bf[y]— a(l - f[YI1 - d(l - 	 [6.11] 
so we expect a rare variant playing punishment strategy y to increase in frequency in a 
population with mean punishment strategy j when the fitness differential Aw = w - W is 
positive, that is, when: 
Aw = b(f ~ 3i + Y — Y  f 	a(l — f [3i + Y — j~ Y — (I — f 	> 0. 	 [6.12] 
Origin of Punishment. We first consider the evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith& 
Price 1973) of forgiveness, by determining under what circumstances no variant with 









Figure 6.2. Frequency with which an individual cooperates (x) as a function of the 
punishment strategy of its social partners (1) and the degree of behavioural error (E), 
according to the example facultative model. Values are obtained numerically, assuming c 
= 1 and d = 3. The bold lines indicates E = 0.01, 0.10, and 0.50. 
Substituting the cooperation function (equation [6.9]) into the fitness differential 
(equation [6.12]) obtains: 
k exp[(C—(y1(N—l))d)1E] 1 	 -Aw=b 	1 + exp[c/E]) 	 [6.13] 
1 + exp[(c - (y/(N - l))d)/E]) 
Recalling that the behavioral error is vanishingly small (r - 0), we find that when the 
threat of punishment posed to social partners of the punishing variant is less than the cost 
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of cooperation ((yd)I(N - 1) < c), then equation [6.13] reduces to -y  a, which is negative, 
and hence the rare variant cannot invade. This is because defection is the rule in the social 
groups of both the wild type and the variant, giving population mean fitness 	a and 
rare variant fitness w— a - ya. When the threat of punishment is greater than the cost of 
cooperation ((yd)/(N— 1) >c), then equation [6.13] reduces to b, which is positive, and 
hence the rare variant can invade. Here, the rare punisher has managed to push her social 
group over the punishment threshold such that cooperation is now the optimal strategy. 
The average social group is fully defecting, so W = a, but the rare variant is now a 
recipient of cooperative behavior and only rarely encounters a defector requiring 
punishment, so that her fitness is w = a + b. Note that although the variant receives 
cooperation, she maximizes her fitness by always defecting (since her unrelated social 
partners are all forgivers) and hence pays no cost of cooperation. If no y satisfies the above 
invasion condition, then forgiveness is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard 
Smith & Price 1973). This is assured when (N - 1)c> d, so that not even a fully punishing 
variant (y = 1) can invade. Evolutionary stability of forgiveness is therefore assured unless 
d>(N-1)c. 	 [6.14] 
Result 4. In the above model, punishment is unlikely to invade forgiveness unless the 
population is structured into very small groups. 
Maintenance of Punishment. To determine whether punishment is an ESS, we let the wild 
type adopt the strategy of full punishment ( - 1) and consider the success of rare 
variants playing y < 1. Substituting the facultative cooperation function (equation [6.9]) 
into the fitness differential (equation [6.12]) obtains: 
1 	 1 
+ exp[(c— (i —(1 _y)/(N_l))J)/e] 1 + exp[(c—d)/e]) 
[6.15] 




First consider "ineffective punishment" (c > d). When behavioral error is vanishing (r - 
0), the fitness differential (equation [6.15]) reduces to a(1 - y), which is positive, and 
hence the more forgiving variant will always invade. This is because even when defection 
is always met with punishment, the defector has greater fitness than the cooperator, so that 
in all social groups defection is rife. The resident strategy incurs the cost of full 
punishment, and so the mean fitness of the population is ii = a - a, whereas the more 
forgiving variant avoids this at least part of the time, giving fitness w = a - ya. Now 
consider "effective punishment" (d> c), such that punished defectors receive lower fitness 
than cooperators. The resident now enjoys the benefits of cooperation and only 
infrequently encounters erroneous defection requiring punishment. If the rare variant 
forgives to such a degree that her social partners optimize by defection; that is, when c —(1 
- (1 -y)/(N - 1))d >0, the fitness differential (equation [6.15]) reduces to -(b+ ya) since 
she loses the benefits of cooperation and punishes a proportion y of her social partners. 
This is negative, and so the rare variant cannot invade. If the variant's forgiveness is not 
sufficient to warrant a switch to defection among her social partners, equation [6.15] 
becomes -(b + ya) exp{c - [1 - (1 -y)/(N - 1)]d}, which is vanishingly small but 
nevertheless negative, and hence the rare variant cannot invade. This is true because with 
vanishing behavioral error (c - 0) the frequency of defection in the fully punishing group 
is a vanishing fraction of the frequency of defection in the more forgiving group, so that 
the fitness saved from not punishing so frequently does not outweigh the fitness lost 
through the reduction of received cooperation. Relaxation of the infinitesimal error 
assumption (figure 6.3) shows that this result is robust, even for large social groups. The 
variant can therefore only invade an otherwise fully punishing population when 
punishment is ineffective, so that punishment is an ESS when: 
d>c. 	 [6.16] 
Result 5. In the above model, punishment is maintained by selection once it has become 
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Figure 6.3. Maximum group size (N).permitting the evolutionary stability of punishment 
( = 1) as a function of behavioural error (c) and the cost of punishing (a), according to 
the example facultative model, assuming b = 2, c = 1, and d = 3. Upper line, a = 0.01; 
middle line a = 0.10; bottom line, a = 0.50. 
Discussion 
Punishment and Cooperation 
We have shown that full punishment can be an evolutionarily stable strategy only if there 
is a positive association between the punishment played and the cooperation received by 
an individual. This could arise if populations are viscqus so that social partners tend to be 
genealogical relatives, but other mechanisms are possible, for example, when individuals 
facultatively adjust their level of cooperation in response to the local threat of punishment. 
We have also provided analytical support for the suggestion of Boyd et al. (2003) that the 
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cost of punishment declines asit becomes common in the population and hence punishing 
behavior might be maintained more easily than it is initially evolved. 
These results suggest three general implications. First, it can be easier for some 
cooperation to evolve by another mechanism (e.g., altruism between relatives) and then. 
punishment evolve to favor and maintain higher levels of cooperation. An analogous 
conclusion has been made for some other mechanisms that do not rely on interactions 
between relatives, such as group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001; Griffin and West 
2002). Second, within the specific context of explaining human cooperation, punishment 
could have evolved at a time when social structure was more conducive to punishment 
(small groups of interacting individuals). Once common, punishment could be retained 
even when interactions began to occur within much larger groups of humans. Third, the 
opposite frequency dependence is true for systems based on rewarding cooperation rather 
than punishing defection—the cost of rewarding escalates as more individuals cooperate, 
whereas we have shown the cost of punishing decreases as more individuals cooperate. 
This might go some way to explaining why punishment as opposed to rewarding is 
prevalent in nature (e.g., Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). 
How can our model be tested? Our major result is that costly punishment can be favored if 
there is a positive association between the punishment played and the cooperation 
received by an individual (results 1 and 2). This could be hard totest directly, especially 
experimentally, because of limitations on how an individual's level of punishment could 
be manipulated. However, some of the fundamental assumptions and predictions of our 
model that underly this result could be tested more easily. In particular, are lower levels of 
cooperationmore likely to leadto punishment, as appearsto occur in superbfairy wrens 
(Mulder and Langmore 1993), naked mole rats (Reeve 1992), and Polistes wasps (Reeve 
and Gamboa 1987)? Second, are individuals more likely to cooperate when they are 
punished, as may occur in Polistes wasps (Reeve and Gamboa 1987)? Third, do 
individuals try to signal that they cooperate more than they actually do, as occurs in white-
winged choughs (Boland etal. 1997)? Fourth, do systems in which social partners are 
more related tend to display less punishment, analogous with Frank's (1995, 2003) result 
that investment into policing correlates negatively with relatedness? 
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Relatedness and Kin Selection 
This analysis has made use of the understanding that the coefficient of relatedness 
appropriate to the direct fitness formulation of Hamilton's rule is a regression measure 
describing the association between actor and social partner phenotypes (reviewed by 
Seger 1981; Michod 1982; Grafen 1985a; Queller 1985; 1992;Frank 1998). Such 
associations are generally due to genealogical closeness and hence genetic similarity, so 
that the maximization of neighbor-modulated or inclusive fitness is popularly referred to 
as "kin selection" (Maynard Smith 1964). Group selection can be responsible for the 
evolution of an altruistic trait only insofar as the benefit to the group is large enough, the 
cost to the individual is low enough, and there is substantial between-group as opposed to 
within-group variation in trait values. Since the proportion of the total variance that is 
attributable to between-group differences is the coefficient of relatedness appropriate for 
whole-group traits, Hamilton's rule can be used to predict when group selection will favor 
the trait (i.e., when relatedness x benefit > cost). Thus, kin selection and group selection 
are mathematically equivalent ways of conceptualizing the same evolutionary process, a 
point that previously has been analyzed in much detail (Price 1972a; Hamilton 1975; 
Wade 1985; Frank 1986,1998; Queller 1992; Reeveand Keller 1999). Consequently, it is 
puzzling that kin selection has been largely ignored in the human altruistic punishment 
literature on the grounds that relatedness is too low, while group selection has often been 
regarded as important (e.g., Gintis 2000). Furthermore, because relatedness is a regression 
of recipient phenotype on actor phenotype, it transcends genetics and applies even when 
the cause of phenotypic similarity is simply imitation, for example, as in the cultural group 
selection proposed by Heinrich and Boyd (2001). In this sense, "kin selection" is 
something of a misnomer because it draws attention to only one cause of the statistical 
association that is relatedness, as Hamilton(1975) realized. 
As this analysis has shown, positive relatedness is not really the key ingredient for the 
evolutionary success of punishment. Punishing behavior is costly to the individual and 
protects the social group from the breakdown of cooperation, and hence it has been 
described as a form of altruism (Sober and Wilson 1998). It might then be expected that 
where it is successful, altruistic punishment is being maintained by kin selection. 
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However, punishment is quite a different form of public good from cooperation—it is 
directly disadvantageous at the group level because it reduces the fitness of the focal 
individual and her social partners. The benefit it brings is indirect because it merely 
creates a coercive social environment in which cooperation is favored. It therefore differs 
from Frank's (1995b, 1996b, 2003a) recent models of competition-repression in which 
investment into policing behavior translates directly into enhanced group fitness. In our 
model, punishment is only of selective value when there is a sufficiently strong correlation 
between punishment strategy played and cooperation received (dXldy; figure 6. 1B). This 
highlights a fundamental nonequivalence of first- and higher-order public goods. 
A positive correlation between punishment played and cooperation received might arise in 
a viscous population where genealogical kin tend to associate with each other, so that the 
social partners of punishers are also punishers (dY/dy >0) and therefore punishers are 
expected to be coerced into cooperating more than forgivers (dxldy >0). This association 
combines with relatedness to ensure that an increase in punishing behavior is associated 
with an increase in the amount of cooperation received (dXldy > 0). The pressure for 
enhanced punishment is therefore not strictly kin selection but rather something more akin 
to "niche construction" (Odling-Smeeet al. 1996), in the sense that the behavior modifies 
the social environment in such a way as to alter the selective pressures acting upon other 
traits. Itis worth noting that localized competition in viscous populations adds extra 
complexity to models of kin selection (see Taylor 1992a, 1992b; Wilson et al. 1992; 
Queller 1994; Frank 1998; Griffin and West 2002; West et al. 2002a; Gardner and West 
(in press) for extensive discussion of its impact on the evolution of social behaviors). In 
our analysis, we have assumed that all competition occurs at the level of the whole 
population, and we leave local competition as an open problem for the future. 
We may easily demonstrate that relatedness is not necessary for the evolution of costly 
punishment by considering mechanisms that generate positive associations between the 
punishment played and the cooperation received despite zero relatedness, for example, the 
facultative model of cooperation introduced above. We discovered that in the absence of 
relatedness, partner recognition, reputation, and any mechanism whereby an individual 
may bias her interactions or tailor her behavior in response to her immediate social 
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partner, punishment might be maintained by selection acting directly at the level of the 
individual. This is because when punishment is already frequent, the fitness saved by 
forgiving is minimal and may be overwhelmed by the concomitant decline in the amount 
of cooperation received because of the decrease in selection for cooperation among social 
partners. This example model is intended for illustrationonly and is designedto 
demOnstrate how a net benefit for punishment might be achieved even when individuals 
do not interact with relatives. More complicated scenarios are therefore possible, and of 
particular interest is the effect of enhanced behavioral error (increasing s). Numerical 
analysis of the example model reveals that increasing the frequency of maladaptive 
behavior reduces the likelihood that individual level selection will be able to maintain 
altruistic punishment in very large groups (figure 6.3), although the results presented 
above are qualitatively robust so long as behavioral error (c) and the cost of punishing (a) 
are small. The degree to which individuals are expected to behave optimally is 
contentious, but punishment is indeed characterized by its cheapness (Sober & Wilson 
1998). 
Conclusion 
We have given analytical support to the suggestion that the cost of punishment declines 
as it becomes a common strategy, so that punishment is more easily maintained than it is 
originally evolved. We showed that it is not relatedness per se that is important in 
ensuring that punishing behavior enhances fitness but rather that a positive correlation 
between punishment played and cooperation received by an individual is crucial. We also 
revealed that facultative adjustment of cooperation can give rise to such a positive 
association even in the absence of relatedness between social partners. Finally, we 
demonstrated that the direct benefits accrued when cooperation is facultative may be 
large enough for selection acting at the individual level alone to maintain punishment 
among humans, rendering elaborate population dynamics and cultural practices 
unnecessary. More generally, our results provide a specific example of how positive 
correlations between the behaviors played by social partners can arise and favor 
cooperation for reasons other then kinship. Major tasks for the future include clarifying 
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the links between punishment and reproductive skew theory (Johnstone 2000; Clutton-
Brock et al. 2001; Langer et al. 2004) and developing more specific models for specific 
situations or organisms. 
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7. Social evolutionary multi-locus methodology 
Abstract 
In general, social evolution theory is concerned with correlations between individuals. 
When co-evolution of multiple social traits is studied, associations between these traits 
are typically ignored. This is analogous to the assumption of linkage equilibrium in 
population genetics theory. It is appreciated that allowing for the evolution of linkage 
disequilibrium can qualitatively change the behaviour of an evolving system. This has 
prompted the development of a general multi-locus notation and corresponding 
methodology. Currently, a general methodology for describing co-evolution of social 
traits is lacking, despite recent interest in such models. Analyses which have allowed for 
between-trait associations have done so at the expense of dynamic sufficiency. We 
develop the multi-locus methodology by allowing for genetic associations between as 
well as within individuals, and relate this to the theoretical foundations of social 
evolution. In the process, we highlight the subtlety of Price's theorem and Hamilton's 
rule. The methodology also provides a general framework for building dynamically 
sufficient models of social evolution that allow for associations between traits. We 
illustrate these developments by application of the methodology to the co-evolution of 
cooperation and punishment in humans. 
Introduction 
Although social evolution theory is fundamentally concerned with associations between 
individuals, analyses of the co-evolutionary dynamics of social traits are typically made 
tractable by assuming statistical independence between the traits. For example, Frank 
(1995b, 1996b, 2003a) describes the co-evolutionary dynamics of competitiveness and 
policing behaviour under the assumption that there is no association between these traits 
within individuals. Such independence is analogous to the assumption of linkage 
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equilibrium in population genetic multi-locus models. It has long been understood by 
population geneticists that this assumption can lead to qualitatively misleading 
predictions. Recent co-evolutionary social evolution analyses have highlighted the 
importance of statistical associations between different traits in different social partners, 
for example in the evolution of costly punishment (Gardner & West 2004a; chapter 6) 
and cooperation based on systems of arbitrary markers (Axelrod et al. 2004). In both 
studies, allowing for associatiQns between these traits carried the cost of losing dynamic 
sufficiency. A general methodology for dealing with such social co-evolutionary 
problems, particularly one in which dynamic sufficiency is restored, is currently lacking. 
Barton and Turelli (1991) and Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) have developed a general 
methodology for describing evolutionary change at multiple gene positions, for arbitrary 
ploidy, dominance, epistasis, transmission rules and lifecycles. Central to this 
methodology is the description of the genetical composition of a population in terms of 
associations (generalised from the traditional conception of linkage disequilibrium) 
between gene positions. The methodology is of such generality that it implicitly allows 
for associations between individuals, and so we may add 'arbitrary social interactions' to 
the above list. The purpose of this paper is to make explicit the social evolutionary 
aspects of this methodology, to relate this to the foundations of social evolution theory 
(and in doing so dispelling some misconceptions), and to show that methodology can be 
used as a general tool for conducting dynamically sufficient analyses of social co-
evolutionary problems. 
In order to guide the reader through this chapter, in this section we will provide a brief 
summary of the following sections. In the next section we introduce the multi-locus 
methodology and explain why it is needed in the study of population genetics. This 
involves an introduction to the notation, which is summarised in table 7.1, and a 
description of evolutionary change due to selection and transmission. The section closes 
with an explanation of how the assumption of quasi-linkage equilibrium (QLE) uses the 
multi-locus methodology to greatly simplify multi locus problems. 
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Symbol Definition 
z A phenotypic value 
w Fitness (a special case of z) 
A generic gene position 
X, Arbitrary allelic value at an instance of i 
p, Arbitrary reference value for i 
Allelic deviation ( 	= X 1 - p 
A, U or V An arbitrary set of gene positions 
G Set of all gene positions contributing to phenotype 
W Set of all gene positions contributing to fitness 
Allelic deviation for a set of gene positions A ( 1 A =fJ) 
iEA 
DA Association gene positions in A (DA =E[1 A]); the general 
definition of linkage disequilibrium 
YA Partial regression of phenotype (z)  on the association (CA)  for set 
A; a genotype—*phenotype map 
a A As YA'  for special case where z = wi W; the multi-locus selection 
coefficient 
tU..A Transmission coefficient; the probability that set of positions A 
after transmission derived from set U before transmission 
We then introduce the reader to the foundations of social evolution theory, namely 
Price's (1970) theorem and special cases - Robertson's (1966) secondary theorem of 
natural selection, Fisher's (1930) fundamental theorem of natural selection, and 
Hamilton's (1963, 1964, 1970) rule. The multi-locus statements of change due to 
selection and transmission are related to the corresponding framework of Price. 
Hamilton's rule is derived from multi-locus considerations, illustrating an analogy 
between relatedness and linkage disequilibrium. Extensions of Hamilton's rule 
incorporating non-additivity of fitness components (synergy; Queller 1985) are 
considered. A general restatement of Hamilton's rule which makes explicit all predictors 
(and associations between predictors) is given. 
Following this, we introduce the problem of costly punishment, which has received much 
attention in connection with human behaviour, and has been explored recently by 
Gardner and West (2004a, chapter 6). We work through Gardner and West's simple 
model, employing the social evolutionary multi-locus techniques, recovering and 
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strengthening their results. In particular, the model is made dynamically sufficient, yet 
rendered tractable using the theoretical developments of this chapter. 
Finally, there follows a discussion of what has been achieved in extending the multi-locus 
methodology to social evolution theory. We also point out some potentially interesting 
extensions for the future. 
Multilocus methodology 
Why have a multilocus methodology? 
The formal basis of evolutionary theory rests in population genetics (Queller 1984; 
Grafen 2002). This is the study of purely mechanical population processes such as natural 
selection, mutation, migration and random drift (Crow & Kimura 1970). Proper 
predictions of the course of evolutionary change requires a full description of population 
composition at a given time step. The number of distinct genotypes increases 
exponentially with the number of loci, and so multi-locus analyses, whether analytical or 
simulation based, can be overwhelming and intractable. A common simplifying approach 
(e.g. Haldane 1964) is to assume statistical independence between loci ("linkage 
equilibrium"), so that the large number of genotype frequencies can be reconstructed 
from a smaller number of gene frequencies. Yet statistical associations between loci 
("linkage disequilibria") cannot in general be ignored, as they will often be created by 
population processes, and it is appreciated that indirect selection caused by direct 
selection on linked loci can dramatically alter the course of evolution. Such indirect 
"hitch-hiking" effects are essential for understanding the evolution of sex and 
recombination, the evolution of female mate preferences, gene flow through hybrid 
zones, how hitch-hiking impacts on patterns of genetic diversity, adaptive arguments for 
the evolution of dominance, and much more (see review by Barton 2000, and references 
therein). It is therefore essential that we follow the frequencies of each of the distinct 
genotypes. 
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Expressing evolutionary change in terms of changes in genotype frequencies can obscure 
the dynamics of quantities that are of more immediate interest, for example gene 
frequencies and population mean trait values. An alternative is to follow the gene 
frequencies and all linkage disequilibria, which is the approach adopted by the multi-
locus methodology of Barton and Turelli (1991) and Kirkpatrick et al. (2002), and 
independently developed by Christiansen (1999). This approach involves tracking exactly 
the same number of evolving variables as if we were following genotype frequencies, but 
it lends itself to a quantitative genetic approach which neatly and naturally partitions the 
various causes of evolutionary change. It also leads the way for a powerful simplifying 
assumption, that of "quasi-linkage equilibrium" (Kimura 1965, Nagylaki 1993), which 
reduces the multi-locus problem to the same degree of complexity as the assumption of 
linkage equilibrium, yet retains a great deal more realism. 
The notation 
The power of the multi-locus methodology lies in its generality, but this can make 
discussion of the interpretation of the notation somewhat confusing. To aid the reader, we 
summarise the key notation in table 7.1. The following excursion into the notation will 
highlight only the features which are of most immediate interest to the aims of this paper 
- that is, making the possibilities for modelling social evolution explicit. For a 
comprehensive but exquisitely readable account, the interested reader is directed to 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2002). 
The Barton-Turelli approach describes the genetical composition of the population in 
terms of the allelic values at the various positions where genes can reside and also the 
associations between these positions. For example, a model involving haploids with two 
biallelic loci might involve a separate position for each locus (and associated allelic 
values, or allele frequencies, for each) and alsci a term describing the linkage 
disequilibrium between the two loci. But positions are not synonymous with loci - for 
instance, in a diploid context with genomic imprinting, it may be necessary to distinguish 
the maternal and paternal instances of the same locus as two separate positions. Thus, we 
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might more correctly describe this as a multi-position, as opposed to multi-locus, 
methodology. Alternatively, 'multi-locus' is correct, so long as we understand 'locus' to 
simply mean 'gene position'. 
Of interest to us are the deviations ( = X, - p 1 ) of a gene's allelic value (X) from some 
arbitrary reference value () for a given position(i). It will often be convenient to define 
the reference value as the average allelic value (p 1 = X 1 ) for that position, so that the 
allelic deviations are simply deviations from the average. Associations over sets of 
positions are described in terms of the average product of these deviations, for example 
the association between locus i and locus j is D 1 = E[l 1 ] = E[ 1 x 	= E[(X1 - p 	- 
P)1 which, if we define the reference values as average values for that position, is the 
standard covariance definition for linkage disequilibrium (D 1 = E[X1X] - E[X1]E[X]; 
Lewontin 1974). However, since this approach allows us to generalise the concept of 
associations beyond linkage disequilibrium, we can talk of associations between any 
positions and not simply loci. Also, the flexible notation allows us to easily define the 
association between three or more positions -r for example D IJk = E[Ik] = E[ 1 X X 	- 
and also for a single position. When the reference value is the average allelic value for 
the position, then the association at a single position is zero (D 1 = E[ 1] = E[X1 - 	= 
E[X1 —X 1 ] = 0). Finally, there is no reason why associated positions should not be resident 
in different individuals. The major aim of this paper is to expand upon this crucial point, 
and to forge conceptual links between the understanding of population genetic 
associations and the social evolutionary concept of relatedness. 
Once we have defined the genetical composition of individuals and the population in 
general, we can dscribe phenotypes. A phenotype (z)  is defined as: 
Z_Z + yA(A DA) +EZ , 	 [7.1] 
AG 
where is the mean phenotypic value for the population, G is the set of all positions 
which contribute to the phenotype, 'y is the partial regression of phenotype on the 
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deviation term (1A)  for the set of loci A (holding all other deviations fixed), and s is the 
uncorrelated error. A special case of particular interest is when the phenotype of interest 
is fitness itself. We may express relative fitness as: 
w 
w 
1+ IaA ( A -DA )+ç 
ACW 
	 [7.2] 
Where the a A  terms are the multilocus methodology's generalised selection coefficients, 
and may be described as the partial regressions (i.e. holding all other associations 
constant) of relative fitness on the de.viation (CA)  for a particular set of positions (A), and 
W is the set of all positions contributing to fitness. Barton and Turelli (1991) use these 
definitions to generate expressions for the change in associations, which we will 
summarise in the next subsection. 
Describing changes in associations 
The change in an association due to selection is: 




(Barton & Turelli 1991, Kirkpatrick et al. 2002).We will derive this expression from 
Price's theorem in the next section. Note that this also allows us to describe the change in 
average allelic values at a single position. Since AD 1 = AX, setting reference values to 
position averages (p i = X 1 ), we have: 
ASXI = aUDUi 	 [7.4] 
ucw 
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If we are concerned with biallelic loci with allelic values X 1 = 1 at frequency p. and X. = 0 
at frequency q, = 1 - p,, then the right hand side of equation [7.4] is also the change in 
allele frequency p 1 . Change due to transmission is defined as: 
ATDA =tU_.ADU - DA 
	 [7.5] 
(Kirkpatrick et al. 2002), where the tUA  coefficients represent the probability that the set 
of positions A were drawn from source set of position U during the transmission event. 
Again, we will derive this in the next section, from Price's theorem. Note that, analogous 
to the derivation of expression [7.4] from [7.3], we can use expression [7.5] to describe 
the change in the average allelic value / allele frequency at a position, due to 
transmission. 
It is important to note that reference values ( ) are not automatically updated during the 
selection or transmission event, so that if we used the average allelic values (X,) as 
reference values before the event, the associations after the event (D) are still expressed 
in terms of deviations from the average allelic values before the event. In order to re-
express these in terms of deviations about the current average value, we need to update 
reference values, as outlined by Kirkpatrick et al. (2002). Kirkpatrick et al. also describe 
how deterministic population processes such as mutation and migration can be 
incorporated into the above scheme, so that the selection and transmission expressions 
are sufficiently general to describe such changes. However, this is not of immediate 
interest to this paper, and so will not be considered further. 
Quasi-linkage equilibrium (QLE) 
Kimura (1965) revealed that multi-locus systems often rapidly settle into a state such that 
linkage disequilibria terms (measured in a particular way, which allows them to be 
independent of allele frequencies) become virtually constant. He referred to this state as 
quasi-linkage equilibrium (QLE; see also Nagylaki 1993). As mentioned previously, the 
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complexity of the multi-locus analysis can be made much simpler if we make the 
assumption that QLE has been reached. Indeed, the possibility of using this gambit 
provided the motivation for developing the general multi-locus framework, which is 
specifically geared towards facilitating the QLE assumption. Essentially, we consider that 
the linkage disequilibria (D A) evolve over a much faster time scale than the allele 
frequencies (p s). By separating the time scales we may set all the linkage disequilibrium 
terms to their equilibrium values for a given set of allele frequencies, and from there 
determine how the set of allele frequencies changes from one time step to the next. Thus, 
the linkage disequilibria are implicit, but are not ignored. The QLE assumption is 
therefore more valid than simply assuming that all the loci are statistically independent, 
but manages to reduce the problem to the same level of simplicity. The approximation 
achieved by the QLE is expected to be accurate when selection is weak relative to 
recombination. As noted by Barton and Turelli (1991) and Kirkpatrick et al (2002), the 
QLE gives surprisingly accurate predictions well beyond the situations in which its 
assumptions are likely to fail. 
Social evolutiOn theory 
What is social evolution? 
Social evolution theory is concerned with the evolution of traits which impact on the 
fitness of individuals other than their bearer, especially when there are correlations 
between the traits of interacting individuals (social partners). Classically, these are 
categorised according to the sign of the marginal fitness effects for the bearer of the trait 
and this individual's social partners - figure 1.1. Mutually beneficial (+1+) interactions 
are mutualistic, those which benefit the bearer at the expense of the recipient (+1-) are 
selfish, those which benefit the recipient at the expense of the bearer (-1+) are altruistic, 
and those which are mutually harmful (-I-) are spiteful (Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1985). 
Thesocial evolution literature abounds in intentional language, and so it may be 
somewhat surprising to find that its theoretical foundations lie in the study of passive, 
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mechanical processes which constitutes population genetics. The link between the two 
fields is provided by Price's theorem (Price 1970, Frank 1998, Grafen 1999). 
Price equation 
The Price (1970) equation, one of the three major contributions G.R. Price made to 
evolutionary biology during his short, tragic career (Frank 1995a), is an exact and general 
statement of evolutionary change, and applies to any mapping of subsets and their 
phenotypes between sets. A set of subsets (say, a population of individuals) is denoted the 
parental set, and another set is the offspring set. Subsets are indexed i E I in each set, 
with each subset having a frequency p, phenotypic value z i and fitness w 1 in the parent set 
and a frequency p and phenotype 4 in the offspring set. Offspring subsets are mapped 
to parental subsets by matching indices. Thus the phenotypic change due to transmission 
between a parent indexed i and its offspring (also indexed i) is Az1 = 4 - z. We are 
interested in the change in the mean phenotype of the population. This is: 
A= ' -= p4— = p1 -(z, +Az1 )— = p±z1 -+ p-Az,. 	[7.6] 
yielding the Price equation: 
A= Cov1 [w, ii,]+ E1 [(w, IW)Az 1 ]. 	 [7.7] 
This is a complete, exact, general statement of evolutionary change. It holds for arbitrary 
ploidy (including mixed ploidies), any mating system, mode of inheritance, social 
systems, etc. The conventional interpreiation of Price's equation is that the covariance 
term represents change in the mean trait value of the population due to the differential 
reproductive success of subsets (say, selection between individuals) and the expectation 
term represents the change due to transmission between subsets and their offspring (say, 
details of inheritance). The key to understanding the Price equation is to understand that 
it saFs very little explicitly, that a great deal is implicit, and that it is most useful as a 
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conceptual aid. For this reason, unless dealing with the fundamentals of evolutionary 
theory, it is not advisable to begin an analysis with Price's equation. Rather, the equation 
can be used for interpretation of results, as it helps to partition the various causes of 
change. 
As it stands, Price's equation lacks dynamic sufficiency, meaning that it cannot be used 
to predict the course of evolution beyond a single generation. For example, given 
information about a population's composition in terms of genotype fitnesses and 
frequencies, Price's equation can be used to predict the change in gene frequencies, but 
not the associations between loci. However, since the equation can be used to follow the 
evolution of any trait, we can follow the change in linkage disequilibrium terms. The 
problem is that this requires knowledge of higher order associations. In general, dynamic 
sufficiency requires that higher order moments of population composition can be 
decomposed into lower order moments (Barton & Turelli 1987, Frank 1998). Such a 
decomposition requires a complete model of population composition (in terms of a finite 
number of allelic states) and processes. Given a complete model of the population, 
Price's approach can be made dynamically sufficient. The multi-locus methodology, in 
particular the recursions for changes in the association terms (DA) due to selection and 
transmission, is the result of applying Price's theorem to a complete model of population 
genetics, as noted by Barton and Turelli (1991). The complete model of the population is 
specified by the multi-locus selection coefficients (a A), genotype-phenotype mappings 
(?A), transmission rules (tUA), and generalized linkage disequilibria (DA). 
To demonstrate this, we now derive the multi-locus expressions for change in 
associations due to selection (equation [7.3]) and transmission (equation [7.5]) from the 
above Price equation [7.7]. Consider a population with focal association DA  undergoing 
first a selection event (to give D) and then a transmission event (t9 give Di'). The 
change in the population mean deviation due to selection (AsE[ A] = ASDA = D.-DA) is: 
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ASDA =Cov(w/W, A ) 




where the complicated term appearing in the second line is a partial regression of relative 
fitness (wIW) on the product of the deviations () for a set of positions (U), holding all 
other deviation terms fixed, and so is simply the multi-locus selection coefficient, a u . The 
change due to transmission (A T DA = Di'— D) according to Price is: 
ATDA =E[(wI)AA] 
= E[(1+ 	 _D A )+EW )( 	tU=ADU A)] 
vcw 	 u:u-A 
= 	tU.ADU -DA + 	tu 	a(DD -D'D)_ aV(DAV -D A D V ) [7.9] 
U:UA 	 U:U-A vcw 	 vcw 
= 	tU=ADU _(DA + 
U:U-A 
= 	tU=ADU -DA 
A 
aV(DAV _D A D V )) 
vcw 
Using these recursions the change in each of the association terms (DA) can be 
determined, giving a complete description of the population in the next time step. The 
recursions can therefore be applied again, to give a full compositional description of 
populations placed further in the future. At any stage, expression [7.1] (the genotype-to-
phenotype map) can be applied to give a complete phenotypic description of the 
population. Thus, a Price equation analysis can be dynamically sufficient, given a 
complete (closed) model for it to work upon. The combination of Price's equation and a 
completely general notation in which to fully describe the composition of the population 
is the multi-locus methodology. 
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Levels of selection versus neighbour-modulated fitness 
One of the immediate applications of Price's equation is to the theory of group selection 
(Price 1972a, Wade 1985). Consider that the subsets (indexed i) in the above derivation 
of Price's equation are now made up of smaller sub-subsets (indexedj E .1). The subsets 
can be described in terms of the properties of their component sub-subsets, i.e. 
w, = Y (q,/q)w 	 [7.10] 
and 
z= Y,(qij 	 [7.11] 
where -qij is the frequency of the j  sub-subset in the whole set, and hence q 1Jq1 is the 
frequency of the th  sub-subset in the ith  subset. The transmission term in the Price 
equation [7.7] can therefore be regarded as being made up of the reproduction and 
redistribution of the sub-subsets during the reproduction of the subsets (i.e. a lower level 
selection event) plus a component- describing changes in the properties of these sub-
subsets themselves (a lower level transmission event): 
i= Cov1 [w1 IW,z,.]+E1 [(wIW)itz,] 
= Cov,[w/ W, 7, ] + E, [Covj [ wij W, z ij li]+E[..]] 
	 [7.12] 
The lower level transmission can be further expanded to involve selection between even 
lower levels, and associated transmission, and so on for an arbitrary number of levels of 
selection. For simplicity, and to make the potentially confusing general description above 
more concrete, we will focus on only two levels - individuals and groups of individuals. 
We will also assume that individuals have perfect heredity (Az ij = 0). The Price equation 
[7.7] therefore takes the form: 
123 
A= Covjw,/ W,z.]+Ej[Cov j [w/W,z, Ii]] 
q(w 1;7)z. - 1+ 	 - (wi/)zi) 	
[7.13] 
= Cov[w,3 W,z jj  
Thus the separate group and individual level selection terms can be summarised in a 
single individual selection covariance form. The key to understanding this selection 
covariance is that wij is the individual's total fitness, which contains information about 
that individual's relative success within its group, and the group's relative success within 
the whole population. In the context of the evolutioh of altruism, altruists suffer a within-
group disadvantage (Cov[w,1 IW,z, 1 I i] <0) due to exploitation by more selfish social 
partners, and a group level advantage (Cov 1 [w 1 IW,zJ >0) due to their altruism, which 
might under some conditions give a total advantage for altruism (Cov[w,, Ii,z 1 ] > 0). The 
'neighbour-modulated' fitness (w 1 ; Hamilton 1964) will reflect any tendency for altruistic 
individuals to associate with other altruists such that the benefits of socialising of 
altruistic neighbours might outweigh the immediate costs of altruism, to derive a net 
fitness benefit. The condition under which this is met is Hamilton's (1963) rule, RB>C, 
which we will derive in a later section from such neighbour-modulated fitness 
considerations. This illustrates a fundamental equivalence between group selection and 
kin selection - mathematically they are the same process. The kin selection versus group 
selection debate is therefore empirically empty, yet it still rages in many of social 
evolution's sister disciplines (Bergstrom 2002). 
Using neighbour modulated fitness to model social evolution is equivalent to using a 
'levels of selection' approach. Wenseleers et al. (2004) provides a recent example of how 
social evolutionary problems - in their example, worker policing - can be tackled from 
these different angles, illustrating their equivalence. In developing the social evolutionary 
aspects of the multi-locus methodology, we can equivalently take two approaches: (1) a 
levels of selection view, where we assign fitnesses to groups of individuals according to 
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the genetics of these individuals, and model the within group selection process within the 
generalised multi-locus framework for transmission; or (2) a neighbour-modulated fitness 
view, where we assign fitnesses to individuals according to their genetical composition 
and that of their social partners. In practice, levels of selection approaches are rather more 
cumbersome and technically problematic than neighbour-modulated fitness approaches, 
and so, following the trend of the social evolution literature, we will focus on the latter 
for the remainder of this paper. 
Secondary theorem of natural selection & the phenotypic gambit 
Social evolution theory, as with evolutionary ecology in general, mostly concerns itself 
only with the operation of selection on phenotypes, which is only one part of total 
evolutionary change. This is neatly summarised by Price's covariance term, or what is 
often referred to as Robertson's (1966) secondary theorem of natural selection: 
A 5 = Cov[w/W,z]. 	 [7.14] 
This phenotypic gambit (Grafen 1984), whereby changes due to transmission are ignored, 
allows a tractable analysis of evolutionary problems where we have no information about 
the genetic architecture of a trait. The gambit pays off, since many predictions of social 
evolution theory are astoundingly well supported by empirical observation, in a 
quantitative rather than simply qualitative sense. For example, sex allocation theory 
provides among the best evidence for adaptation in the real world (West & Herre 1998, 
Frank 2002). In addition to pragmatics, the focus on only a partial change has a more 
fundamental basis, and follows the precedent of R.A. Fisher (1930, 1941). 
Fundamental theorem of natural selection & individual as maximising agent analogy 
In Fisher's view, the "most important application of this analysis (which can be applied 
to any measurable character) is to give a rational account of the action of natural 
selection" (Fisher 1941). This rational account formed the basis of chapter 2 of his (1930) 
book, The genetical theory of natural selection. The result, which he described as the 
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fundamental theorem of natural selection, perplexed biologists for decades until it was 
explained by Price (1972b) and Ewens (1989) - see Edwards (1994) for a complete 
history of this theorem. Although Price did not use this particular approach, the true 
meaning of the fundamental theorem is most easily illustrated using his selection 
covariance mathematics (Edwards 1994, Frank 1998). As Fisher (1941) hinted, the 
fundamental theorem is simply a special case of the secondary theorem of natural 
selection, where the focal trait (z)  is fitness (w) itself. Hence: 
A sWCov[wI,w] = Var[w]fli. 	 [7.15] 
As Fisher (1930) put it, "the rate of increase of fitness of any species is equal to the 
genetic variance in fitness", and since variances are non-negative then the mean fitness of 
the population increases when there is variation in fitness. By framing the derivation in 
this way, we see that the fundamental theorem is a statement of only a partial change 
(Price 1972b, Ewens 1989, Frank & Slatkin 1992, Edwards 1994). Fisher (1930) 
deliberately excludes changes in mean fitness due to the "deterioration of the 
environment", which are neatly summarised by Price's (1970) transmission term (in 
equation [7.7]). Of course, the fundamental theorem could never claim to be a complete 
description of evolutionary change in mean fitness. Much attention has been devoted to 
demonstrating how the intricacies of genetical systems can lead to decreases in the mean 
fitness of population (Moran 1964), but simply acknowledging the existence of natural 
disasters should convince that mean fitness does not always increase. Price (1972b) was 
disappointed with this conclusion, as was Ewens (1989), who popularised this 
interpretation. If the fundamental theorem is only a partial statement, then what is its 
significance? 
The significance is that this partial change represents the engine of adaptation, a 
mathematical description of Darwin's improbability generator, natural selection (Grafen 
2003). Fisher has isolated, from the complicated and perhaps intrinsically unpredictable 
total evolutionary change in fitness, the purely mechanical process which gives riselto 
adaptedness and hence the appearance of design. Thus, the fundamental theorem provides 
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the beginnings of a formal logical basis for Darwin's analogy that natural selection 
should cause individuals to behave as if they were designed to maximise their fitness 
(Grafen 1999, 2002). It provides a licence for biologists to make use of this analogy, and 
hence forms the fundamental basis of all evolutionary optimisation theory (Grafen 2003), 
which side steps the details of population genetics to ask: which strategy should an 
organism employ in order to maximise its fitness? 
With the adoption of Darwin's analogy comes the language of agency, which has been 
used extensively and profitably within evolutionary ecology. The use of such intentional 
language highlights a major problem for evolutionary biologists - the pervasiveness of 
apparently 'altruistic' behaviours in the natural' world. W.D. Hamilton (1963, 1964, 1970) 
solved the problem by introducing the concept of neighbour-modulated fitness and an 
associated condition - Hamilton's rule - to describe when social behaviours are 
selectively favoured. 
Hamilton 's rule 
As with the fundamental theorem of natural selection, much attention hasbeen devoted to 
demonstrating the non-validity of Hamilton's rule (reviewed by Grafen 1 985a). We shall 
see that the rule isa mathematically true statement, and that it is only the action of natural 
selection which is of interest. 
Implicit in the secondary theorem is the impact on fitness (w) of all the determinants of 
fitness which are correlated with the focal trait (z) - earlier we introduced the concept of 
neighbour-modulated fitness, whereby the phenotype of a social partners is included as a 
determinant of fitness. Hamilton (1964, 1970) makes such social determinants explicit in 
the derivation of his rule. From the secondary theorem, we have 




The regression of relative fitness on one's own phenotype value (l 3,) can be further 
partitioned to give: 
= (w,Z + p z. f3z .)Var[z]I 
	
[7.17] 
Where the partial regression of fitness on own phenotype value (i.e. holding fixed the 
social partner phenotype, Z) is 13wz.Z = - C, i.e. the cost of the social phenotype; the partial 
regression of fitness on social partner phenotype (i.e. holding own phenotype fixed) is 
13w,Zz = +B, i.e. the benefit of having social partners with the trait; and the regression of 
social partner phenotype on own phenotype is j3Zz  which is the coefficient of relatedness 
(R; Hamilton 1970, Grafen 1985a) between the focal individual and its social partners. 
Assuming that there is some variance in phenotype, selection acts to increase the average 
phenotypic value of the population when 
RB> C. 	 [7.18] 
This derivation of the rule has been phrased in terms of a focal individual's direct, 
neighbour-modulated fitness (Hamilton 1964) - the costs and benefits accrue directly to 
the focal individual, and the relatedness term describes how the phenotypes of social 
partners relates to one's own phenotype. A potential problem with neighbour-modulated 
fitness is that it cannot properly be regarded as a measure that is maximised by an 
individual agent. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the association (relatedness, R) 
which ensures that,for example, an individual who displays more altruism than average 
enjoys the company of social partners who are more altruistic than average can in general 
only be thought of in terms of correlation rather than causation. The focal individual does 
not directly manipulate the social behaviours of her partners. Thus, there may be a 
correlation, but not necessarily a causal relationship, between an individual's strategy and 
fitness. Secondly, a worker in a social insect colony may altruistically forego her own 
reproduction in order to help the queen raise progeny. Clearly, such a strategy does not 
maximise the neighbour-modulated fitness of the altruist. Properly understood, 
neighbour-modulated fitness is a measure associated with the strategy (gene, breeding 
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value, etc) itself, which is averaged over instances of the strategy across the various 
classes of individual, and is not assocated with any particular individual. This may be 
described as the "gene's eye view" (Dawkins 1976). In order to salvage the individual as 
maximising agent analogy for social behaviours, Hamilton (1964) introduced the concept 
of "inclusive fitness". Rather than measuring an individual's direct success as a function 
of its social strategy and the correlated strategies of its neighbours, inclusive fitness 
measures all the effects of a focal actor's behaviour on the reproductive success of 
recipients, each increment being weighted according to the relatedness between the actor 
and the recipient. Here, relatedness is regarded as a measure of fidelity of transmission of 
one's own genes through the reproduction of social partners as opposed to the direct 
alternative (Frank 1997). Inclusive fitness is then associated with particular actors, and is 
a direct outcome of their behaviours, so it represents a true individual maximand. 
Neighbour-modulated fitness and inclusive fitness are simply alternative methods of 
book-keeping, and are equally valid approaches (Frank 1997a, 1998). It is interesting to 
note that, either way, the correct definition of Hamilton's (1970) coefficient of 
relatedness is a regression, and is not in general a probability measure such as the 
probability that genes are identical by descent (Malecot 1948). 
As discussed above in relation to Price's theorem, Hamilton's rule is a rather subtle 
statement of evolutionary change, with many details implicitly tidied away into its three 
components, so naïve applications of the rule are likely to lead to difficulties - as we 
shall see. In undertaking a social evolutionary analysis it is advisable to begin with a 
concrete model of, for example, neighbour-modulated fitness, rather than beginning with 
Hamilton's rule. Hamilton's rule should appear as a result of the analysis, and provides a 
useful conceptual aid (Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998). 
We now derive an example Hamilton's rule for a simple model, using the multi-locus 
machinery. Let haploid individuals who socialise in pairs have a biallelic locus 
controlling their social behaviour. An allele with value X 1 = 1 has population frequency p1 
and causes: a direct fitness cost to self (who is denoted 1); a direct fitness benefit to 
partner (denoted 2); where these two components of fitness are additive. The alternative 
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is a null allele, with value X1 = 0, and frequency q 1 = 1 —pt.  The change in the frequency 
of the altruistic allele due to selection is: 
ASA = AD1 = a 1 D 11 + a 1 D 11 = (a 1 + a 1 R)p 1q1 	 [7.19] 
i.e. selection causes an increase in the frequency of the altruistic allele when R a 12 > - 
a11 .The multi-locus selection coefficients a 11 and a12 provide the (relativised) cost and 
benefit terms of Hamilton's rule. This simple derivation illustrates a connection between 
the concept of relatedness in social evolution theory and linkage disequilibrium in 
population genetics - both are associations between gene positions. As we discovered in 
the derivation of Hamilton's rule [7.18], relatedness is a regression, and moreover in this 
example model it is the regression associated with the covariance term describing the 
'linkage disequilibrium' between individuals within a locus. This might seem rather 
obvious, but it is important to explicitly point out, as there is extensive misunderstanding 
as to what the coefficient of relatedhess is. 
Relatedness is often interpreted as a probability measure, though this is not in general 
correct - as we have seen, it is a regression coefficient. For example, negative 
probabilities are not permissible, yet negative relatedness is, and this allows for the 
evolution of spiteful behaviours (Hamilton 1970, Grafen 1985a, Foster et a! 2001, 
Gardner & West (in press), chapter 4). Why is this misconception so prevalent? Hamilton 
(1963) understood that the coefficient of relatedness was in principle a regression 
coefficient, but argued that under weak selection it could be approximated by Wright's 
(1922) correlation coefficient of relationship. The coefficient of relationship is expressed 
in terms of path coefficients describing the genetic associations between and within 
individuals, and these have popularly been interpreted as probabilities of IBD (Malecot 
1948). It is interesting to note that Wright used the example of negative path coefficients 
between uniting gametes when there is outbreeding to illustrate his disagreement with 
Malecot's probability of IBD approach (Wright 1969, Nee et al. 2002). Malecot's 
interpretation, which may be valid in certain circumstances though not in general, is 
presented as mathematical fact in such classic texts as Crow & Kimura's (1970) 
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Introduction to population genetics, and so the misconception has taken root in the heart 
of population genetics. Thus we are left in the bizarre situation where population 
geneticists are happy to talk about negative linkage disequilibrium but not negative 
relatedness - although the above derivations (hopefully) demonstrate their conceptual 
equivalence. While on the subject of what Hamilton's relatedness measure is not, is 
worth pointing out that it is not a measure of genealogical closeness. Hamilton (1964) 
illustrated this point with the famous 'green beard' (Dawkins 1976) thought experiment. 
See Queller et al. (2003) and Keller & Ross (1998) for empirical examples of green 
beards. 
Given the conceptual link between relatedness and linkage disequilibrium, it may be 
fruitful to imagine that the same forces sha5ing linkage disequilibrium will be acting 
analogously upon relatedness. Linkage disequilibrium can arise due to drift and 
incomplete recombination, and similarly positive relatedness between social partners will 
often arise due to drift and incomplete dispersal generating within-group associations. It 
is also well appreciated that epistatic interaction between loci can be a cause of linkage 
disequilibrium, so we could expect positive relatedness to arise when, say, cooperative 
groups have synergistic success. For example, Frank (1994) has shown that synergistic 
selection for more mutualistic groups can generate positive relatedness between social 
partners, even where genealogical closeness is ruled out (for example, because the social 
partners belong to separate species). A slight technical difficulty here is that epistasis is 
defined as a departure from multiplicity, whereas synergy terms in social evolution 
models (encountered in the next subsection) are described as deviations from additivity. 
How far the analogy between linkage disequilibrium and relatedness will stretch is 
unclear, and merits attention. 
Extending Hamilton's rule 
In the derivation of Hamilton's rule [7.18] for the example model above, we assumed that 
components of fitness (costs, benefits) combined additively. Allowing for such an 
additional interaction term extends the rule, so that we have: 
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A 5p1 =a. D.. +a. D.. +a 1 . D... >0. 
II 	liii 	 1 2 	1 1 1 2 	 1 1 2 	1 1 1 1 1 2 
[7.20] 
It is worthwhile to pause here and consider what the above extension represents, as 
previous discussion surrounding this type of approach have been misleading and are 
borne out of misunderstandings about Hamilton's rule. Queller (1984, 1985) stipulated an 
equivalent extension - his approach is effectively a special case whereby all the reference 
values are zero ( = 0), whereas with the multi-locus approach they are entirely 
arbitrary, though it is natural to set them equal to the mean trait value (p 1 = X ) - and 
this was specially motivated by the possibility of non-additivity of fitness components 
within social interactions. He described new 'synergy' coefficients, related to the D 42 
term (which in our scheme may be interpreted as the population average association 
between an individual's allelic value at locus i and the association at i between that 
individual and her social partner), which is multiplied by a term relating to the interaction 
payoff. Grafen (1 985a, b) argued that such complicating terms are actually implicit in the 
existing cost (C) and benefit (B) of Hamilton's rule, so that the rule already sufficiently 
handles such scenarios. 
To illustrate, consider a two player game with payoff matrix as illustrated in figure 7.1. 
Queller (1984) essentially argues that the 'Hamilton's rule' R b > c is insufficient to 
predict whether or not selection favours cooperation, and so corrects the rule by adding a 
synergy coefficient to multiply the interaction payoff (d). But R b > c is not the 
Hamilton's rule we derived in the previous section, it is a straw man, and is easily shown 
to be deficient. For example, if we allow only the pure strategies Cooperate (C; z = 1) 
and Defect (D; z = 0), with respective frequencies p and q, then we have fitnesses: 
w = a+(R+(1—R)p)(b— c+d)—(1—R)(1— p)c 
w D — a+(l—R)pb 
Applying the secondary theorem, we find that selection favours an increase in the 
Cooperate strategy when: 
[7.21] 
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Player 2 strategy 
Player I strategy Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate b — c+d —c 
Defect 0 
Figure 7.1. Payoff to player 1 from a social interaction between players 1 and 2, as a 




RB > C 
[7.22] 
where the three components of Hamilton's rule fulfil their proper definitions: R = / 2' B 
= 	and C = I3w,zZ Thus Hamilton's rule, if correctly understood, is equipped to deal 
with such game theoretic scenarios, even when fitness effects are large such that 
interaction terms (d) are nontrivial. With this in mind, expression [7.20] is not presented 
as the addition of a correction term to complete a deficient Hamilton's rule, but rather it 
is an extension of the existing components into their implicit subcomponents, making 
explicit what is already there. Hamilton's rule provides, in unmodified form, the general 
framework in which to understand social evolutionary problems as sought by, for 
example, Charlesworth (2000) and Wenseleers & Ratnieks (2001). The cost and benefit 
terms are somewhat complicated, so that Hamilton's rule cannot quite claim "to be 
applied painlessly to solve particular problems" (Charlesworth 2000), but this misses the 
point. As remarked upon previously, Hamilton's rule should not be used as a starting 
point for an analysis, but rather it should appear as a result of applying more standard and 
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concrete methodologies (Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998), such as population genetics 
or game theory. By framing the results of an analysis in terms of Hamilton's rule, we 
have translated the problems into the common language of social evolution theory, 
allowing for simple comparisons and contrasts regardless of the diversity of biological 
scenarios and analytical approaches. 
Simply by applying the multi-locus notation, we can extend Hamilton's rule for arbitrary 
numbers of gene positions (for example, multiple loci and multiple social partners) and 
for arbitrary statistical associations and fitness interactions between these positions. From 
the secondary theorem, the change in the population average for any trait (z)  which is 
attributed to the action of selection is given by the covariance of relative fitness and trait 
value. In general, this is: 
Az = Cov[w/w,z]— 	YAaU(DAU — D A DU ). 	 [7.23] 
AcG ucG 
As we have seen, Hamilton's rule is simply a restatement of the secondary theorem 
which gives particular attention to the association between social partners. Making a 
separate generalised multi-locus Hamilton's rule makes little sense. Expression [7.23] 
suffices, provided that we keep in mind that sets of gene positions A and U may span 
several individuals, so that certain associations may be interpreted as linkage 
disequilibria, others as relatedness, and others as between-locus between-individual 
associations. To illustrate, we will consider a sithple social evolutionary multi-locus 
problem which makes reference to each of these different associations in the next section. 
Example: cooperation and punishment 
The problem 
A major concern of evolutionary biologists is to explain the prevalence of cooperation 
from primordial replicators to human and animal society, given that at every level of 
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biological organization there is the possibility of selfish behaviour disrupting group 
harmony (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995). Human cooperation in particular poses a 
major problem, as in general it is felt that relatedness (and the probability of repeat 
interactions) is not high enough to support altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003 provide a 
recent review). One solution which has recently received much attention is the threat of 
punishment (Boyd & Richerson 1992, Sober & Wilson 1998, Fehr & Gachter 2000) - 
although this poses its own problems. Punishing incurs costs for the punisher, and so it 
too has been regarded as altruistic (Fehr & Gachter 2002). Such altruistic punishment has 
been observed repeatedless in empirical studies of human behaviour (for example, Fehr 
& Gachter 2002). As yet it defies explanation. One argument (e.g. Sober & Wilson 1998) 
suggests that punishment will often be cheaper than cooperation, so that kin selection can 
maintain altruistic punishment even when relatedness is too low for cooperation to be 
directly favoured. Hence, kin selection maintains punishment which maintains 
cooperation. 
Gardner and West (2004a; chapter 6) rejected this explanation, showing that since 
punishment directly harms both punisher and punished, increased relatedness between 
social partners directly disfavours the evolution of puiishment. For this reason, such a 
lose-lose interaction might be better described as spite (for example, see Johnstone & 
Bshary 2004). Gardner and West suggested that a different association between 
individuals - the association between the cooperation strategy of one's social partners 
and one's own punishment strategy - can allow for the evolution of punishment. A verbal 
argument suggested that when relatives tend to interact, linkage disequilibrium will arise 
since punishers are more likely to be associated with punishers and hence are under 
stronger selection to cooperate, and this linkage disequilibrium coupled with relatedness 
would give rise to the crucial association between the traits between social partners. 
Gardner and West's social evolutionary analysis was incapable of following the 
evolutionary dynamics of such associations, and so the idea remains unexamined. 
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Illustrative Model 
Following Gardner and West (2004a; chapter 6), we examine a simple model which 
captures all the necessary details. Haploid individuals interact in pairs, with one 
individual from each pair randomly assigned the role of Player 1, and the other Player 2. 
Player 1 either cooperates (incurring personal cost c and giving Player 2 a benefit b) or 
defects (no pay-off for either player), and Player 2 may respond to defection either with 
punishment (incurring personal cost a and inflicting a cost d for Player 1) or else 
forgiveness (no pay-off for either player). Cooperation and punishment strategies are 
encoded by biallelic loci i andj respectively, with allele X 1 = 1 giving cooperation / X 1 = 0 
giving defection, and X = 1 giving punishment / X, = 0 giving forgiveness, and these 
alleles have population frequency p. / qj and p/ q1 respectively. Mating is at random (no 
associations between uniting gametes) and recombination between the two loci occurs at 
rate r. For simplicity, we will treat the relatedness (R) between social partners as a 
parameter, rather than an evolving variable. 
Multilocus analysis 
The fitness function is: 
w=1—X +X _(i-x.)x._(i_x.)x.. 
2 " 	2 12 	2 1 2 	2 	1' 	J2 
[7.24] 
Making the substitution = X 1 —p, (i.e. p i = p 1) and dividing both sides by 7,  gives the 
form of expression [7.2]. Here, the multi-locus selection coefficients are those 
coefficients multiplying the corresponding allelic deviations 1A•  These are: 
a , =(_c+dp)/2 	a, 
a = — aq /2 	 a = — dq1 /2 	 [7.25] 
a.. 






w =i+!', 	 +.D1 	
[7.26] 
=i+E_ a±dqp + 	 RDjj  
Note that, because of the symmetjy of the model, the association between individuals 
between loci is the same in both directions: D, 12 = D 21 . Further, this association is equal 
to R D 1 , i.e. the between locus between individual association is given by the product of 
the association within individuals between loci (linkage disequilibrium, D,) and the 
regression between individuals within loci (relatedness, R). This is shown by considering 
that: 
D41 =Cov[, 1 ] 
= f3 Var[ I J2 
= ( 	+ 	 )var[] 
= (o +R13)Var[ j ] 
RDjj  
[7.27] 
And by symmetry, the same is true for D,211 . By substituting into expressions [7.3] and 
[7.5], correcting for the update in reference values after selection, we obtain the change in 
the frequency of the cooperation allele, the frequency of the punishment allele, and the 
linkage disequilibrium between the two loci. 
Before proceeding to examine the invasion and maintenance conditions for punishing 
behaviour, we will first examine the direction of change in linkage disequilibrium (AD 1 ) 
when it is initially absent (D 1 = 0). Gardner and West gave a verbal argument suggesting 
that positive linkage disequilibrium should result when social partners are related, such 
that punishers associate with punishers and hence are more heavily selected to be 
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cooperators. Substituting D ii  = 0 into the recursion for linkage disequilibrium evolution 
gives: 
/ a+d + (Rb-c+(Ra+d)p1)(a+Rd)q, 
2 	 42 	
)pgipjqj [7.28] 
When there is zero relatedness (R = 0) between social partners and no linkage 
disequilibrium (D=  0), after a single generation the linkage disequilibrium will be (1-
r)a(pd - c)pqpq14W 2 , i.e. it will increase if pd>c, and decrease if pd<c. This reveals 
that there is another pressure generating associations between the loci: the additivity of 
fitness components translates into a deviation from multiplicity (epistasis) and hence 
linkage disequilibrium. For weak selection (a, b, c, d << 1; hence negligible epistasis), 
and positive relatedness (R>0) between social partners R>O, then (to leading order) the 
linkage disequilibrium (Do)  increases from zero to -(1-r)R(a+d)p1qp1q1 after a single 
generation. This is true for stronger selection given a sufficient frequency of cooperators 
(it is exactly true for p.-1, regardless of the strength of selection). This is the effect 
predicted by Gardner and West. 
Let us first consider the evolutionary origin of punishment. When punishing is rare, 
cooperation is also disfavoured, so we may set p, = op 1 and pj = Op, where the 0 denotes 
an infinitesimal quantity. This being the case, we may also set the linkage disequilibrium 
Dii = oD. This allows us to ignore higher order terms, linearising the system. The 
resulting recursions can be summarised in matrix form: 
óp' 	l+(Rb-c)12 	0 	 -(1-R)a12 	 op 1 
= 0 	1-(a+Rd)/2 	(R(a+b+d)-c)12 op 3 	[7.29] 
OD,J' 	0 0 	(1-r)(1+(Rb-c+(1-R)a)/2) OD,1 
Or, more compactly, as x' = Mx. The three eigenvalues are solutions (X) of the 
characteristic equation Det[M - X I] = 0 (where I is the 3x3 identity matrix), and are: 1 
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- (Rb - c)12, (1 - r)(1 + (Rb - c + (1 - R)a)12), and 1 - (a + Rd)12. The punishment allele 
invades when the leading eigenvalue (the solution with the largest magnitude) exceeds 1. 
Noting that we are only interested in situations where Rb<c (because otherwise 
punishment is not required for the evolution of cooperation), the three eigenvalues are all 
less than 1. Hence, in this simple model, the punishment gene cannot invade the 
population. 
We now consider the evolutionary maintenance of punishment, by setting p1 = 1 - öp,, p 
= 1 - ôp and Dij = oD. The recursions, summarised in matrix form, are: 
1—Ra/2+(1—R)b/2—d/2 







Rb12+(1—R)(a+d)12—c12  •Iop [7.30] 
l+b/2—c/2 
0 (l—r) 1—(l—R)(a—b+d)12 
l+b/2—c!2 
The eigenvectors for the above matrix are: 
R(a+d)/2 
111 101 	R(a+d)12+(1—R)a/2—r(1—(1—R)(a—b+d)/2) I 
(Rb—c+(1—R)(a+d))/2 	 I o 	L and 	 I 	[7.31] 
(Rb— c+(1—R)(a+d))/2+r(1—(1—R)(a— b+d)/2) I Lol [o] 	 i 	
j 
Two of the three eigenvectors for the matrix are trivial, involving no variation at one of 
the two loci. The third is non-trivial only for R>0. It is biologically meaningful only if it 
corresponds to non-negative allele frequencies, i.e. the first and second elements have the 
same sign. The corresponding eigenvalue is: 




when this is less than 1, the perturbation in allele frequencies and linkage disequilibrium 
is neutralised, so that the population of cooperator-punishers is resistant to invasion. 
Lets first consider tight linkage relative to intensity of selection, i.e. r << a, b, c, d. Then 
the eigenvector is, approximate to leading ordei: {R(a+d)I(Rd-(1-2R)a),1,1}. This is 
biologically plausible for sufficiently small a. Making the appropriate substitutions into 
the eigenvalue, we find that this is less than 1 when Rb + (1-R)(a+d) > c, i.e. there are 
regions of parameter space allowing for the maintenance of punishment by selection. 
Looking to the other extreme, where selection is weak relative to recombination (r >> a, 
b, c, d), the eigenvector is, to leading order, approximately: {-R(a+d)12r, (Rb + (1-
R)(a+d)-c)12r,1}. The first element is always negative, so to give a biologically plausible 
allele frequency would require a rescaling of the eigenvector such that we would have a 
negative linkage disequilibrium. From [7.28] we expect linkage disequilibrium to 
increase from zero, so we can rule out this solution as meaningless. Hence, if selection is 
weak then punishment is not resistant to invasion by a more forgiving allele. This is 
because the crucial association (between one's punishment and one's social partner's 
cooperation) is proportional to the linkage disequilibrium between the cooperation and 
punishment loci within individuals. Strong linkage disequilibrium cannot arise when 
selection is weak relative to recombination. 
Discussion 
Evolutionary problems involving multiple traits are problematic in that associations 
between traits can cause direct selection on one trait-to result in indirect selection on the 
associated traits. Social evolution theory is concerned with the consequences of 
associations between individuals, but typically ignores associations between traits. For 
simplicity, co-evolving traits are assumed to be statistically independent, for example in 
the policing models of Frank (1995b, 1996b, 2003a). However, recent theory has 
emphasized the importance of between-trait associations in the evolution of costly 
punishment (Gardner & West 2004a; chapter 6) and altruism based on arbitrary tags 
(Axelrod et al. 2004). These studies extended Hamilton's rule to multiple co-evolving 
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social traits, but unfortunately lost dynamic sufficiency in the process. In extending the 
multi-locus methodology to social evolutionary problems we have provided a general 
framework within which we can construct extended Hamilton's rules describing the 
action of selection on co-evolving social traits. Additionally, the methodology also 
provides the means for making such an analysis dynamically sufficient. This has been 
illustrated by re-examining Gardner and West's model of cooperation and punishment 
using the new theoretical tool. Although we have focused on simple one-gene-for-one-
trait models, the notation is sufficiently general to allow for social evolutionary problems 
involving arbitrary numbers of traits with arbitrary genetic architectures. 
We have adopted a neighbour-modulated fitness view, derived from Price's theorem. 
Application of the Price equation to social evolution theory also suggests an alternative 
approach for describing the evolution of social behaviours. The levels of selection 
approach decomposes evolutionary change according to selection events at different 
scales of biological organisation. Selection at lower levels is described in terms of 
transmission at higher levels. Both approaches are equally valid - group selection is 
mathematically equivalent to kin selection. In extending the multi-locus methodology to 
social evolution we may validly employ either approach. In general, social evolution 
theory has found the latter approach to be the most useful for modelling actual biological 
problems, and so we have adopted a neighbour-modulated view for much of this paper. 
We have concerned ourselves with asking how relatedness between social partners 
influences the evolution of social traits, and have not in general enquired as to the 
evolution of relatedness itself. To do so would require that we specify a model of the 
segregation of individuals within and between groups, which is difficult in the current 
neighbour-modulated fitness scheme but is ably handled by the general selection / 
transmission framework of the multi-locus methology when applied to groups. Hence, a 
multi-locus levels of selection approach will be more appropriate for certain problems, 
and deserves attention. 
In showing that the multi-locus methodology is implicit in Price's (1970) scheme, we 
have illustrated the subtlety of Price's approach. Hamilton's (1963, 1964, 1970) rule, 
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which derives directly from Price's equation, is a similarly subtle statement of 
evolutionary change. Failure to recognize the subtlety and complexity of Hamilton's rule 
has led to statements to the effect that it is deficient, provides only approximate 
predictions, and that in complicated models it needs to be modified by adding novel 
components. Such attempts at fixing Hamilton's rule can be understood in terms of the 
multi-locus methodology, and we have shown that all that has been achieved is to make 
existing implicit components explicit. Of course, illuminating the hidden is of value, 
provided that we understand this is all that is being done. Hamilton's rule is a true, 
general statement describing the action of natural selection on social traits, and thus it 
provides a unifying principle and common framework within which the whole of social 
evolution theory may be understood. We emphasize that, because of the hidden 
subtleties, Hamilton's rule is not usually appropriate for use as a starting point in analyses 
of social evolution. A more concrete approach, such as starting with a population genetics 
model, or writing down a direct neighbour-modulated fitness function, is less beset with 
pitfalls, and if done correctly should result in Hamilton's rule in some form dropping out 
of the analysis. It can then be used as a conceptual aid (Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 
1998). The same applies to Price's theorem, which is generally unwieldy when employed 
to analyse particular problems, and is often more appropriate for understanding the 
results of an evolutionary analysis. 
Gardner and West (2004a, chapter 6) highlighted the importance of the association 
between a focal individual's punishing strategy and the cooperation displayed by its 
social partners in favouring the evolution of costly punishment. A verbal model 
suggested this could be a manifestation of having both an association between the traits 
within an individual, and an association within traits between individuals. A multi-locus 
analysis confirms that both positive relatedness and linkage disequilibrium (due to 
incomplete recombination) are crucial for the association to arise. We have found that in 
some cases the tendency of punishers to associated with cooperators will overcome the 
direct disadvantages of punishment, namely the personal cost plus the disadvantage of 
being punished by more punishing relatives. This is more likely when selection is strong 
relative to recombination, such that significant linkage disequilibrium can evolve. 
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Punishment, as described in this model, is quite distinct from the policing models of 
Frank (1995b, 1996b, 2003a). Policing provides a direct benefit to one's group through 
prevention of competitive behaviours, whereas punishing modifies the social 
environment such that cooperation is favoured. Thus, it is perhaps better to consider it as 
an example of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 1996), as opposed to a kin selected 
trait. 
Gardner and West's (2004a; chapter 6) dynamically insufficient analysis necessarily 
treats this key association as a population parameter. Given a certain fixed degree of 
association, they demonstrated that punishment is more easily favoured when common 
than when rare, so that the maintenance of punishment is relatively easy whereas the 
conditions under which it can invade are less readily satisfied. The dynamically-sufficient 
multi-locus analysis, follows the between-trait between-individual association as an 
evolving variable, reveals that in this model punishment can never invade but can be 
maintained, lending more weight to this result. 
The generality of the existing multi-locus methodology notation implicitly allows for 
arbitrary social interactions, as we have seen. What other extensions might be fruitfully 
explored? So far, we have only considered interacting social partners which belong to the 
same population, although there is no reason why they could not belong to separate 
species. The generalised understanding of relatedness allows for Hamilton's rule to be 
applied to mutualisms (Frank 1994), and so this suggests an extension which could 
readily be integrated into the existing social evolutionary multi-locus framework. 
Additionally, the general notation available for describing the transmission of inherited 
factors and their contributions to fitness allows for the possibility of following cultural 
evolution, and perhaps more interestingly, gene-culture co-evolution. We have discussed 
the social multi-locus dynamics of co-evolving cooperation and punishment traits in 
terms of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 1996). The multi-locus notation provides 
a sufficiently general framework in which to examine and unify such processes. 
143 
8. Recombination and the evolution of mutational 
robustness: a two-locus model 
Abstract 
Mutational robustness is the degree to which a phenotype (such as fitness) is resistant to 
mutational perturbations. Essentially, robustness reduces the selection coefficient 
associated with deleterious mutations, providing an immediate benefit for the mutated 
individual. However, robust systems decay due to the accumulation of deleterious 
mutations that would otherwise have been cleared by selection. This decay has received 
very little attention in the evolution of robustness literature. At equilibrium, a population 
or asexual lineage will have a mutation load which is invariant with respect to the 
selection coefficient of deleterious alleles, so the benefit of robustness (at the level of the 
population or asexual lineage) is temporary. Previous work has shown that robustness can 
be favoured when robustness loci segregate independently of the mutating loci they act 
upon. I examine a simple multi-locus model that allows for intermediate rates of 
recombination and inbreeding to show that increasing the effective recombination rate 
can allow for the evolutionof greater genetic robustness. 
Introduction 
The first ideas concerning phenotypic robustness were articulated by Waddington (1940) 
and Schmalhausen (1949) and were borne out of observations of the remarkable 
constancy of developmental traits in the face of both environmental and genetic 
perturbations, a phenomenon described by Waddington as 'canalisation'. The explanation 
proposed by Waddington was adaptive. He reasoned that traits under stabilising selection 
towards some intermediate optimum should benefit from any mechanism that prevents 
deviation from that optimum due to either heritable (genetic) or non-heritable 
In collaboration with A.T. Kalinka. 
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(environmental) perturbations. The perturbations that are of interest to us here are 
heritable; specifically, deleterious mutations. 
The evolution of genetic robustness is conceptually similar to the adaptive evolution of 
dominance first proposed by Fisher (1928). In both cases it is the heritable deviation from 
the wild type that is being buffered, and the selective advantage of the modifier is of the 
order of the mutation rate. Fisher believed that, although the selective advantage was 
weak, in a large population with a number of recessive mutations the accumulated 
selective pressure would win out, a belief not shared by Wright (Hartl 1989). Another 
related phenomenon which has received attention in the literature is the evolutionary 
transition from haploidy to diploidy. The benefit afforded by an extended diploid phase 
may be through the 'masking' of recessive or partially recessive deleterious mutations, 
although this would be a short-term benefit as the mutation load at equilibrium could be 
up to twice that for haploids depending on the degree of dominance (Crow & Kimura 
1965; but see Kondrashov & Crow 1991, Perrot et al 1991). Together with the evolution 
of genetic robustness these scenarios involve evolutionary modification of the genetic 
system itself driven by the immediate benefit of alleviating the affects of deleterious 
mutations. Interestingly, models of diploidy evolution are incompatible with Fisher's 
model for the evolution of dominance because they assume that deleterious mutations are 
at least partially recessive (Perrot etal 1991). 
A classic result which motivates this study is that the equilibrium mutation load (L* ; 
Haldane 1937) of a population undergoing irreversible deleterious mutation (at rate t) is 
invariant with respect to the selection coefficient (s) of the deleterious allele. According 
to Price's (1970) theorem, the change in the frequency (p) of the deleterious allele (which 
we will denote by allelic value X=1, to distinguish it from the wildtype, X=0, which has 
frequency q = 1 —p) is 
"p = Cov[wRii,X] + E[(w/w)AX] = -spq +Mq [8.1] 
1—sp l—sp 
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indicating that there is a stable equilibrium (Ap = 0, dAp/dp <0) at p = p/s (provided 
s>p), and an unstable equilibrium (Ap = 0, dAp/dp > 0) atp = 1 (which becomes stable if 
p ~s). Denoting the stable equilibrium p" = pls, the mean fitness of the population at this 
stable point is * =p*x(1..$)+(l..p*)xl = 1 —p, and hence the equilibrium mutation load 
(L* = 1- i * = p) is not a function of the selection coefficient. While it may be 
temporarily advantageous to reduce the selection coefficient, this leads to the 
accumulation of deleterious mutations that would otherwise have been cleared by 
selection, and so the population or asexual lineage with enhanced robustness does not 
improve its equilibrium mutation load. Thus there is no long term benefit for being 
robust. This mutational decay of robust systems has received only limited attention 
(Frank 2003b). If robustness has a cost, then it will in the long term cause a net 
disadvantage for the population or asexual lineage. In an asexual population, we predict 
eventual loss of robust lineages. However, in a sexual population a robust lineage might 
have a relative advantage despite robustness bringing a net cost to the population as a 
whole. Recombination between the robustness loci and those loci which are under 
deleterious mutation decouples the immediate benefit of robustness from the longer-term 
cost of generating a higher mutation load. There are two advantages of recombination: (1) 
the robust genome can discard the excess deleterious mutations it has accumulated, and 
(2) these are inflicted.upon the non-robust lineages where they will caused enhanced 
damage to fitness, improving the relative fitness of the robust lineages in the population. 
This has received some attention, and the above reasoning is confirmed by contrasting the 
predictions of models of complete linkage (Hermisson et al 2002) with those which 
assume free recombination (Dawson 1999). However, results for robustness evolution 
with intermediate recombination rates (r) are lacking (de Visser et al. 2003). 
We examine a simple model which captures the essence of this problem. The dynamics 
of the system are described using a multi-locus methodology (developed by Barton & 
Turelli 1991 and Kirkpatrick et al. 2002) which highlights the linkage disequilibrium 
between loci, and provides a general notation which will be helpful for extending the 
analysis to more complicated models. We will focus on the gradual evolution of 
robustness by examining when small increases or decreases in robustness strategy are 
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favoured. In particular, we will generate a general description for intermediate 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price 1973), given that one exists, 
and relate this to recombination and inbreeding rates. 
Models and Analyses 
Multi-locus model 
We consider a simple model which captures all the important features of this problem - a 
large population of sexual haploids, with a lifecycle which involves (i) selection, 
followed by (ii) mutation, and finally (iii) mating to form diploid zygotes which undergo 
meiosis to form the next generation of haploid individuals. A biallelic locus i suffers 
recurrent mutation from the null allele (X = 0) to the mutant (X 1 = 1) at rate t, which 
incurs a fitness decrement s. The frequencies of the mutant and null are, respectively, p, 
and qj = 1 —ps.  A second locusj confers robustness, and takes either of two forms. The 
first (X= 0) allele confers a degree of robustness k which reduces the selection 
coefficient of the deleterious mutation from s to (1 - k)s. It also suffers a direct cost, c. 
The alternative (X= 1) allele confers robustness /c and incurs cost c. The allele 
frequencies are qj and pj respectively, where p + qj = 1. Consider that locus j determines 
the expression of a chaperonin type molecule which to some extent restores function to 
the mutated gene product of locus i. Parameters c and k are functions of expression 
strategy: increased expression enhances robustness k but carries a production cost c. Two 
strategies are considered, x and y, encoded by the respective alleles at locus j. We will 
assume that the direct effects of the loci multiply to give genotype fitness, and that p is 
suitably small for us to ignore the possibility of fixation of the deleterious mutation. 
Selection 
Fitness can be written in the form: 
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= (1 - X1 )(1 - X )(l - c) + X, (1 - X )(l - (1 - k )s)(l - c) + (1 - X. )X (1 - 
c) [8.21 
+ X,X(1 —(1— k)s)(1 —c r ) 
Defining = X - p as the deviation of an allelic value from the population expectation, 
we may expand the fitness function as outlined by Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) to obtain 
multi-locus selection coefficients and mean fitness of the population: 
a, 
a1 = (cxC y — s(c +k — ck) — (c +k _ck))IW 
a =s((c +k  — ck) — (c +k —ck))/W 	
[8.31 
W=l—sp 1 —cq —cp —s(c  +k —ck)(D — p,q) 
+s(c +k —ck)(D — p,q) 
Where D ij  = E[x], and is the linkage disequilibrium between loci i andj (Barton & 
Turelli 1991, Kirkpatrick et al. 2002). We now determine the change due to selection for 
each of the three variables of this system: p, p1 and Dij 
The change in the frequency of the deleterious mutation which is due to selection is: 
ASA= a.D ii + aD 
Y 
+ aD i. 	
[8.4] 
= a.p1 q, + aD 
IV + a(l - 2p,)D , 
(Barton & Turelli 1991, Kirkpatrick et al. 2002). 
The change in allele frequency, due to selection, at the robustness locus is: 
A 5p = aD Y +aJ D fl +aY D W 
=a1 D +a1 p1q1 +a(l-2p)D 	
[8.5] 
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Following the multi-locus methodology of Barton & Turelli (1991) and Kirkpatrick et al. 
(2002), and taking care to update reference values for the allelic deviations to current 
population averages, the change in the linkage disequilibrium due to selection is: 
AD =a 1 D 1  +aD +a(D, _D 2 )-A 5pAp J  
= a,(l - 2p1)D , + a(l - 2p)D , 	 . 	 [8.6] 
+ a 	+ (1- 2p)(l - 2p1 )D u - D 
Mutation 
Denoting the frequency of the deleterious variant after selectionp', the change in 
frequency due to mutation is: 
'MPI =p+u(l-p)-p =u(l-p,'). 	 [8.7] 
Since thej locus does not undergo mutation, Ap = 0. The change in the linkage 
disequilibrium due to mutation is: 




Tranmission - the union of gametes, crossing over, and fair meiosis - does not alter the 
allele frequencies in this model, but it does impact on the linkage disequilibrium. 
Following Kirkpatrick et al. (2002), the linkage disequilibrium between two positions 
after a transmission event is the expectation of the linkage disequilibria between the 
positions that were the source of the genes before transmission, weighting by the 
probability that the genes came from each source. In our model, this is: 
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D =rD, +(l—r)D., 	 [8.9] 
i.e. with probability r there has been a recombination event, such that one mating partner 
donated the i gene and the other the j gene, and with probability 1 - r there has not been 
a recombination event, such that the two genes derive from the same parent. In the former 
instance, the linkage disequilibrium between the two genes was Di.e. the association 
between the i and j genes between mating partners after mutation, and in the latter 
instance it is simply D - the association between i andj within the same individual 
after mutation. The association between loci between mating partners emerges because 
there is an association between loci within individuals (linkage disequilibrium) and an 
association between individuals within loci (relatedness). The over-all association can be 
quantified as follows: 
- Cov[X, , X] = f3 1 Var[X] 
	
[8.10] 
where I3Ij2  is the regression of X, 1 on X 2 , and Var[X] is the variance in allelic values at 
locus j, i.e. pj qj. The regression coefficient can be expanded in terms of partial 
regressions: 
I IIJ2 = 1802 2 + /3,, J2 0'2J2 	 [8.11] 
where: the partial regression of X, 1 on X holding X.2 constant is zero (1311j2•12 = 0, •because 
any association between X, 1 and X 2  is mediated by the between-individual within-locus 
association); the partial regression of X,,, on X 12 is the regression coefficient of relatedness 
(iI.j2 = R; Hamilton 1963, 1970) - in this context of relatedness between mating 
partners it is also the coefficient of inbreeding (f, Wright 1922, Nee et al. 2002); and 
= DJVar[X1] is simply the regression between the loci within an individual. Substituting 
into expression [8.10] obtains: 
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D7, = Rf3 11 Var[X1 = RD, 	 [8.12] 
i.e. the association between-loci between-individuals is simply the product of linkage 
disequilibrium and relatedness. Substituting into expression [8.9] obtains the linkage 
disequilibrium after transmission: 
D=(l—r(l—R))D =(l—re )D., 	 [8.13] 
where re = r (1 - R) is the 'effective rate of recombination'. 
Evolution of robustness 
We have obtained recursions describing the change in the frequencies of the deleterious 
mutation (p) and robustness modifier (p)  and the linkage disequilibrium (D i,) over a 
single generation incorporating selection, mutation and transmission. Ultimately we are 
not interested in the dynamics of two alleles conferring different degrees of robustness. 
Rather, we wish to understand how robustness, as a phenotype, evolves. To achieve this 
we will make some additional assumptions. Firstly, we will consider that mutations at the 
robustness locus generate vanishingly small changes in robustness strategy. We will 
assume a continuum of strategies, 0 :5 z < 1, and allow each strategy to be represented by 
a separate allele. The allele with strategy z has robustness effect k[z]  and incurs cost c[z]. 
We will generate a description for z n', defined as the strategy whereby small variants 
about z" will not invade a population playing strategy z, i.e. local ESS. To do this, we 
shall modify our multi-locus analysis in the following ways. The X1 = 0 allele plays 
strategy x, and hence generates an amount of robustness k[x] and incurs a cost c[x], 
whereas the X,= 1 allele plays strategy y = x + ox, where Ox—.O, giving k[y] = k[x] + Ox 
k'[x] and c[y] = c[x] + Ox c'[x]. We will consider that the former allele is the population 
'resident', and the latter allele is a vanishingly rare prospective 'invader'. 
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Earlier, we assumed that p was sufficiently small for us not to have to worry about 
fixation of the deleterious mutation. Since we now consider vanishing variation about the 
population mean robustness strategy, this condition can be expressed as p <(1-k[x])s. 
Given only minor robustness variants, the deleterious mutation should remain close to its 
equilibrium frequency, i.e. p, = p/(1-k[x]s) + öp,, where 8p 1 is a vanishingly small 
quantity. Making this substitution, and summarising the changes in the allele frequency at 
the robustness locus and linkage disequilibrium due to selection, mutation and 
recombination, obtains: 
- 	(1— c[y])(l - k[x] - (l - k[y])) 
- (1— c[x])(l - k[x]) - z(1 - c[x] - k[x] + c[x]k[x]) 
- 	s(1 c[y])(l - k[y])(l - k[x]) 	
D 
(1— c[x])(l - k[x]) - .t(l - c[x] - k[x] + c[x]k[x]) j 
[8.14] 
D" - (1 - c[y])(k[y] - k[x])(1 - , )i((1 - k[x])s - 
- 	(1— c[x])(1 - k[x]) 2 s(1 - 	
p1 
+ (1— c[y])(l - r )((l - k[x])(l —(1 - k[y])s) - i(k[y] - k[x])) 
Dii  (1— c[x])(1 - k[x])(1 - 
Note that neither of these recursions are functions of Op,;  thus, we may set the frequency 
of the deleterious allele close to its equilibrium, and disregard its exact frequency. The 
above recursions may be summarised in matrix form, as M.v = v". The leading 
eigenvalue (X) associated with the matrix gives the rate of increase of the rare robustness 
variant, and hence is variant's reproductive value. This is found by solving the 
characteristic equation Det[M-XI]=O where Det[N] is the determinant of matrix N and I 
is the 2x2 identity matrix. For the moment, we are interested in the intermediate ESS z, 
such that the minor variant is neutral (?=1). The characteristic equation is then Det[M-I] 
= 0, which can be written down and is rather complicated. Substituting in x - z' and y 
z + Ox gives an expression of the form 
F[c[z *], c '[z *], k[ z *],k'[z*], It, ,, ]x & + O[6X2] = 0 	 [8.15] 
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Dropping the higher order terms of ox, and noting that Ox # 0, we can solve for r, giving: 
(1 - k[z *])c '[z *]((l - k[z*])s - 
(1— c[z *])k'[z *] t —(1—  k[z *])(l —(1—  k[z*])s)c'[z*] = G. 
	 [8.16] 
The putative internal ESS is implicit in the equation re = G, and turns out to be difficult to 
explore directly. We note that there are no intermediate solutions (0 <z'' < 1) for r = 0. 
We can look at the relation between z and i through more indirect means. Translating 
the cost function by increasing c[z] but holding c'[z] fixed increases the cost of 
robustness. Partial differentiation of G with respect to c examines how r must change in 
order for z to remain fixed given the change in c. We have: 
- 	(1 - k[z*])c'[z*]k'[z*].t((l - k[z*])s - 	
. 	[8.171 
ac 	((1 - k[z*])(l - (1 - k[z*])s)c'[z*] - (1 - c[z *])k'[z *]j 7 
This is always positive for 0 < c [z *], k[z *] < 1 and c '[z *], k'[z*] >0. Hence, increasing 
the cost of robustness must be met with an increase in effective recombination rate. If we 
can accept a priori that increasing the cost of robustness will result in a decrease in the 
ESS z, then we can infer that increasing effective recombination rate facilitates the 
evolution of costly robustness, giving an increase in the ESS z. This is supported by 
numerical exploration of parameter space. 
Expression [8.16] can be solved numerically to give the putative internal ESS z for any 
parameter set and cost and robustness functions - some examples are given in figures 
8. 1A and 8.2A. The assumption of vanishing variation is somewhat artificial, and so we 
have used simulations to test the predictions using a similar two-locus model which 
allows for a continuum alleles which are simultaneously extant (simulation results are 
presented in figures 8.1A and 8.2A). We find that the numerical solutions to the 
analytical prediction given by [8.16] and the results of the simulations are generally very 
good (figure 8. 1A), although occasionally the simulations do exhibit qualitatively 
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Figure 8.1. A (above) numerical solutions for equation [8.16] for cost and robustness 
functions c[x]=x'° & k[x]=x', deleterious selection coefficient s =0.1, mutation rate 
t=O.Ol and a range of effective recombination rate, Te . Dots are results from simulations. 
B (below) numerical solutions to marginal fitness function, dX/dy, evaluated at y=x. 
dXldy>0 indicates increased robustness is favoured, d?idy-<O indicates less robustness is 
favoured. Note that the internal stable equilibrium (ESS) is an increasing function of re . 
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Figure 8.2. A (above) numerical solutions for equation [8.16] for cost and robustness 
functions c[x]_-0.015x & k[x]=x, deleterious selection coefficients =0.1, mutation rate 
i=0.01 and a range of effective recombination rate, r. Data points are results from 
simulations initialised with vanishing robustness (dots), or mean robustness x=0.5 
(squares). B (below) numerical solutions to marginal fitness function, dXldy, evaluated dt 
y=x. dX/dy>0 indicates increased robustness is favoured, dXldy<0 indicates less 
robustness is favoured. Note that the internal stable equilibrium (ESS) is an increasing 
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rate, beyond which the simulations exhibit a threshold behaviour (see, for example, figure 
8 .2A) with almost-complete robustness apparently being favoured. 
As mentioned previously, the asymptotic rate of increase of the rare variant (X) is the 
solution with the largest magnitude for the characteristic equation Det[M-XI] = 0. 
Numerical inspection of the two solutions reveals that one consistently gives biologically 
plausible rates of increase for when small variants are assumed (i.e. X = 1). Marginal 
fitness (m = dXldy, evaluated at y = x) can be determined analytically, and is a 
complicated function of the parameters and distributions. It reveals whether a population 
playing resident strategy x will favour the invasion of a slightly more robust variant (i.e., 
when m > 0) or whether lower robustness is favoured (m < 0). Setting re  to zero, 
marginal fitness reduces to c' [x]I(1-c[x]), which is always negative and hence a reduction 
in robustness is favoured for all x. Thus, the ESS is zero robustness when the effective 
rate of recombination is zero. 
Numerical investigation of marginal fitness reveals a positive-feedback effect, whereby 
increased robustness is often intrinsically favoured when the population exhibits a great 
deal of robustness (for example, figure 8.211). This is due to the association between the 
more robust variant and the deleterious mutation being proportional to the effective 
selection coefficient of the deleterious mutation (Se  = ( 1-k[x])s). This association is one of 
the costs associated with robustness. When the resident strategy is robust (large k) then 
the effective selection coefficient is small, hence only a small association arises. Unless 
the cost of robustness is prohibitively large (as in figure 8.2B, which has the cost' of 
robustness accelerating to c -, 1 as x - 1), the marginal fitness may be increasing for 
high x, suggesting an ESS z' = 1.This is in addition to the internal stable equilibrium at 
lower x. Which end point the population ultimately reaches is likely to be a function of its 
initial state. In the simulations we have initialised the population such that the population 
mean robustness strategy is 0.5. Examining figure 8.2A, we found that the ESS z was a 
step function of the effective recombination rate, with a threshold at re  = 0.013. Given 
that it is more plausible biologically for initial robustness to be low, we have re-done the 
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simulations with initialisation such that 99% of individuals have zero robustness, and the 
remaining robustness alleles make up the remaining 1%. Here we find that the population 
gets stuck at the stable equilibrium, and the simulation results are in good agreement with 
our analytical prediction [8.16]. 
Discussion 
We have modelled the evolution of costly mutational robustness in a simple two locus 
model for when recombination (r) between the two loci is intermediate. Previously, only 
the extremes of zero recombination (Hermisson et al 2002) and free recombination 
(Dawson 1999) have been considered. We have also incorporated relatedness (R) 
between mating partners (inbreeding), giving an 'effective rate of recombination' 
parameter (re = r (1-R)). An analytical statement relating the internal ESS robustness 
strategy (z*)  to the effective rate of recombination has been obtained. Consistent with 
previous theory, we find that costly robustness cannot be favoured when there is no 
recombination between the robustness locus and the loci that are the targets of the 
robustness. In addition, we show that, where one exists, the internal unbeatable 	- 
robustness strategy is an increasing function of effective recombination rate. We have 
modelled the evolution of this two-locus system by introducing vanishing variants, one at 
a time, around the resident strategy. This artificial game theoretical approach appears to 
be justified, as the predictions find good support in simulated data which relaxes this 
assumption. 
Why do we predict enhanced robustness with effective rate of recombination? The key to 
understanding this is to see robustness as a 'selfish' trait, having immediate benefits but 
ultimately overwhelming costs. It is similar to the classic tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin 1968) of the social evolution literature, whereby exploitation of a public good 
(driven by selfishness of individuals) leads to the destruction of that public good (which 
is a bad outcome for every member of the group). Social evolution theory reveals that self 
restraint, which averts the tragedy, is increasingly favoured as individuals are more 
related, because the cost of selfish behaviour is increasingly paid by one's relatives, 
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reducing inclusive fitness. Robustness provides an immediate benefit in reducing the 
harmfulness of a deleterious allele, but it leads to an accumulation of deleterious 
mutations. When relatedness between mating partners is high and recombination rates are 
low, this accumulation of deleterious alleles is focussed on one's own genome or in the 
genomes of relatives, reducing the selfish advantage of robustness. When relatedness is 
lower and recombination rates higher, the costs of excess deleterious alleles are suffered 
by the population in general and not by the selfish perpetrators in particular, leading to a 
relative fitness advantage for robust lineages. 
Of central importance to this study is Haldane's (1937) mutation load invariant. Because 
the equilibrium mutation load (L* = t) is invariant with respect to the selection 
coefficient (s) of the deleterious mutation, it cannot be alleviated (in the long term) by 
modifiers of robustness which reduce the magnitude of s. It is easy to see why the 
invariant exists - decreasing the deleterious effects of mutations reduces the efficacy with 
which natural selection removes them from the population, hence they become more 
frequent. Similar 'no pain, no gain' invariants are predicted for the cost of selection 
(given by the negative natural log of the initial frequency of the favoured allele, 
regardless of the strength of selection; Kimura 1961) and also in some simple models of 
parasite virulence (where parasites become more aggressive in their exploitation of the 
host as their impact on host mortality is reduced; e.g. Frank 1996a). As we have seen, 
evolving robustness does not in the long term improve the mean fitness of the population, 
as the equilibrium mutation load is invariant with respect to the selection coefficient of 
deleterious alleles. In fact, the mean fitness of the population is predicted to decline, as 
the costs of robustness'remain after the short term benefits disappear. This being the case, 
the model predicts increased maladaptation in sexual I outbred genomes, whereas asexual 
/ inbred genomes should be more efficient and less afflicted with the mutationally-
decayed remains of robust networks. 
Currently, no convincing empirical evidence has been published that demonstrates that 
genetic robustness exists as an adaptation. One reason for this is that, while it is possible 
to demonstrate that heritable variation is buffered in particular organisms, it is not easy to 
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determine whether genetic robustness is the primary function or merely a side-effect of 
evolution for environmental robustness (Rutherford and Lindquist 1998, Queitsch et al 
2002). In particular, experimental evolution of RNA molecules has shown that genetic 
robustness can result from direct selection for environmental robustness (Ancel and 
Fontana 2000, Burch and Chao 2004). However, the evolution of genetic robustness as a 
primary function may be plausible if there is migration between sub-populations in a 
heterogeneous environment (Stearns 2002). Migration rates can be much higher than 
mutation rates and therefore provide a stronger selective pressure for the buffering of 
maladapted alleles. It is with a view to extending the analysis to more complicated multi-
locus models that we have employed the methodology of Barton and Turelli (1991) and 




Each of the chapters in this thesis contained their own extensive discussion. The aim of 
this chapter is to briefly review what has been achieved in each of the preceding chapters, 
and to highlight some emerging general points. 
Chapter 2. Even more extreme fertility insurance and the sex ratios 
of protozoan blood parasites 
In chapter 2, I examined a sex allocation problem - the trade-off between the production 
of male and female gametocytes in malaria and other protozoan blood parasites - where 
previous theory has achieved a rather poor fit with the empirical data. Specifically, much 
less female bias is observed than is predicted by standard local mate competition (LMC) 
theory, which assumes (1) limitless male fecundity and (2) large mating groups. The 
theory of fertility insurance, whereby female bias is curbed in order to ensure fertilization 
opportunities for these females when either male fecundity is limited or mating groups 
are small, has gone some way to explaining the disparity. In the context of protozoan 
blood parasites, both of these standard assumptions of LMC theory are often invalid, and 
so I have examined the implications for sex allocation when neither are met. I found that 
the interaction of these two pressures for fertility insurance causes a much smaller female 
bias than had previously been supposed. Empirical workers are now examining the 
importance of fertility insurance - for example Merino et al. (2004) show that 
antimalarial drugs lead to lower Haemoproteus density in blue tits, and that this is 
associated with reduced female bias. Thus, the addition of some extra biological details 
have, in this instance, greatly increased the predictive power of LMC theory. 
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Chapter 3. A dimensionless invariant for relative size at sex change: 
explanations and implications 
In chapter 3, I examined the opposite situation. In the context of the timing of sex change 
in sequential hermaphrodite animals, the predictions of sex allocation theory has had 
exceptional success, accounting for >90 % of the variation in relative of timing of sex 
change across several phyla, despite massive variation in supposedly relevant biological 
details, and several orders of magnitude in body size. I formalized the dimensionless 
theory underlying these predictions, generating a fitness function which is expressed in 
terms of the key dimensionless quantities (aM, kIM and ô, where a is age at maturity, M 
is instantaneous mortality rate, k is the Bertalannfy growth coefficient, and ô is an 
exponent relating male size to fecundity) which are thought to underly the sex allocation 
strategy. I addressed recent criticism of the dimensionless approach in this biological 
context (Buston et al. 2004), and related to this I have highlighted the problems 
associated with generating null hypotheses for such theory. I also suggest that much of 
the criticism stems from a simple semantic disagreement as to what degree of invariance 
is expected from an invariant. As we are dealing with biology and not physics, clearly 
invariance is never absolute. Yet these striking near-invariant relationships remain, and 
are highly statistically significant. With this in mind, I suggest that the proper way 
forward is to employ the dimensionless approach to quantify the average values and 
variation in the key underlying parameters, some of which will be very difficult or 
intrinsically impossible to measure directly. Using a sensitivity analysis I found that two 
of the three dimensionless parameters of the model appear to be relatively invariant (aM 
0.64 +1- 0.18 s.d., k/M 0.96 +1- 0.45 s.d.), while the third (ô) may vary considerably 
without affecting the invariance in relative timing of sex change. 
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Chapter 4. Spite and the scale of competition 
In chapter 4, I related theory regarding the impact of localized competition on the 
evolution of altruism to a largely neglected theory of negative relatedness and the 
evolution of spiteful behaviours (Hamilton 1970, Grafen 1985a, Foster et al. 2001). The 
effects of local competition have been introduced into social evolutionary models in 
several ways, sometimes incorporating indirect competitive effects separately into 
Hamilton's (1963, 1964, 1970) rule (Grafen 1984, Frank 1998), and sometimes rescaling 
relatedness itself (Queller 1994), to recover a simple Hamilton's rule (RB>C). Several 
studies, employing the latter approach, have showed theoretically (Queller 1994) and 
experimentally (West et al. 2001b, Griffin et al. 2004) that local competition reduces the 
relatedness between social partners, and hence inhibits the evolution of altruism. I have 
extended this theory to. show that local competition can facilitate the emergence of 
negative relatedness (R<0) between social partners, such that spite (B<0, C>0) can be 
favoured by selection (i.e. RB>C). This development in spite theory allows re-
interpretation of several social behaviours in terms of spite, allows us to make 
quantitative predictions of spite evolution, and suggests where spite may be favoured. 
Spite should be looked for particularly where there is (1) strong competition between 
social partners and (2) the capacity for kin recognition, so as to avoid directing spite 
towards one's positive relations. Some examples include bacteriocin production in 
bacteria (Gardner et al. 2004, chapter 5) and the evolution of the sterile soldier caste in 
polyembryonic parasitoid wasps (Gardner & West 2004b, Appendix). 
Chapter 5. Bacteriocins, spite and virulence 
In chapter 5, I applid the theory of spite to chemical (bacteriocin) warfare in bacteria 
Bacteriocin production entails production costs (C>0) for the producer cell, which often 
has to commit suicide in the process. Bacteriocins have a toxic effect on neighbouring 
bacteria (B<0). Their specificity, such that only conspecifics or closely related species are 
affected, suggests a role in interference competition. Additionally, due to linkage with an 
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immunity locus, clones of the producer which also carry the gene will be unscathed. 
Hence, the system appears to satisfy the two requirements for spite: strong local 
competition and the capacity to kin discriminate. A simple model demonstrates that the 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price 1973) in terms of bacteriocin 
production is an increasing function of the intensity of local competition. Also, 
bacteriocin production is predicted to be a dome-shaped function with respect to the 
frequency of clonal kin within the range of bacteriocin attack. This is due to the need for 
both susceptible non-kin social partners (the victims) and immune kin (to benefit from 
the relaxed resource competition). This result is related to the evolution of virulence 
caused by parasitic bacteria. In the standard 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968) 
models for the evolution virulence (Frank 1 996a), the classic prediction is that increased 
kinship between parasites will favour low virulence. However, given a positive 
association between the vigour of bacterial growth and virulence, the bacteriocin model 
suggests a U-shaped relation between bacterial kinship and virulence. In this context, 
adding some extra biological detail generates a qualitatively different prediction. This 
may help explain why empirical support for the standard virulence theory is often lacking 
(Herre 1993, Frank 1996a, Griffin & West 2002). 
Chapter 6. Cooperation and punishment, especially in humans 
In chapter 6, I examined the problem of costly punishment. Punishment is invoked as an 
explanation for cooperation within large groups of unrelated individuals, for example in 
human society. However, the pressures underlying the evolution of punishment itself are 
obscure. A verbal argument (due to Sober & Wilson 1998) runs as follows: costly 
punishment is an altruistic public good, and just as other public goods are favoured by 
kin/group selection,punishment is favoured when there is relatedness between social 
partners. Since punishing is cheap relative to cooperation, it easily will evolve even when 
there is a small amount of relatedness between social partners, thus it will promote 
cooperation in contexts where cooperation will not itself be favoured. I found a flaw in 
this argument. The direct effect of punishing is to hurt oneself and one's social partner. 
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'Altruistic' punishment is therefore rather misleading, and perhaps the behaviour is better 
explained in terms of spite (for example, see Johnstone & Bshary 2004). This means that 
this model of punishment is fundamentally different from Frank's (1995b, 1996b, 2003a) 
models of policing as a mechanism of repression competition. Policing prevents 
antisocial behaviour, and so directly benefits the group. An extended Hamilton's rule 
which incorporates the co-evolving punishment and cooperation traits revealed that any 
benefit for punishment is generated by a positive association between the punishment 
strategy of the focal individual and the cooperation strategy of the social partner. This 
sort of between-trait between-individual. 'linkage disequilibrium' is typically ignored in 
social evolutionary models (for example, Frank 1995b) in order to achieve dynamic 
sufficiency. The extended Hamilton's rule suggested several possibilities: (1) increasing 
relatedness directly disfavours the evolution of punishment; (2) punishment may be 
favoured by niche construction (Odling-Smee 1996), if the cooperative environment that 
it favours is inherited by the descendants of punishers; (3) punishment appears to be more 
easily maintained than initially evolved, because punishers do very little punishing once 
cooperation is established (this was also noted by Boyd et al. 2003); and (4) the opposite 
is true for rewarding behaviour, suggesting a reason why punishing rather than rewarding 
is the norm in the natural world (for example, Clutton-Brock & Partker 1995). However, 
the dynamic insufficiency of the model means that these possibilities cannot properly be 
explored, leaving them as open questions for the future. 
Chapter 7. Social evolution multi-locus methodology 
In chapter 7, I borrowed a multi-locus methodology (developed by Barton & Turelli 
1991, Kirkpatrick et al. 2002) from the population genetics literature, in order to analyse 
the co-evolution of social traits (as, for example, in the model of chapter 6) without 
losing information about the associations between these traits. I showed that the multi-
locus methodology intimately related to the foundations of social evolution theory: they 
share the same quantitative genetic approach to describing fitness, phenotypes and the 
causes of evolutionary change, and the multi-locus methodology emerges as a result of 
164 
combining Price's (1970) theorem with a completely general notation of population 
composition and processes. Of key importance is the generalized conception of linkage 
disequilibrium, which the multi-locus methodology defines for any arbitrary set of gene 
positions, and hence also incorporates associations between individuals. I used the multi-
locus notation to give a general account of how an extended Hamilton's rule (such as 
employed in chapter 6, and independently by Axeirod et al. 2004) can be constructed to 
describe social evolution for an arbitrary number of associated gene positions which 
contribute to an arbitrary number of traits. I emphasize that such details are implicitly 
allowed for in the original Hamilton's rule, which retains its mathematical truth. The 
methodology is then employed to analyse a dynamically-sufficient model for the co-
evolution of cooperation and punishment, which lends weight to the conclusions of 
chapter 6. 
Chapter 8. Recombination and the evolution of mutational 
robustness: a two-locus model 
In chapter 8, I applied the multi-locus methodology to the evolution of mutational 
robustness. A two-locus model captured the tension between the benefits of robustness 
and the emerging cost due to carrying an increased load of mutations. Since the 
equilibrium mutation load of the population is invariant with respect to robustness 
strategy, costly robustness is detrimental to the population in the long term. Previous 
work had focused on complete linkage (Hermisson et al. 2002) or freely segregating loci 
(Dawson 1999). I examined a condition which is necessarily satisfied by an intermediate 
ESS robustness strategy, and used this to show that increasing recombination rate and 
decreasing inbreeding rate promote the evolution of costly robustness. I related the 
tension between immediate benefit and delayed, group-level cost to the 'tragedy of the 
commons' (Hardin 1968, Frank 1998) literature in social evolution. 
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General remarks 
Some general themes have emerged from these studies: 
Social evolution is based on associations 
Fundamental to social evolution are behaviours which impact on the fitness of individuals 
other than the behaver. Of particular interest is when social partners are phenotypically 
and/or genetically correlated. Much attention has been given to genealogical closeness 
(kinship) as a source of such correlations. This has resulted in what might have been 
called 'social selection' being instead referred to as 'kin selection' (Maynard Smith 
1964). This is unfortunate, as it obscures the generality of the social evolutionary 
framework, and the extensive applications of Hamilton's (1963, 1964, 1970) rule. This 
point is made in chapter 6, and it is demonstrated that facultative behaviour can lead to 
positive relatedness (R>0) in Hamilton's rule, even in the absence of kinship. Chapter 6 
also extends the concept of the social association beyond relatedness as it is currently 
defined, to allow for associations between different traits in different social partners. The 
result is a novel two-trait Hamilton's rule, which has made an independent appearance 
recently in the context of cooperation based on systems of co-evolving tags (Axelrod et 
al. 2004). Chapter 7 illustrated that relatedness, linkage disequilibrium and such between-
trait between-individual associations can be understood within the same general 
framework. Hamilton's rule is shown to be an extremely subtle statement, which has 
implicitly allowed for such extensions since its proper derivation (Hamilton 1970). 
Biological details sometimes matter 
Social evolution theory has enjoyed astonishing success, in terms of explaining the 
observed variation in social behaviours. Given this success, it is probable that poor 
empirical support in certain areas of social evolution theory are not due to a 
misunderstanding in how selection operates, but rather it is more likely that some crucial 
details of the system's biology have been overlooked. Noting that some of the biological 
166 
assumptions of classical theory will not be valid in every circumstance, and developing 
the theory accordingly, can dramatically improve the explanatory power of the theory. 
For example, simultaneously relaxing the assumptions of limitless male fecundity and 
large mating groups allows for much improvement in the predictive power of local mate 
competition theory in explaining sex allocation in protozoan blood parasites (chapter 2). 
Such developments have huge practical importance as, for example, a quantitatively 
accurate theory which relates malaria inbreeding rates to malaria sex ratios can 
conversely relate malaria sex ratios (easy to measure) to malaria inbreeding rates 
(difficult to measure), which can be important in understanding the epidemiology of this 
disease (Nee et al. 2002). Using sex allocation as inspiration, and noting that biological 
details do appear to make a huge difference in models of virulence evolution (for 
example, bacteriocin production in chapter 5, siderophore production as examined by 
West & Buckling 2003) there is hope that developing the theory of virulence evolution 
will eventually achieve more predictive success than it currently enjoys. 
Biological details sometimes do not matter 
Studies such as Allsop & West's (2003a) description of a sex change invariant which 
holds across phyla imply that sometimes a great deal of variation in biological details 
does prevent a simple model from having terrific predictive power. Such invariant 
relationships should be exploited wherever they are found, as they potentially shed a 
great deal of light on the underlying biology. For example, in chapter 3 I examined how 
variation in three dimensionless parameters of the sex change model translates into 
variation in the relative size at sex change. Given the observed invariance in size at sex 
change, I was able to obtain estimates of these underlying parameters. Often such 
parameters will be difficult or impossible to measure directly, and so the existence of 
invariants provides an opportunity to measure these through indirect means. I would also 
argue that the invariant suggests the basic sex change model is correct, i.e. that we have 
correctly understood the trade-off between male and female reproductive function. 
167 
Don't worry too much about semantics 
Arguments over semantics can impede theoretical progress, and should be avoided. 
Classically, this is exemplified by the kin selection versus group selection debate, which 
still rumbles on (e.g. Keller 1999, Bergstrom 2002) despite simple mathematics showing 
that these are two sides of the same process (Price 1972a, Grafen 1984, Wade 195, 
Frank 1986, Queller 1992, Hamilton 1975). As mentioned above, in chapter 3 I avoided 
being drawn in by arguments as to what constitutes an invariant in biology, and used a 
striking nearly-invariant relationship to examine the biology underlying sex change. In 
chapter 4 I re-examined the theory of spite evolution. There is room for much 
disagreement as to whether some or all or none of the behaviours mentioned in that 
chapter are really spiteful, as it is possible to reinterpret these in terms of altruism or 
spitefulness. I have chosen to use the framework of spite for several reasons: (1) the 
direct effects are losses in reproductive success to both actor and recipient, and so 
according to the standard classification (figure 1.1) we should call this spite (Trivers 
1985); (2) it seems inappropriate to describes such behaviours as suicidally unleashing 
toxins on one's neighbours (bacteriocin production, chapters 4 and 5), and sacrificing any 
possibility of future reproduction in order to murder an embryonic host-mate (soldier 
caste in polyembryonic parasitic wasps, chapter 4 and Appendix 'Spite among siblings'), 
as altruism; (3) the key ingredient for Hamiltonian spite, negative relatedness (Hamilton 
1970, Foster et al. 2001) naturally falls out, along with Hamilton's rule, from a direct 
fitness analysis of such behaviours (chapters 4 and 5), and leads to simple interpretation; 
and (4) this spiteful interpretation of the local competition results allow for greater 
consistency and clarity - for example, we can use as a rule-of-thumb that "local 
competition will tend to inhibit altruism and will tend to promote spite", which is 
conceptually simpler than "local competition will inhibit some forms of altruism and 
promote some other forms of altruism". 
To conclude, social evolutionary biology owes much of its success to its firm, 
conceptually simple, theoretical underpinnings. The theory boasts a unifying framework - 
centred around Price's theorem and Hamilton's rule - which is sufficiently general to 
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address problems of arbitrary complexity. However, the work of social evolution 
theorists is by no means done. An appreciation for the subtlety of the paradigm is 
essential for: (1) development of simple, explicit models for social systems of interest; (2) 
ensuring rigorous theory-driven empirical research; and (3) making full use of our 
observations to contribute to a better understanding of nature and ourselves. 
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IS EVOLVABILITY INVOLVED IN THE ORIGIN OF MODULAR VARIATION? 
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Abstract.—Lipson et al. (2002) presented an elegant linear algebraic formalism to define and study the evolution of 
modularity in an artificial evolving system. They employed simulation data to support their suggestion that modularity 
arises spontaneously in temporally fluctuating systems in response to selection for enhanced evolvability. We show 
analytically and by simulation that their correlate of modularity is itself under selection and so is not a reliable indicator 
of selection for modularity per Se. In addition, we question the relation between modularity and evolvability in their 
simulations, suggesting that this modularity cannot confer enhanced evolvability. 
Key words—Adaptability, canalization, fluctuating selection, pleiotropy, robustness. 
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Modularity is a major principle of design and abounds in 
nature. Functional separation of modules—from eukaryote 
organdIes to Drosophila limbs to human cognitive facul-
ties—may give robustness to changing inputs and facilitate 
future improvement. The question of the evolutionary origins 
of such modularity is important and the recent simulation 
study of Lipson et al. (2002) is therefore a welcome contri-
bution. They introduce a potentially extremely useful for-
malism that allows one to quantify modularity and study its 
evolutionary origins. Environmental variables are described 
by a vector E, and phenotypic traits by a vector P. A matrix 
A, which premultiplies E to give P, then describes the or-
ganismal process of transforming environmental input into 
phenotypic output. 
Lipson et al. argue that the "blockiness" of A and its 
correlate, the number of zero elements, are measures of mod 
ularity. By assigning fitnesses to realized phenotypes de-
pending on their distance from an arbitrarily chosen optimum, 
Lipson et al. (2002) study the evolution of modularity. Their 
simulations show that the frequency of zero elements in the 
matrices deviates from the expected value (1/3, the frequency 
of zero elements at initialization and among random muta-
tions) when the environment changes rapidly. Lipson et al. 
attribute these results to a "second order (delayed) pressure 
for decomposition for adaptability," (p.1554) that is, the un-
coupling of traits to allow independent optimization of each 
and hence increased ability to adapt to new environments. 
Enhanced evolvability is concluded to be a cause, as well as 
a fortunate outcome, of the preponderance of zero-element-
rich matrices. We disagree with this conclusion and believe 
that an alternative explanation exists. In addition, we feel 
that modularity cannot influence evolvability in their study. 
In the simulations of Lipson et al., the element values of 
E are restricted to —1 and + I and the element values of A 
are restricted to —1, 0, and + I. The elements of the phenotype 
vector P are therefore restricted to the range —n - n, where 
n is the number of dimensions of the vectors (eight in the 
simulations of Lipson et al). They restrict the elements of 
F, the arbitrary optimal phenotype, to —1 and +1. The op-
timal phenotypes are therefore restricted to a small subset of  
all possible phenotypes, centered on the origin. We find that 
matrices with many zero elements tend to produce pheno-
types that are closer to the zero vector, and therefore on 
average closer to the optimal phenotypes (mathematical de-
tails are given in the Appendix). 
Rather than appealing to enhanced evolvability, the pre-
ponderance of zero-rich matrices can be explained by the 
advantage delivered to any A that can maintain a phenotype 
close to the origin, despite environmental perturbation (i.e., 
canalization; Waddington 1942). In Figure 1 we give the 
probability distribution of the value of an element of P as a 
function oft, the number of zero elements in the correspond-
ing row of A. As increases, the value of the focal element 
of P is more tightly distributed about the origin. Figure 2 
reveals the relation between t and the mean scalar residual 
(negatively correlated with Lipson et al. 's measure of fitness) 
in a focal dimension: increasing reduces the residual and 
thus increases fitness. Conducting simulations of our own, 
we have been able to demonstrate frequencies of zero ele-
ments significantly greater than 1/3, even when mutation is 
suppressed. Hence, individual lineages may thrive or decline, 
but cannot evolve and therefore cannot be under selection 
for enhanced evolvability (see Fig. 3 and Table I). 
Moreover, in the set-up of Lipson et al., it is unclear why 
enhanced evolvability is expected to play any role. Each el-
ement of the vector P is the result of (dot-) multiplying a 
separate row vector from A with E. Contrary to the sugges-
tions of Lipson et al., manipulating the elements of such a 
row vector has no effect on the value of other elements of 
P. This means that when evolving A in the context ofa certain 
environment E and a certain target phenotype F, every ele-
ment of the actual phenotype P can be optimized indepen-
dently. Interestingly, a different use of the same formalism 
was suggested by Lipson et al. and avoids this problem. Un-
der this alternative scheme, vector E describes the genotype 
and matrix A describes the genetic architecture of the phe-
notype (e.g., pleiotropy), a framework similar to the multiple 
quantitative trait model proposed by Taylor and Higgs 
(2000). By allowing both E and A to evolve, one can study 
the evolution of modularity and evolvability under, for ex-
ample, fluctuations in F. 
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Fro. 1. The probability distribution of the value of P. as a function of the number of zero elements in the K' h row of the 8 X 8 ternary 
matrix A, C. Here n (= 8) and every value of (= 0, 2, 4, 6, 8) are even, so the values of P. are restricted to the set of even integers. 
This is not to say that modularity is not under selection. 
It is possible that modularity confers robustness of fitness in 
response to the form of environmental change investigated 
by Lipson et al. When matrices are highly modular, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between environmental 
characteristic and phenotypic trait, alteration of only one as-
pect ofthe environment will pertucb the phenotype in one 
dimension only. Matrices that are less modular have envi-
ronmental components each affecting more than one trait, 
and more than one trait being affected by several environ-
mental components. They are therefore perturbed in multiple 
dimensions whenever a single aspect of the environment is 
altered. Because Lipson et al. change the sign of only one 
element of E at each environmental alteration, it is conceiv -
able that selection for fitness robustness has given rise to an 





0.5 . ... -- 
k'] •: :. 
Fro. 2. The expectation of the residual r as a function of C for 
an 8 X 8 ternary matrix. By ensuring that phenotype vectors are 
more tightly distributed around the origin, and hence closer to the 
optimum, matrix rows with more zero elements achieve reduced 
residual, on average. 
quite a different pressure than the supposed selection for 
enhanced evolvability. 
In summary, Lipson et al. have presented an exciting and 
novel formalism that may yield quantitative, as well as qual-
itative insights into the evolution of evolvability and other 
problems. However, in their application of the model they 
have: (1) failed to demonstrate selection for modularity per 
se; and (2) not clearly established a link between modularity 
and evolvability. Wesuggest that enhanced evolvability can 
be neither a cause nor an outcome of the increase in their 
correlate of modularity. 
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FiG. 3. The frequency of zero elements, averaged over 400 rep-
licates, after 20 generations of evolution for a population of 50 8 
X 8 matrices over a range of rates of environmental change dUdE. 
The broken line indicates the null prediction 1/3. Simulations were 
devoid of mutation, but otherwise the evolutionary algorithm re-




TABLE 1. Simulation data and the one-tailed sign test for significant 
departure from null prediction "frequency of zero elements = 1/3". 
No. of 
replicates 
Mean frequency (Out of 400) 
of zero elements with frequency 
(from 400 of zero 
dt/dE replicates) elements >1/3 P 
0.359 268 4.700 X 10-12 
2 0.353 243 9.979 x 10-6 
3 0.349 233 5.639 x 10' 
4 0.353 250 3.266 x 10-7 
5 0.350 228 2.946 X 10 
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of zero elements in A. and m Bin(n - , 1/2) is the number of 
same-sign pairs of A, and E (i.e., those pairs of elements multi-
plying to give +1). Rearranging, the probability distribution of P.  
is found to be 
" - 	 ] P[P = xJ = 	- - 2", 	 (Al) 
2 
for n = 8, the distribution of P. as a function of t is shown in 
Figure 1. 
E[rJ as a function of 
Lipson et al. define fitness as a decreasing function of the (scalar) 
distance between realized phenotype P and an arbitrary optimum 
F. The residual in the Kut  dimension is r = IF. - PI where F.  
takes value + 1 or —1 with equal probability. The probability density 
function of r is then 
P[r. = y] = P[IPj - 1 =] + P[IP,I + I = y] 
= (P[IPj = y + 1] + P[IPJ = y - i]). 
Because P. is symmetrical about the origin, P[P = z] = P[P = 
—z] and so for z > 0 1 P[IP,I = z] = 2 P[P = z], that is, for 
>1, 
P[r. = y] = P[P., = y + 1] + P[P = y - I]. 	(A3) 
Fory-1; 
Corresponding Editor: R. Harrison 	P[r, = 1] = P[P = —2]P[F, = —1] + P[P = +2]P[F = -I-i] 
APPENDIX 
The Distribution of P. 
A is a nxn ternary matrix (element values are —1, 0, and + 1) 
and E is a n-element column vector with element values + 1 and 
- I. The product of the premultiplication of E by A gives the phe-
notype vector P. The K' element of P is given by P. = A.,.E = 
= .0 + m.(+1) + (n - - ,n).(-1) where t is the number 
+ P[P, = 0] = P[P., = +2] + P[P, = 0] 
P[r., = 0] = P[P = —1]P[F., = —1] + P[P., = +1]P[F, = +1] 
= P[P, = +1]. 	 (A4) 
Because r, = P., ± 1, and P. is restricted to values of the same 
parity as n - , r, is only evaluated for those integers with parity 
opposite ton - . For n = 8, the mean ofr, is revealed as a function 
of in Figure 2. 
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Abstract 
Theory developed for malaria and other protozoan parasites predicts that the evolutionarily stable gametocyte sex ratio (z * ; 
proportion of gametocytes that are male) should be related to the inbreeding rate (/) by the equation z' = (1 —f)12. Although this 
equation has been applied with some success, it has been suggested that in some cases a less female biased sex ratio can be favoured 
to ensure female gametes are fertilized. Such fertility insurance can arise in response to two factors: (i) low numbers of gametes 
produced per gametocyte and (ii) the gametes of only a limited number of gametocytes being able to interact. However, previous 
theoretical studies have considered the influence of these two forms of fertility insurance separately. We use a stochastic analytical 
model to address this problem, and examine the consequences of when these two types of fertility insurance are allowed to occur 
simultaneously. Our results show that interactions between the two types of fertility insurance reduce the extent of female bias 
predicted in the sex ratio, suggesting that fertility insurance may be more important than has previously been assumed. 
© 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Fertility insurance; Local mate competition; Malaria; Sex allocation; Stochastic model 
1. Introduction 
One of the many successful applications of sex 
allocation theory has been the study of how competition 
for mates between related males can favour the 
evolution of female biased sex ratios (Charnov, 1982; 
Godfray, 1994; Hamilton, 1967; West et al., 2000a,b). 
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in applying 
this theory (local mate competition; LMC) to malaria 
and related protozoan parasites (Read et al., 2002; West 
et al., 2001). Here, the appropriate prediction is that the 
evolutionarily stable (ES; Maynard Smith, 1982) game-
tocyte sex ratio (z*;  proportion of gametocytes that are 
male) should be related to the inbreeding rate (f) by the 
equation z' = (1 —f)/2 (Hamilton, 1967; Nee et al., 
2002; Read et al., 1992). When there is complete 
inbreeding (f = 1; i.e. a single lineage or clone is selfing), 
the ES strategy is to produce the minimum number of 
males required to fertilize the available female gametes 
and thus, maximize the number of zygotes. Conversely, 
'corresponding author. Tel.: +44-01316505508; fax: 
+44-01316506465. 
E-mail address: andy.gardner@ed.ac.uk (A. Gardner). 
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when gametes in the mating pool are of a mixture of 
lineages, f decreases and the sex ratio increases in order 
for each lineage to maximize its genetic representation 
in the zygote population. The relationship between the 
inbreeding rate and sex ratio has been able to explain a 
number of sex ratio patterns in Apicomplexan parasite 
populations (reviewed by West et al., 2001; Read et al., 
2002). However, there are a number of observations that 
cannot be explained by this equation. In particular: (1) 
across Haemoproteus populations in birds the sex ratio 
does not correlate with an expected correlate of the 
inbreeding rate (prevalance; Shutler et al., 1995; Shutler 
and Read, 1998); (2) in malaria parasites, sex ratios 
within and between infections can be extremely variable 
(Osgood et al., 2002; Paul et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; 
Pickering et al. 2000; Schall, 1989; Taylor, 1997), and 
less female 'biased sex ratios can lead to greater 
transmission success (Robert et al., 1996). 
A potential explanation for these contradictory 
observations is "fertility insurance"—the production 
of a less female biased sex ratio to ensure that all female 
gametes are fertilized (West et al., 2002). Before 
describing how fertility insurance can influence the ES 
sex ratio it is necessary to describe the background 
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biology. In malaria and related Haemospororin para-
sites, haploid sexual stages (gametocytes) are taken up 
from the host in the blood meal of a vector. Once inside 
the midgut, the haplqid gametocytes differentiate into 
haploid gametes and fuse to form zygotes. These 
resulting diploid zygotes undergo meiosis and asexual 
proliferation before migrating to the vector's salivary 
glands where they wait to enter a new vertebrate host. 
Each female gametocyte (macro-gametocyte) will differ-
entiate into 1 female gamete, whereas each male 
gametocyte (micro-gametocyte) will produce several 
motile male gametes. The number of viable gametes 
produced per male gametocyte varies enormously across 
species-4-8 in mammalian malaria parasites (Read 
et al., 1992); in some lizard malarias (Schall, 2000); 
5–> 1000 in Eimeriorin intestinal parasites (West et al., 
2000a, b). 
Fertility insurance can occur for two broad reasons-
which are summarized here but discussed more fully in 
West et al. (2002). First, the number of male gametes 
produced per gametocyte (c) may be a limiting factor 
(Read et al., 1992). If the mean number of viable 
gametes produced per male gametocyte is c, then the ES 
sex ratio must be z * 11(c + 1), otherwise there will not 
be enough male gametes to fertilize the female gametes 
(Fig. 1A; Read et al., 1992). Second, the ability of 
gametes to interact may be a limiting factor. West et al. 
(2002) investigated this possibility by assuming that the 
number of gametocytes whosegametes can interact (q) is 
restricted. In this case a less female biased sex ratio is 
favoured to avoid the stochastic absence of males in a 
mating group of q gametocytes (Fig. 113; West et al., 
2002). A low q could occur for a number of reasons 
including low male gamete motility, high gametocyte or 
gamete mortality, low gametocyte density, or small 
blood meals (Shutler and Read, 1998; Paul et al., 1999, 
2000, 2002; Reece and Read, 2000; West et al., 2001, 
2002). Recent attention has focused on how the host 
immune response may influence and vary the impor-
tance of these factors (Paul et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; 
Reece and Read, 2000). 
In order to make their analyses mathematically 
tractable, previous studies have considered the influence 
of these two forms of fertility insurance separately. 
When examining the influence of male gametocyte 
fecundity (c), Read et al. (1992) assumed that the 
gametes from an infinite pool of gametocytes can 
interact (q = cc), and when examining the influence of 
the number of gametocytes whose gametes can interact 
(q), West et al. (2002) assumed that male gamete 
fecundity was not a limiting factor (c = cc; i.e. one 
male gametocyte is able to provide enough gametes to 
fertilize all of the female gametes in its mating group 
arising from q gametocytes). It has subsequently been 
assumed that the overall effect of these two factors can 
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Fig. 1. The relationship between the predicted unbeatable sex ratio 
(proportion of gametocytes that are male; z*)  and the inbreeding rate 
(f). (A) Unbeatable sex ratio when the number of gametes produced by 
each male gametocyte (c) varies and gametes from all gametocytes in 
a very large group can interact (q— cc; Read et al. 1992). (B) 
Unbeatable sex ratio when the number of gametocytes whose gametes 
can interact (q) is limited and-the numberof gametes produced by each 
male gametocyte (c) is not limiting (West et al., 2002). 
favours the least female biased sex ratio (West et al., 
2002). However, there is the possibility that these factors 
may interact—when both c and q are low, even if there 
are males in a mating group, these males may not be 
able to provide enough gametes to fertilize all the female 
gametes. Although this scenario could logically occur, it 
is not clear whether this interaction will significantly 
influence the ES sex ratio. We use a stochastic analytical 
model to address this problem and consider how the 
unbeatable sex ratio is influenced by the interaction of 
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terminology associated with malaria parasites, but our 
results are applicable to any Apicomplexan parasite with 
dimorphic sexual stages. 
2. Methods 
We consider an infinite population of vertebrates 
harbouring malaria parasites and supporting an infinite 
number of blood-feeding dipteran vectors (effects due 
to finite numbers of vertebrate hosts is negligible unless 
the number of hosts are extremely small; Taylor and 
Bulmer, 1980). Every host contains an infinite pooi of 
haploid gametocytes circulating in the peripheral blood, 
comprising n independent lineages (all notation is given 
in Table 1). Within a lineage, all gametocytes are 
clonally derived from a single sporozoite founder 
individual. Each lineage produces a proportion z of 
male gametocytes and 1 - z of female gametocytes, 
where z is determined by a single biallelic nuclear gene. 
A common 'Null' allele exists at frequency 1 - m and 
Table I 
Definition of each parameter/variable referred to in the methods and 
appendix 
Symbol Definition 
bi(k, it) Binomial distribution: k trials and probability of 
success a 
C Number of viable male gametes per male 
gametocyte 
F Inbreeding coefficient;f = 
gx Number of X-allele male gametes remaining viable 
HypGeo(a,f3,y) Hypergeometric distribution: a trials, and $ 
potential successes out of y 
M The Mutant allele 
M Population frequency of the mutant 
N The Null allele 
N Number of independent lineages per vertebrate 
host 
P Probability of male gamete survival 
Q Number of gametocytes whose gametes can 
interact in the vector 
Success of the K-allele in a host containing y 
Mutant infections 
wx Absolute fitness of the X-allele 
Z Sex ratio (proportion male gametocytes per 
lineage) 
Evolutionarily stable (ES) sex ratio 
zx Sex ratio employed by the K-allele 
Species-specific number of gametes released per 
male gametocyte 
d- Number of K-allele females in a mating group 
Px Number of K-allele males in a mating group 
TX Total number of K-allele gametocytes in a mating 
group - 
WX,y Frequency of K-alleles in successful male (y = I) 
or female (y = 0) gametes 
Co Relative fitness of the Null, wN/wM; Mutant 
invades if w < I 
Number of zygotes produced by the mating group 
has z = ZN, and an infinitely rare 'Mutant' allele exists at 
frequency m and has Z = ZM. We may assign each 
infected host individual to one of n + 1 classes on the 
basis of the number of Mutant lineages carried. Each 
host is fed upon by a large number of vectors, 
transmitting q gametocytes to each vector in the process. 
Once in the midgut of the vector, each male gametocyte 
gives rise to c male gametes and female gametocytes 
each give rise to a single female gamete. Random 
syngamy ensues, and the resulting next generation of 
zygotes are, following Read Ct al. (1992), assumed to 
reflect the genetic composition of the next generation of 
infections. It is worth noting that although each vector 
contains a single mating group of size q the predictions 
of this analysis will hold for any number of such groups, 
provided that there is no exchange of gametes between 
mating groups. 
The fitness of the Null is the mean success of a Null 
lineage from each host-class weighted by the number of 
Null lineages in the host-class and the frequency of that 
host-class. As the mutant is infinitely rare, so that m - 0, 
the fitness of the Null is dominated by its success 
in vectors feeding upon hosts containing no Mutant 
lineages 
WNSN,OfSN,O, 	 (1) 
where SN,O  is the mean number of zygotic Null alleles 
produced per vector feeding on a host harbouring zero 
Mutant lineages, and f is the degree of inbreeding. The 
Mutant never occurs in such hosts, and almost never 
occurs in hosts with other Mutant lineages, so its fitness 
is dominated by its success in vectors feeding upon hosts 
with 1 Mutant lineage and n - 1 Null lin'eages 
WMSM1, 	 . 	 (2) 
where SMI is the mean number of zygotic Mutant alleles 
derived from a vector feeding on a host containing one 
Mutant infection only. The Mutant invades if WM > Wr 
and so the ES sex ratio z' is the value of ZN, such that 
CO = WN/WM is not less than unity for all OzMl. 
Exact solutions for 5N,0  and SM,I  will be determined, so 
that for known q, c and f pairs of sex ratio strategies 
may be compared. 
A vector feeding on a Null-only host is assured of 
obtaining q Null gametocytes in its bloodmeal. 
Bi(q, ZN,) are male, and the remaining ON = q - 
AN are female, so that there are CAN male gametes and 
ON female gametes able to interact in the midgut. The 
number of zygotes, C, is the smaller of these two values, 
and since zygotes are diploid the number of Null alleles 
formed in that vector is 24: 
q 
SN,O = 	
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A vector feeding on a host containing 1 Mutant and 
n - 1 Null lineages will obtain q gametocytes of which 
TM '-.Bi(q,J) are Mutant and TN = q - TM are Null. 
These will comprise pM —Bi(TM,zM) Mutant males 
and cIM = TM - PM Mutant females, and PN 
Bi(x N,z N ) Null males and ON = TN - PN Null females. 
The number of zygotes, C is then the lower of the two 
values C(/IM + PN) and cbM + 1 N, meaning that there are 
4 successful male gametes and C successful female 
gametes. Of the former, a proportion vj 
HypGeo((, CPM , C(PM +,UN))IC will be Mutant, and of 
the latter a proportion tM0 HypGeo(, 4M' 
4M + 4N)/( will be Mutant. The success of the Mutant 
is simply (wMi + M,o)  (Taylor, 1981; Charnov, 1982), 
i.e.: - 
q 	TM qtM 
SM,i = 	
() ftM(l _f)_tM (TM 
	
PM)TM 0 JU M =OUN =0 	. ) 
P 
 ( ZM
M  l - ZM ) tM PM 
(q - TM) 
(l -  ZN 
AN 
min{c(pM + PN), q - PM - PN} 
(E[WM,i] + E[WM,d]), 	 (4a) 
where 
( PM 
E[wMi] 	PM +PN 
if M + PN > 0, 	
(4b) 
0 	PM+PNO, 
( TM — PM 
I 	 . if q—PM—PN>0, 
E[WM,o] = q - PM - PN 	 (4c) 
q — PM — PN=O. 
These expressions reveal whether the Mutant allele 
can invade a population fixed for the Null. We 
determined the ES sex ratio iteratively, such that the 
value of ZN in each round is the sex ratio of the 
successfully invading Mutant or successfully defending 
Null of the previous round, and ZM is a randomly 
assigned value. After an indefinite number of rounds the 
Null will assume and subsequently retain the value of z " , 
so that at any time the currently unbeaten z can be 
tested for evolutionary stability by plotting w for ZN 
equal to the putative Z* against all 0 ZM 1 and 
rejecting if w < 1 for any ZM. 
To check our expressions, we derived Eqs. (3) and (4) 
for the special cases where q or c are infinite, i.e. 
corresponding to the analyses of Read et al. (1992) and 
West et al. (2002). These equations are presented in the 
appendix, and in all cases gave the same results as the 
previous analyses.  
3. Results and discussion 
We have discriminated between two types of fertility 
insurance, in response to: (i) low male gamete fertility 
(low c), and (ii) the ability of gametes to interact (low q). 
Previous theoretical work has examined the effect of 
these two types of fertility insurance separately. Speci-
fically, West et al. (2002) assumed that when both of 
these factors are operating, the effect for sex ratio 
evolution can be determined by seeing which leads to a 
greater reduction in the predicted female bias (i.e. which 
of Figs. 1A and B predicts the least female biased sex 
ratio). In contrast, our model explicitly allows.for both 
types of fertility insurance to act simultaneously, and 
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Fig. 2. (A) Relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding 
rate, for given values of q when c = 2 assuming no interaction between 
the two types of fertility insurance and (B) relationship between ES sex 
ratio and inbreeding rate arising from Eqs. (I)—(4), for given values of 
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Fig. 3. (A) Relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding 
rate, for given values of q when c = 4 assuming no interaction between 
the two types of fertility insurance and (B) Relationship between ES 
sex ratio and inbreeding rate arising from Eqs. (1)-(4), for given values 
of q when c = 4. 
example predictions when the two types of fertility 
insurance are allowed to act separately as previously 
assumed by West et al. (2002) (part A of the figures) or 
simultaneously in our model (part B of the figures). Our 
results show that when both c and q are low, the ES sex 
ratio may be higher than predicted when considering 
these two effects separately. 
Why does our model predict a less female biased sex 
ratio? It has been assumed that one male gametocyte 
will be able to provide enough gametes to fertilize all the 
female gametes in the mating group that arises from q 
gametocytes. This is not the case if (q - 1) > c. More 
generally, the male gametocytes will not be able to 
fertilize all the female gametes when (q - p)> cp, where 
p is the number of male gametocytes in a mating group. 
This risk of not having enough males to fertilize the 
0 	0.2 	0.4 	0.6 	0.8 	1 
(B) 	 Inbreeding rate (I) 
Fig. 4. (A) Relationship between predicted sex ratio and inbreeding 
rate, for given values of q when c = 8 assuming no interaction between 
the two types of fertility insurance and (B) relationship between ES sex 
ratio and inbreeding rate arising from Eqs. (1)-(4), for given values of 
q when c = 8. 
females in the group leads to less female biased sex 
ratios being favoured. Another way of conceptualising 
this is that a finite q increases the potential for low c to 
be a problem-when gametes can not interact as 
successfully (finite q), a mating group may contain only 
a single or small number of male gametocytes, and so 
the gamete fecundity (c) of these males is more likely to 
be a limiting factor. 
Our model shows that the interaction between the two 
types of fertility insurance can have a surprisingly large 
influence on the ES sex ratio. In the examples that we 
give, the predicted sex ratio can be up to 0.1 higher (Fig. 
2, when c = 2, q = 10 andf = 0.3). In this instance the 
sex ratio deviates from equality (0.5) by approximately 
half the amount inferred by West et al. (2002). Although 
increasing c proportionally reduces the degree of female 
bias, the complex interplay between male fecundity and 
520 	 A. Gardner et aL / Journal of Theoretical Biology 223 (2003) 515-521 
size of mating groups makes it difficult to relate the 
magnitude of this effect to q. In the limit, as q increases 
towards infinity, the effect dissipates as the predictions 
converge with those of Read et al. (1992). However, as q 
rises it increases the propensity for c to become limiting. 
The effect is therefore a dome-shaped function of q, 
although the exact relationship crucially depends upon 
the particular parameter values. 
We also extended our model to allow stochastic 
variability in the number of viable gametes per 
gametocyte (c); see appendix, Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6). This 
could occur through variation in the number of gametes 
produced per gametocyte, or through mortality. Adding 
in this stochasticity (for invariant E[c]) gives further 
reduction in the female bias predicted, although this 
effect is negligible in all but the smallest of mating 
groups. However, a novel prediction arises from this 
form of stochasticity, as it allows the investigation of the 
mean value of c < 1, so that male fecundity is lower than 
that of females. In this case, a male biased sex ratio is 
favoured. For the case of q-+ oo Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4) 
remain valid even for c< 1, and male biased ES sex 
ratios are easily demonstrated. Switching the roles of 
males and females in the classic LMC relation, the result 
of Read et al. (1992) can be extended so that, as before, 
for C?' 1 z"= max{(l—f)/2, l/(c + 1)}, yet now for c 1 
z' = min{( 1 +f)/2 , 11(c + 1)}. This prediction contrasts 
with standard LMC models constructed for insects (e.g. 
Nagelkerke and Hardy, 1994; West and Herre, 1998), 
where male biased sex ratios are never predicted, due to 
the assumption that one male can mate any number of 
females (analogous to assuming c = x). Male biased 
sex ratios have been observed in some samples of lizard 
malaria (Paperna and Landau, 1991), although the 
necessarily small sample sizes mean that these observa-
tions should be treated with caution. 
To conclude, our analysis has revealed that fertility 
insurance can be a more potent evolutionary buffer to 
female biased sex ratios in malaria and related parasites 
than previously suggested. Clearly, the outstanding 
problem is to obtain empirical estimates of c and q, 
and how their values are influenced by factors such as 
host immune responses. We have recently reviewed the 
existing literature on this (West et al., 2002), and sadly 
very little is known. 
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Appendix 
In West et al. (2002) the implications of finite mating 
group size for fertility insurance were made amenable 
for mathematical treatment by assuming infinite male 
fecundity. This represents a special case of our model, 





( l - ZN)N2, 	 (Ala) SN,O = E 
,=o 11N 
where 
1qN if 11zv>0, 
0 	/IN — O 	
(A.lb) 
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(E[WMI] + E[tuMo]), 	 (A.2a) 
where 











M + N 




E[Mo] = q - M - N 
if q - M - > 0, 
0 	 q—(—,u=O. 
(A.2d) 
Conversely, in the deterministic analysis of Read et al. 
(1992), the fertility insurance consequences of limited 
male fecundity were investigated under the assumption 
of infinite mating group size. This special case, q = 
reduces Eqs. (3) and (4) to give 
SN,O = 2qmin{czN,(1 - zN)} 	 (A.3) 
and 
SM,1 =qmin{c(zMf+zN(l - f)), 
0 ZM)f+(l — ZN)( 1 -f)} 
x1 	ZMf 	+ 	( l — zM)f 
\ZMf+ZN(lf) 0 — zM)f+(1 — zN)0—f) 
(A.4) 
Although both SN,O and SMI are linear functions of q, 
and therefore have infinite solutions, the relative fitness 
of the Null allele may still be evaluated as w is the ratio 
of the two and hence is finite. The predictions converge 
with those of Readet al. (1992) for c? 1, but being more 
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general, are able to predict the male biased ES sex ratio 
when males fecundity is more limiting than that of 
females, so that c < 1. 
We considered the possibility of stochastic male 
fecundity, specifically, how accurately do expressions 
(3) and (4) predict the ES sex ratio when the value of c 
represents the expectation of a random variable? 
Assuming that males all produce the same species-
specific number (x) of gametes, each with independent 
probability p of being viable for fertilization, Eqs. (3) 
and (4) become 
q XPN / 	\ 
SN,0 	 ( q z(l 
- Z)-PN (XIIN \ 
PN=OgN=O \PNJ 	 gN ) 
p N(l - p)XPN9N2 min{gN, q - / N} 	(A.5) 
and 
q 	M qPM XPM APN 
SMI =
( q )fzu (I _qtM(TM 
ZMOPMOPN=OgM=OgN=O \tM 	 PM / 
PM' 
ZM ti - ZM) Z
M PM (q - ZM ) ( l - ZN ) tM 
IAN 
(XPM (XPN p5M+5N (1 - p)xM+PN)_M -g 
\ 8M J gN  J 











E[Mo1 = q - PM - IAN 
if q - PM - IAN > 
0 	 q—PM—PN--0 
(A.6c) 
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Bacteriocins, spite and virulence 
Andy Gardnerl*, Stuart A. West 1 and Angus Buckling2 
'Institute of Cell, Animal and Population Biology, University of Edinburgh, King's Buildings, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh EH9 31T, UK 
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There has been much interest in using social evolution theory to predict the damage to a host from 
parasite infection, termed parasite virulence. Most of this work has focused on how high kinship between 
the parasites infecting a host can select for more prudent exploitation of the host, leading to a negative 
relationship between virulence and parasite kinship. However, it has also been shown that if parasites can 
cooperate to overcome the host, then high parasite kinship within hosts can select for greater cooperation 
and higher growth rates, hence leading to a positive relationship between virulence and parasite kinship. 
We examine the impact of a spiteful behaviour, chemical (bacteriocin) warfare between microbes, on the 
evolution of virulence, and find a new relationship: virulence is maximized when the frequency of kin 
among parasites' social partners is low or high, and is minimized at intermediate values. This emphasizes 
how biological details can fundamentally alter the qualitative nature of theoretical predictions made by 
models of parasite virulence. 
Keywords: social evolution; neighbour-modulated fitness; negative relatedness; Hamiltonian spite; 
scale of competition; interference competition 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a large theoretical literature applying evolutionary 
theory to explain the damage that parasites cause to their 
hosts (van Baalen & Sabelis 1995; Frank 1996; Gandon et 
al. 2001; Day & Burns 2003). Parasite virulence presents a 
fundamental trade-off in that parasites must deplete host 
resources to grow and transmit to new hosts, yet over-
exploitation can result in host mortality and an associated 
reduction in resource availability (Frank 1996). This is the 
'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968), in which indi-
viduals are expected to display altruistic self-restraint only 
if they are sufficiently related to their group (Frank 1998). 
A classic result of virulence theory is that intensity of 
exploitation and hence damage to hosts correlates nega-
tively with kinship among the parasites infecting a host 
(Hamilton 1972; Bremerman & Pickering 1983; Frank 
1992, 1996). This occurs because a lower relatedness 
leads to greater competition for resources, which selects 
for faster growth rates to obtain a greater proportion of 
the host resources, and these higher parasite growth rates 
lead to higher virulence. 
However, empirical support for this prediction is sever-
ely lacking (Herre 1993, 1995; Chao et al. 2000; Read & 
Taylor 2001; Davies et al. 2002; Griffin & West 2002; 
Read et al. 2002). One possible explanation for this is that 
variation in the underlying biological details can lead to 
alternative relationships (Frank 1996; Ganusov & Antia 
2003; Schjørring & Koella 2003). In particular, it has been 
shown that if parasites can cooperate to overcome their 
host's defences then the opposite prediction is favoured-
a positive relationship between parasite kinship and 
virulence (Chao et al. 2000; Brown et al. 2002; West & 
Buckling 2003). For example, West & Buckling (2003) 
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modelled the evolution of the production of costly public 
goods (siderophores) that promote bacterial growth dur -
ing iron starvation in an infection. Not surprisingly, the 
altruistic production of siderophores is expected to be 
maximized when kinship is highest, yet this leads to 
enhanced growth and therefore host damage precisely 
where previous theory predicted self-restraint and hence 
low virulence. 
Just as altruistic behaviour can promote parasite growth 
and hence enhance virulence, it is reasonable to assume 
that spiteful interactions (interference competition) 
between parasites could reduce the vigour of an infection 
and associated host damage. We consider such a spiteful 
trait: bacteriocin production. Bacteriocins are the most 
abundant of a range of antimicrobial compounds facultat-
ively produced by bacteria, and are found in all major bac-
terial lineages (Riley & Wertz 2002). They are a diverse 
family of proteins with a range of antimicrobial killing 
activity, many of which can be produced by a single bac-
terium, including enzyme inhibition, nuclease activity and 
pore formation in cell membranes (Reeves 1972; Riley & 
Wertz 2002). Unlike other antimicrobials, the lethal 
activity of bacteriocins is often (but not always) limited to 
members of the same species as the producer, suggesting 
a major role in competition with conspecifics (Riley et al. 
2003). Intraspecific competition may also help to explain 
the observed variation in the types of bacteriocin produced 
by different strains of the same species. For example, at 
least 25 bacteriocins (colicins) have been identified in 
populations of Escherichia coli, with different populations 
producing unique combinations (Riley & Gordon 1999). 
Clone mates are protected from the toxic effects of bac-
teriocins by genetic linkage between the bacteriocin gene 
and an immunity gene that encodes a factor that deacti-
vates the bacteriocin (Riley & Wertz 2002). 
In addition to the benefits of bacteriocin production 
(killing competitors), there are also costs (Reeves 1972; 
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Chao & Levin 1981; Kerr etal. 2002). This cost may sim-
ply be a diversion of resources from other cellular func-
tions, but in many Gram-negative bacteria, such as E. coli, 
cell death is required for the release of bacteriocins 
(Reeves 1972; Riley & Wertz 2002). Such costs (and costs 
associated with bacteriocin immunity) are critical for 
coexistence, between bacteriocin-producing, sensitive and 
resistant strains (Czárán et al. 2002; Kerr et al. 2002; Czá-
ran & Hoekstra 2003). We investigate how key parameters 
affect the relative costs and benefits of bacteriocin pro-
duction, hence the level favoured by natural selection, and 
the impact this has on disease virulence. Specifically, we 
consider how bacteriocin production evolves in response 
to the average kinship (r) of competing bacteria and the 
scale of competition relative to the effective range of bac-
teriocins (a). 
2. MODELS, METHODS AND ANALYSES 
(a) Simplest scenario 
We first consider a social arena, defined as the spatial range 
of bacteriocin warfare, comprising n equally abundant lineages 
drawn independently from the asexually reproducing bacterial 
population. A proportion r= 1/n of the bacteria within a focal 
bacterium's social arena are its clone-mates, or 'kin'. The 
remaining 1 - r are derived from the other n - 1 lineages, and 
are 'non-kin'. Using a game theoretic approach, we consider the 
fitness of a vanishingly rare mutant that allocates an amount of 
resources y into bacteriocin production within a population with 
average allocation z, so as to determine the 'unbeatable' 
(Hamilton 1967) or 'evolutionarily stable' (Maynard Smith & 
Price 1973) allocation strategy y'.  An amount of bacteriocin ry 
within the social arena is attributable to the focal lineage, and 
rz to each of the othe.r lineages. The focal lineage is then sub-
jected to an amount (1 - r)z of unrelated bacteriocin to which 
it is susceptible, and for each of the n - 1 other lineages, 
(1 - r)z + r(y - z). A lineage picked at random from the popu-
lation as a whole experiences, on average, (1 - r)z unrelated 
bacteriocin. Lineages are immune to their own bacteriocins, and 
although resistance (non-susceptibility of a lineage to a bacteri-
ocin which it does not itself produce) is not explicitly discussed 
in this model, the resulting reduction in susceptibility can be 
regarded as included in the general growth functions. The 
growth rate of a lineage, G, is given by the sum of two compo-
nents, H and I. H reflects the cost of bacteriocin production, 
being a positive, decreasing function of the focal lineage's allo-
cation to bacteriocin production, y. Our predictions rely on no 
specific form for H; when a specific relationship is required for 
illustrative purposes (figures 1-3), we use H= I - y. I models 
the reduction in growth owing to mortality by unrelated bac-
teriocins, being a positive, decreasing, linear or decelerating 
function of the amount (F) of unrelated bacteriocin it is sub-
jected to. Our predictions rely on no specific form for I; when 
a specific relationship is required for illustrative purposes 
(figures 1-3), we use I = 1 - Y"2 . We combine the terms H and 
I additively to give overall growth (G = H + I) for mathematical 
convenience, as it allows greater tractability than using a multi-
plicative scheme (G = H x I), and does not qualitatively change 
the results (see Appendix B). Using the construction of Frank 
(1998), fitness is determined by the growth of the lineage rela-
tive to the average competitor of that lineage: 
GfOC ,I 
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Figure 1. The ESS production of bacteriocins (y')  as a 
function of the average kinship (r) between bacteria. Values 
are obtained numerically using the model described in § 2a, 
assuming that bacterial growth is the sum of growth 
components H= 1 - y and I = 1 - V"2 (where the focal 
bacterium produces an amount y of its own bacteriocins, 
and receives an amount V from its social partners) and the 
intensity of local competition which is local is a = 0.5 (filled 
squares) and 0.6 (filled circles). Intermediate kinship. (r) and 
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Figure 2. The ESS production of bacteriocin (y') as a 
function of the average kinship (r) between bacteria. Values 
are obtained numerically using the two-lineage model 
described in Appendix A, assuming that bacterial growth is 
the sum of growth components H= 1 - y and 1=1 - 
(where the focal bacterium produces an amount y of its own 
bacteriocins, and receives an amount V from its social 
partners) and the intensity of local competition which is - 
local is a = 0.5 (solid line) or a = 0.6 (dotted line). 
Intermediate kinship (r) and increasingly local competition 
(high a) favour enhanced bacteriocin production. 
The parameter a defmes the (spatial) scale at which competition 
for resources takes place. This model therefore allows compe-
tition for resources and bacteriocin interaction to take place at 
different scales. Specifically, a proportion a of competition for 
resources occurs locally, within the scale of bacteriocin interac-
tion, and the (1 - a) remainder occurs globally. At the extremes: 
if a = 1 then competition for resources and bacteriocin interac-
tion occur at the same scale (soft selection at the level of the 
social group); if a = 0 then competition is at the global level 
(2.1) 
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Figure 3. The virulence (v) as a function of the average 
kinship (r) between bacteria. Values are obtained numerically 
using the host mortality model described in § 2b, assuming 
that bacterial growth is the sum of growth components 
H= 1 y and I = 1 - Yu2 (where the focal bacterium 
produces an amount y of its own bacteriocins, and receives 
an amount Y from its social partners), host survival is 
S = 3 - G (where Gh0 , is the overall bacterial growth in 
the host), the intensity of local competition is a = 0.5, and 
the range of bacteriocin warfare with respect to the whole 
infection is b= 0.1 (filled circles) and 0.2 (filled squares). 
Virulence is minimized at intermediate kinship (r) and when 
the range of bacteriocin warfare (b) is large. 
(hard selection at the level of the social group). Gf O , t , G101 and 
GgIob,! are, respectively, the growth rate of the focal lineage, the 
local average and the global average. These are, in full 
Gf0 , 1 = H[yJ + I[(l - r)z], 
Giocai = r (H[y] + I[(1 - r)zJ) + (1 - r)(I-I[z] + I[(l - r)z 
+ r(y - 
Ggiot=i = H[z] + I[(1 - r)z]. 	 (2.2) 
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) illustrate the fundamental trade-off in 
our model. Bacteriocin production by the focal lineage is: (i) 
costly, because it lowers the growth rate of the focal lineage 
(GfOI); and (ii) beneficial, because it lowers the growth rate of 
competitors G101 . 
Employing the direct fitness maximization technique of 
Taylor & Frank (1996; Frank 1998), we obtain the following 
results (details in Appendix A; numerical examples are given in 
figure 1). 
Result 1: enhanced bacteriocin production is favoured at inter-
mediate kinship (r). The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is 
y = 0 at r= 0 and 1, and is maximized somewhere in the range 
0 < r < 1. When the focal lineage occupies only a tiny pro-
portion (r—. 0) of the social arena, its impact on competitor 
growth is negligible, and hence the benefit through competitor 
killing does not outweigh the cost of bacteriocin production. 
When the focal lineage dominates the social group (r—. 1), the 
density of cells susceptible to its bacteriocin is too low for the 
benefit of competitor killing to outweigh the production costs. 
Result 2: enhanced bacteriocin production is favoured as the 
scale of competition a is increased (and hence competition for 
resources becomes more local) for all 0 < r < 1. This occurs 
because fitness can be enhanced in two ways: (i) maximizing 
own growth (G10, 1); and (ii) reducing the growth of local  
competitors (G10 ,1). When competition is entirely global (a = 0), 
there is no benefit in reducing the growth of local competitors, 
so that the ESS is the strategy that maximizes focal growth (by 
reducing bacteriocin production). As competition becomes 
more local (a > 0), production of bacteriocin is increasingly fav-
oured so as to reduce the growth of the local competitors. 
We also consider a model in which the abundance of the focal 
lineage can vary continuously over the range 0 r 1, and the 
other cells all belong to one other lineage (see Appendix A and 
figure 2). We recover the same results, fmding that ESS bacteri-
ocin production is maximized at intermediate kinship (at 
r= 1/2, because of the symmetry of this model) and increases as 
competition becomes more localized (i.e. as a increases). 
As is often the case (Taylor & Frank 1996; Frank 1998), 
inspection of the direct marginal fitness (equation (A 1)) yields 
a form of Hamilton's (1963) rule RB> C (equation (A 2)). In 
this: (i) relatedness is negative and given by R = —(ar)/(1 —ar); 
(ii) the negative 'benefit', summed over all reciiiients, is 
B= (1 - r)I'[(l - r)z] where I'[YI is the derivative dI[Y]/dY 
and represents the marginal reduction in growth of a lineage 
which is poisoned by an amount Y of foreign bacteriocins. To 
understand how a negative relatedness can arise, we will use the 
result of Queller (1994) that average relatedness to one's com-
petitors is zero. Recalling that the scale of competition (a) is 
defined as the proportion of competition which is local, consider 
an arena of competition in which a proportion of competitors a 
are social partners, and of these a proportion r belong to the 
focal lineage. Then a proportion ar of competitors are clonally 
related to the spiteful actor by 1, and a proportion 1 - ar are 
related by some unknown coefficient R. Applying Queller's 
insight, we know that ar x 1 + (1 - ar) x R = 0, and rearranging 
we obtain R= —(ar)/(1 —ar). Hence: 
Result 3: the evolution 6f bacteriocin production involves a 
negative relatedness between actor and recipient, and hence fits 
Hamilton's (1970) original definition of a spiteful behaviour. 
Relatedness between non-kin social partners is given by R = 
- (ar)I( 1 - ar), where a is the proportion of competition that is 
local, and r is the proportion of social partners that are clonal 
kin. This equation gives negative values for relatedness, except 
when either (or both) a and rare zero, in which case relatedness 
equals zero. 
(b) Host mortality 
The above model is appropriate for free-living bacteria, bac-
teria grown on agar plates, or parasitic bacteria in which host 
mortality does not influence the ESS production of bacteriocin. 
For parasitic bacteria, this would be appropriate when the extra 
host mortality due to the infection impinges very little upon bac-
terial success, or when there are many social groups within the 
host, such that any lineage's growth rate has a negligible impact 
on the mortality of the host. A simple model, relaxing these 
assumptions, considers that direct fitness of the focal lineage is 
given by the product S x T, where S represents host survival (i.e. 
the time over which transmission is possible) and is a linearly 
decreasing function of the average growth rate of lineages in the 
host. Tis the transmission rate achieved by the focal lineage, i.e. 
its growth rate relative to competitors, the fitness measure given 
by equation (2.1). A parameter, b, is introduced to denote the 
proportion of the bacterial population within the host that is in 
the focal arena of social (bacteriocin) interaction; b = 0 corre-
sponds to when the social arena comprises a vanishingly small 
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proportion of the total infection, and b = 1 corresponds to the 
arena of bacteriocin interaction being the entire infection. As in 
our first model, we assume n equally abundant lineages. The 
appropriate fitness function is 
G 0,,1 
w = S[Gho=JaGioc,i  + (1 - a) Gglob,I' 	
(2.3) 
where the growth rate of a random lineage within the host is 
on average 
= bG0 , 1 + 0 - b) G Ob,I. 	 (2.4) 
Virulence (v) can be defined as the reduction in S relative to a 
host with zero bacterial growth (G hO,, = 0), i.e. v = S[O] 
— S[Gh0,,]. The following result is obtained (see Appendix A for 
details, and figure 3 for numerical examples). 
Result 4: virulence (v) is maximized at the extremes of 
relatedness (r = 0 and r = 1), and is minimized at intermediate 
values 0 < r < 1. This is because of the maximization of bacteri-
ocin production at intermediate values of r, such that absolute 
growth of bacteria is reduced here but not at more extreme 
values, so that virulence is more pronounced whenever bacteria 
tend to socialize mostly, or not at all, with their kin. 
3. DISCUSSION 
We have shown that the production of bacteriocin is 
expected to be enhanced when kinship (r) is of intermedi-
ate value (result 1; figures 1 and 2). Because bacteriocin 
production is expected to correlate with low bacterial 
growth rates, virulence will tend to be minimized at inter -
mediate r and maximized when bacteria compete only 
with non-kin (r= 0) or only with kin (r= 1). We therefore 
predict a U-shaped relationship between virulence and 
kinship (result 4; figure 3), contrary to previous models 
that variously predict monotonically increasing or decreas-
ing virulence as kinship is increased. This emphasizes that 
the qualitative outcome of virulence evolution crucially 
depends on the biological details, such as whether para-
sites are able to improve their success through prudent 
growth (Frank 1996), or cooperative contributions to pub-
lic goods (Brown et al. 2002; West & Buckling 2003), or 
through anti-competitor toxin production. 
Our result is intuitive if we consider that when kinship 
(r) is low the influence of the focal lineage on the growth 
of its social partners will be negligible, and so reduced 
allocation of resources into bacteriocin production is fav-
oured. By contrast, when kinship is high, the proportion 
of cells in the social arena that are susceptible to bacteri-
ocin killing is small, and thus the benefit of producing bac-
teriocin is less than the cost that this entails. At 
intermediate kinship, bacteriocin production is favoured 
because competition with non-relatives is important, and 
bacteriocin production by the focal lineage can signifi-
cantly decrease the growth of the non-competitors. Result 
2, that the ESS bacteriocin production is an increasing 
function of the degree to which competition is local (a; 
figures 1 and 2), is also intuitive in that when competition 
is increasingly local the benefits accrued by reducing the 
growth of local competitors are enhanced. 
The costly allocation of resources into bacteriocin pro-
duction qualifies as an example of Hamiltonian spite 
(Hamilton 1970, 1996; Hurst 1991; Foster et al. 2001; 
Gardner & West 2004). It is well accepted that altruism  
can be adaptive despite a direct fitness cost provided the 
beneficiary of altruism is sufficiently positively related to 
the actor (i.e. a positive R and a positive B, and RB> C). 
Hamiltonian spite is when a costly behaviour is favoured 
because it has a cost to the recipient (negative B), and the 
recipient is negatively related to the actor (negative R, and 
RB> C). How can negative relatedness arise? Negative 
relatedness to some individuals is inevitable when posi-
tively related individuals exist in the same competitive 
arena. The reason for this is that because the relatedness 
of an actor to a randomly chosen individual from its com-
petitive arena is, on average, zero (Queller 1994), the 
existence of positive relations within that arena implies the 
existence of negatively related competitors (Result 3). In 
this situation, spiteful behaviour will be favoured if it can 
be preferentially directed at these negatively related com-
petitors, and RB> C is satisfied. The specificity of bac-
teriocin action allows it to potentially fill this criterion, 
because it will preferentially harm non-relatives who are 
not resistant to that particular bacteriocin; i.e. bacteriocins 
harm individuals who are negatively related to the pro-
ducer. Although the anti-competitor function of the bac-
teriocins suggests that this is selfishness at the level of the 
clonal lineage, it is certainly spiteful at the level of the self-
destructing bacterium producing the toxins. 
To conclude, we have shown theoretically how kinship 
and the scale of competition determine levels of bacteri-
ocin production favoured by natural selection. Contrary to 
previous work, we find a U-shaped relationship between 
kinship and virulence. The results are qualitatively the 
same whether bacteria have fixed strategies for bacteriocin 
production or if bacteriocin production is facultatively 
adjusted in response to kin recognition. These predictions 
could be tested by: (i) correlating bacteriocin production 
with average kinship in natural populations; or (ii) exper-
imentally evolving bacteria under different degrees of kin-
ship and scales of competition. Furthermore, our 
predictions are not limited to bacteriocin production by 
bacteria. A variety of microbes, including yeasts (see 
Schmitt & Breinig 2002) and halophilic archea (see 
Cheung et al. 1997) are known to produce toxins that tend 
to target conspecifics. 
We thank N. Barton and three anonymous reviewers for com-
ments. Funding was provided by BBSRC, NIERC and The 
Royal Society. 
APPENDIX A 
(a) Simplest scenario 
Substituting equation (2.2) into equation (2.1) we 
obtain fitness function w [y,z]. If we assume only minor 
variants (y z; Taylor & Frank 1996) the marginal fit-
ness is found to be 
dwt 	(1 - ar)H'[z] - ar (1 - r)I'[(l - r)z] 
(Al) dy Y=z H[z] + I[(1 - r)zJ 
Where H' < 0 is the derivative of H with respect to its 
parameter (e.g. y in the instance of the mutant), and may 
be interpreted as the marginal cost (—C) of producing 
bactenocins. 1' <0 is the derivative of I with respect to 
its parameter (e.g. (1 - r)z for the amount of bacteriocin 
attacking the focal mutant), and is the negative 'benefit' 
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accrued by the recipient of spiteful behaviour—summing 
over all the recipients, the benefit is 
B = (1 - r)I'[(l - r)z]. Increased bacteriocin production 
(y) is favoured whenever duldy > 0 is satisfied, yielding 
Hamilton's rule: 
- ar 
B>C. 	 (A2) 
1 - ar 
Substituting r= 0 into equation (A 1) obtains H'[z]/ 
(H[z] + I[z]), which is negative and hence y' = 0. When 
r= 1, equation (A 1) becomes (1 - a)H'[z]/(H[zJ + I[z]) 
which is negative and so y = 0. When a = 0, equation 
(A 1) gives H'[z]/(H[z]+I[(l - r)z]), which is negative so 
that y = 0. Therefore, the presence of more than one 
lineage (0 < r < 1) and some degree of local competition 
(a> 0) are essential for non-zero allocation to bacteriocin 
production. If we denote the right-hand side (RHS) of 
equation (A 1) by J, then the ESS z = y satisfies J = 0. 
Using implicit differentiation, we can write 
21_ 6J/8r 
dr - 6116y' 	
(A 3) 
where 8 denotes partial derivatives. For y to be conver-
gence stable (i.e. in a population close to y', mutants 
closer to y  are favoured by selection), the denominator 
on the RHS of equation (A 3) must be negative (Taylor 
1996). Hence, assuming convergence stability, dy/dr has 
the same sign as 61/6r (Pen 2000). Evaluating the partial 
derivative at r= 0 (and hence y' = 0) yields —a(H[0] 
+ I[0])(H'[O] + I'[O])/(H[O] + I[0])2, which is positive 
when a> 0. This indicates that when there is some degree 
of local competition, and intermediate relatedness, bac-
teriocin production will be nonzero. Using the same pro-
cedure, we may find the partial derivative of J with respect 
to the scale of competition, a: 
rIi'[y] + r(1 - r)I'[(l - r)y'] 
8a 	 H[y'] +I[y'J 
(A 4) 
which is positive for all 0 < r < 1, and hence bacteriocin 
production is an increasing function of the scale of compe-
tition (a) when kinship is intermediate. 
We now relax the assumption of equally abundant lin-
eages, looking now at the situation where only two lin-
eages occupy the social arena, so that the focal lineages 
comprise a proportion r or 1 - r of the bacterial cells with 
equal probability. The appropriate fitness function is then 
w=r 
aGiocau + (1 - a) G Oba l 
+ 
aG102 + 0 - a) GObl 
(1 - r) G10 1 2 	
(A 5) 
where 
G 0 ,11 =H[y] +I[(l —r)z], 
GfO ls = HI:y] + I [rz], 
Giocaii = r (H[y] + I[(1 - r)zJ) + (1 - r)(H[z] + I[ry]), 
G10 ,12 = 0 - r) (H[y] + I[rz]) + r(H[z] + I[(l - 
GgIobaI = H[z] + rI[(1 - r)z] + (1 - r) I[rz]. 	(A 6) 
Following the same procedure as before, we obtain 
/r(H[z} + I[(1 - r)z])I'[rz] 
ar(1 - r)( 
- r)(H[z] + I'[rz])I'[(l - r)zJ 
dw 
	
= 	(1 - a(1 - 2r(1 - r)))H[z] 
+ +r(1 - ar)I[(1 - r)z] 	H'[z] 
+(1 - r)(1 - a(1 - r))I[rz] 
{H[z] + rI[(1 - r)z] + (1 - r)I[rz]}2. 	 (A 7) 
Setting r- 0 yields (1 - a)H'[z]/(H[zJ + I[0]) which is 
always negative and hence y = 0 at r= 0. Setting r— 1 
yields (1 - a)H'[z]I(H[zJ + I[0]) which is always nega-
tive, so y' = 0 at r = 1. And when a -. 0, we obtain 
H'[zJ/(H[z] + rI[(l - r)z] + (1 - r)I[rz) which is always 
negative, so that y * = 0 when a = 0. 
As before, if we defineJ as the RHS of equation (A 7) 
when z = y , then it is easy to show that for a> 0, 
61/6r=dy'/dr=0 is satisfied for only r= 1/2. Since 
y' = 0 at r = 0 and r = 1, and assuming no discontinuities 
over the range of r, we can conclude that y monotonically 
increases over the range 0 < r < 1/2 and montonically 
decreases over the range 1/2 < r < 1. 
The partial derivative of J with respect to the scale of 
competition is 6J/6a = —(r(1 - r)(r(H[y] + I[(1 - r)]) 
x1[ry *] + (1 - r)(Hy] + I[ry'])I'[(l - r)y *]) + (1 - 
2r (1 - r))H[y *] + r21[(l - r)y*] + (1 - r)2I[ry *])H[y *J)/ 
(H[y*] + rI[(1 - r)y *] + (1 - r)I[ry *])2, which is posi-
tive for all 0 < r < 1, and hence bacteriocin production is 
an increasing function of the scale of competition (a) at 
intermediate kinship. 
(b) Host mortality 
Previously we constructed a fitness function (equation 
(2.3)) appropriate to the situation where bacterial growth 
impacts upon host mortality (virulence) and hence intro-
duces a novel selection pressure. We also introduced a 
parameter b scaling the social arena with respect to the 
host. If b = 0, so that the social arena comprises a van-
ishing proportion of the bacterial population within the 
host, then GhO , = G 0b j and S is a constant with respect 
to y, so that marginal fitness is given by equation (A 1). 
For b> 0, and assuming only minor variants (y 
z, GfOC G1 , j G Ob Gh0,, G), marginal fitness is 
dw 
=S'[G]rb(H'[z] + (1 - r)I'[(l - r)z]) 
dy 
+ S[G]_ )TJ-L 	LLL.r 	(A 8) 
The second component on the RHS is proportional to the 
marginal fitness (equation (A 1)), and represents the 
trade-off between the cost and competitor-killing capabili-
ties of bacteriocins. When a = 0, this component reduces 
to (S[GJH'[z])/G, which is always negative, reflecting the 
disadvantage of spite when competition is global. The first 
component, positive and proportional to rb, is the selec-
tion pressure for enhanced killing and costly production 
when growth of the focal lineage and its neighbours 
impact non-trivially upon host mortality. As r tends to 
zero, marginal fitness is negative (S[G]H'[zJ/G) as the 
behaviour of the focal lineage has no impact on host mor -
tality and there is no advantage to be had from directing 
spite at local competitors (relatedness to non-kin in the 
social arena is zero). At r= 1, the second component is 
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negative (S[G](1 - a)H'[z]IG) reflecting the fitness cost 
of bacteriocin production, and the first component is 
positive (S'[G]H'[z]) reflecting the enhanced fitness due 
to the reduction in host mortality. Note that this positive 
pressure is due entirely to the costs of bacteriocin pro-
duction, and not through its bacteriocidal activity; this is 
due to an artificiality in the model such that the bacteria 
have no means of reducing own growth other than pro-
ducing costly bacteriocin. Because no gain in terms of 
competitor killing is to be had from producing bacterio-
cins at r= 1, we expect y' =0. 
If y' = 0 at r= 0 and 1, then since H and I are decreas-
ing functions of y', it is here that Gh 0 , L H + I is maxim-
ized. Because S decreases with increasing Gh 0 , S is 
minimized at r = 0, 1. If we define virulence as the 
reduction in host survival relative to that for a host in 
which bacterial growth is zero (v = Sm,, - 5), then viru-
lence is maximized when S is minimized (V ms,, = 5mx 
- Smja), i.e. at the extremes of relatedness, r= 0 and 
r= 1. 
When a and b are both zero, so that there is no selection 
for spite nor for reduced virulence, equation (A 8) reduces 
to (S[GJH'[z])/G which is negative and hence y' = 0. 
APPENDIX B 
Relaxing the assumption of additive growth compo-
nents, and making no further assumptions about the 
components of growth beyond bacteriocin production 
reducing the growth of the .focal lineage (Gf0I)  and its 
non-kin social partners we can recover the major 
predictions made in this study. Consider the fitness func-
tion (equation (2.1)). Marginal fitness can be written 
dw 
dy 
(aG1 ,,1 + ( 1 - 	 - G10d(aG1oc + (1 - a)G
g I ob,j) 
dy 	 dy 
(aG10,1 + (1 - a)Gg,,b,I) 2 
(B 1) 
Assuming only minor variants, so that y z, and 
G 0, 1 G,0 1,1 Giocai G 0bl G. we have 
dw - ( 	
dGfocal 	 dGo.riai) 	
(B 2) 
dy 	
(1—ar) 	—a(1 —r) 
dy dy 
Fitness increases with enhanced bacteriocin production 
when dw/dy > 0. dG fr,/dy is negative owing to the pro-
duction costs of bacteriocin, and dG,01 Idy is negative 
because non-kin social partners experience higher mor-
tality as bacteriocin production by the focal lineage is 
increased. Equation (B 2) therefore demonstrates the 
trade-off between the direct cost of bacteriocin production 
and the benefit of competitor killing. The benefit is zero 
when a = 0 andlor when r= 1, so thai marginal fitness is 
{(1 - ar)dGfOC,lIdy}/G < 0 for all y, meaning that the 
ESS bacteriocin production is at y = 0. Also, the impact 
of the focal lineage's bacteriocin on competitor growth 
approaches zero as the focal lineage accounts for a van-
ishing proportion of the social group, i.e. at r= 0, 
dG,0 Idy = 0, and so here the marginal fitness is nega-
tive, and y' = 0. Therefore, regardless of the precise 
details describing how the growth of the focal lineage and 
its non-kin social partners decline with enhanced bacteri-
ocin production, provided they do decline, we can state 
that the ESS is y = 0 when kinship is zero or complete 
(r= 0, 1) and when competition is entirely global (a = 0). 
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PERSPECTIVES 
tidomimetic library was screened to find 
molecules that could compete with the 
binding of the SMAC peptide to the Bir 
domain of different forms of lAP. After fur-
ther chemical modification of a candidate 
molecule, Li et al. generated compound 3 
that, like SMAC, has a high avidity for dif-
ferent forms of TAP including X-chromo-
some encoded lAP (XIAP), cellular IAP-1, 
and cellular IAP-2. Compound 3 blocked 
the interaction of XIAP with active caspase 
9. In previous work, SMAC was shown to 
act synergistically with a death receptor 
called TRAIL to induce tumor-selective 
apoptosis (10). Impressively, treatment of 
glioblastoma cells with a combination of 
the ligand for the TRAIL receptor and 
compound 3 resulted in apoptôsis of the tu-
mor cells, whereas normal cells were not 
ECOLOGY 
"Sometimes I work my brother over ... I 
make him squirm, I've made him cry. He 
doesn 't know how I do it I rn smarter than 
he is. I don 't want to do it It makes me 
sick." 
-John Steinbeck, East of Eden 
A
lthough sibling conflict abounds in 
the literary world-from the Bible 
to Steinbeck--it also features 
prominently in the real world. Recent re-
search from the laboratories of Strand and 
Hardy (1-3) on sibling conflict among par-
asitic wasps sheds light on that most puz-
zling of social behaviors-spite. 
Social behaviors are those that affect the 
fitness of multiple individuals (4). The so-
cial behavior that has provoked the most in-
terest is altruism, in which an action incurs 
a direct fitness cost for the actor and pro-
vides a benefit for the actor's social part-
ners. Hamilton showed that altruism is fa-
vored when individuals are helping their 
close relatives, and hence still passing on 
their genes to the next generation, albeit in-
directly. A pleasingly simple and elegant 
method for quantifying this idea of kin se-
lection is Hamilton's rule, which states that 
an altruistic behavior will be favored if the 
cost to the actor (C) is outweighed by the 
product of the benefit (B) and the genetic re-
latedness (R) to the social partners, resulting 
in RB > C (5). Hamilton, however, also 
The authors are in the School of Biological Sciences, 
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harmed. Li et al. (4) also demonstrated that 
compound 3 could potentiate apoptosis in 
cells treated with TNF-a (tumor necrosis 
factor-(x) without activation of the nuclear 
transcription factor NF-icB. Because TNF-
a mediates host responses in acute and 
chronic inflammatory conditions, these 
results suggest that compound 3 may 
have potential for treating inflammatory 
diseases (11). Although the efficacy of 
compound 3 was not evaluated in vivo, 
the authors are using compound 3 as a 
lead structure for the refinement of 
future therapeutic compounds with better 
pharmacological properties. 
Peptidomimetics are only now emerging 
as a powerful solution for overcoming the 
limitations imposed by the physical proper-
ties of native peptides. Walensky et al. (3) 
pointed out that his rule has a more sinister 
interpretation (6). His rule can be twisted to 
predict that spiteful behavior-which hurts 
both the actor and the recipient-may be fa-
vored when there is sufficient negative re-
latedness between the social partners. 
Negative relatedness may seem like a 
bizarre concept, but it simply means that 
the recipient of a particular behavior is less 
related than other competitors to the actor 
(6-8). It has generally been assumed that 
spite is unlikely to be an important evolu-
tionary force because the conditions re-
quired to obtain significant negative relat-
edness are too restrictive. Nonetheless, the-
oretical interest in spiteful behavior rum-
bles on. It is clear that spite can evolve giv -
en the right conditions: (i) when there is 
strong competition for local resources 
among social partners and (ii) when indi-
viduals have the capacity to recognize (and 
refrain from being spiteful to) their close 
kin (6, 7). In recent work, Strand, Hardy, 
and their colleagues (1-3) investigated a 
biological system that appears to satisfy 
both conditions-the sterile soldier caste 
of polyembryonic parasitic wasps. 
These small wasps deposit their eggs 
into the eggs of moths, and the wasp larvae 
develop within the moth caterpillars (see 
the figure). A single wasp egg proliferates 
asexually (clonally) to produce multiple 
larvae such that, when the host contains 
larvae from several eggs, the limited food 
resources within the caterpillar will permit 
only a fraction of those larvae to complete 
development and emerge as adults. Thus, 
there is intense competition for resources  
and Li et al. (4) demonstrate provocative 
proof-of-concept approaches to the design 
of peptidomimetics that may have a decid-
ed impact on future therapeutics that target 
disease by modulating specific protein-
protein interactions. - 
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among the larvae within the host, satisfy-
ing the first condition for spite. 
The majority of the wasp larvae develop 
normally, whereas others develop preco-
ciously to form a soldier caste that differs 
morphologically and behaviorally from 
normal wasp siblings (see the figure). 
Donnell et al. (1) demonstrate that the 
mechanism underlying caste formation in 
the clonally developing wasp population in-
volves asymmetric inheritance of germ 
cells. Embryos that develop into normal 
larvae inherit the germ line, whereas em-
bryos that develop into soldiers do not, 
making them obligately sterile-the cost of 
developing as a soldier. Upon hatching, sol-
diers distribute themselves throughout the 
host and launch aggressive attacks on other 
larvae, murdering their unfortunate victims. 
This has the potential to be spite and not al-
truism because the benefits of reduced 
competition accrue to all larvae in the host 
and not preferentially to closer relatives (7). 
This would be an adaptive spiteful be-
havior if soldiers preferentially attacked 
the larvae they are least related to in the 
caterpillar, which requires kin recognition, 
the second condition for spite (7). In a new 
study, Giron and colleagues (2, 3) demon-
strate that soldiers are indeed capable of 
recognizing their kin, and the investigators 
then elucidate the mechanism. First, they 
varied kinship by introducing either full 
(but not genetically identical) sisters and 
brothers or unrelated larvae into a host 
caterpillar containing a developing female 
brood of wasp larvae (2). The introduced 
larvae were labeled with a fluorescent trac-
er, and attack rates were assessed by meas-
uring how many of the resident soldiers in-
gested labeled larval tissue (see the figure). 
As predicted, the researchers found a 
strong negative correlation between attack 
rates and kinship. 
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A 	Life cycle of a polyembryonlc wasp 
A female wasp deposits her The wasp larvae undergo clonal 
eggs into a caterpillar host egg. proliferation within the caterpillar host. 
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In a companion study 
(3), the investigators shed 
light on the mechanism 
of this kin recognition 
faculty. They reveal that 
the key element is the ex-
traembryonic membrane 
surrounding each larva 
during its development in 
the caterpillar host. They 
show that attack rates 
correlated negatively 
with kinship when the 
membrane was present, 
but not when the mem-
brane was removed. In 
addition, by transplanting 
membranes between larvae they were able 
to fool the soldiers, whose attack rates cor-
related negatively with the kinship of the 
membrane donor but not with the larva en-
cased inside. Mechanisms of kin recogni-
tion are unstable because deceptive variants 
arise that signal strong kinship to everyone; 
such variants can become common. 
However, the importance of the membrane 
in protecting larvae from host immune at-
tack means that rare variants are intrinsi-
cally favored and that common variants are 
disadvantageous, providing a robust, 
honest signal of kinship. This may be true 
for many endoparasites, rendering such 
species masters of kin recognition. 
One potentially puzzling result is that 
manipulation of resource availability by 
starving the host caterpillars did not influ- 
PLANETARY SCIENCE 
I mages of Jupiter and Saturn from tele-scopes and space probes only show the outermost layers of these giant planets. 
Learning about their interiors, which con- 
sist mostly of hydro- 
Eiihanced online at 	gen (H) and helium 
www.sciencemag.orglcgi/ (He) and make up 
contentlfulll305/568911414 over 90% of the plan- 
etary mass in the solar 
system, is more challenging. Recent model 
studies (1-3) show how new measurements 
from the Cassini spacecraft—now in orbit 
around Saturn—could lead to a better un-
derstanding of the interior of Saturn and, 
by extension, all giant planets. 
The most important input into giant 
planet models is the equation of state—that 
The author is with the Planetary Systems Branch, 
NASA Ames Research Center, Moftett Field, CA 
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ence the level of aggression exhibited by 
the wasp soldier caste (2). Possibly be-
cause competition is always local, resource 
availability does not influence how soldiers 
vary their relatedness-dependent behavior. 
Alternatively, soldier larvae may not be 
able to assess the intensity of competition 
for resources, either because doing so is 
difficult or because natural variation in 
competition is negligible and there has 
been no need for this faculty to evolve. 
Future work on how local competition for 
resources relates to soldier aggression 
could benefit from explicit theoretical 
modeling, as well as alternative methods 
for varying the scale of competition such as 
selection experiments (9) or comparative 
studies across species and populations. 
Nonetheless, the existence of an aggressive 
is, the relation between pressure and densi-
ty—of hydrogen. Uncertainties in the equa-
tion of state translate directly into uncer-
tainties in the estimated size of the 'heavy 
element" (elements more massive than He) 
cores of the giant planets and the abun-
dances of elements in their hydrogen-rich 
envelopes (1). Two groups have measured 
the shock-induced compressibility of deu-
terium, a heavy isotope of H, but there is a 
50% discrepancy between their data sets (4, 
5). As Saumon and Guillot (1) show in a re-
cent paper in The Astrophysical Journal, 
this uncertainty profoundly affects infer-
ences about the composition of the planets 
and the sizes of their cores. These quantities 
must be known before we can understand 
the process of giant planet formation and 
properties of the early solar system. 
The authors created static models of 
Jupiter and Saturn that match all available 
soldier caste among .parasitic wasps pro- 
vides evidence that spite does exist in the 
real world, as Hamilton predicted it would. 
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constraints, including mass, radius, oblate-
ness, rotation period, atmospheric tempera-
ture, and gravitational moments for each 
planet. They also used a wide range of pos-
sible equations of state for H to allow for 
the disparate experimental data sets. 
According to their model, Jupiter's core is 
0 to 11 Earth masses. Saturn's core is like-
ly larger, between 9 and 22 Earth masses, 
(For comparison, Jupiter is 317.8 Earth 
masses and Saturn 95.2 Earth masses.) 
Overall, Jupiter is enriched in heavy ele-
ments by a factor of 1.5 to 6 relative to the 
Sun, and Saturn by a factor of 6 to 14. The 
most striking of these results is that we 
cannot be sure whether Jupiter has a core. 
The greatest uncertainty in the structure 
of Jupiter comes from unsatisfactory under-
standing of liquid metallic H at Mbar pres-
sures. In contrast, for Saturn, poor knowledge 
of its gravitational moments, which describe 
how the planet's mass responds to its rotation, 
is the main obstacle. Gravitational moments 
are determined by measuring small accelera-
tions of a spacecraft as it passes near a plan-
et. During Cassini's 4-year mission, error 
bars on the low-degree gravitational mo- 
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Spite and the scale of competition 
A. GARDNER & S. A. WEST 
Institute of Cell, Animal and Population Biology. University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK 
Keywords: 	 Abstract 
Hamiltonian spite; 	 In recent years there has been a large body of theoretical work examining how 
hard selection; . 	 local competition can reduce and even remove selection for altruism between 
kin competition; 	 relatives. However, it is less well appreciated that local competition favours 
negative relatedness; 	 selection for spite, the relatively neglected ugly sister of altruism. Here, we use 
Price equation; 	 extensions of social evolution theory that were formulated to deal with the 
soft selection; - consequences for altruism of competition between social partners, to illustrate 
Wilsonian spite. 	 several points on the evolution of spite. Specifically, we show that: (i) the 
conditions for the evolution of spite are less restrictive than previously 
assumed; (ii) previous models which have demonstrated selection for spite 
often implicitly assumed local competition; (iii) the scale of competition must 
be allowed for when distinguishing different forms of spite (Hamiltonian vs. 
Wilsonian); (iv) local competition can enhance the spread of spiteful 
greenbeards; and (v) the theory makes testable predictions for how the extent 
of spite should vary dependent upon population structure and average 
relatedness. 
Altruism and spite 
Social behaviours can be categorized according to the 
direct fitness consequences they entail for the actor and 
recipient (Fig. 1; Hamilton, 1964, 1970, 1971). A beha-
viour increasing the direct fitness of the actor is mutu-
alistic if the recipient also benefits, and selfish if the 
recipient suffers a loss. It is easy to see how such 
behaviours can be favoured by natural selection. Behav-
iours which reduce the direct fitness of the actor - 
altruism if the recipient enjoys a benefit, spite if the 
recipient suffers a loss - are !ess easy to explain. Hamilton 
(1963, 1964) introduced the concept of inclusive fitness 
and showed that while certain behaviours are detnmen-
tal to the individual, they may result in a net increase in 
the actor's genes in the population. Altruism can be 
favoured by natural selection despite a direct fitness cost 
(C) to the actor if the benefit (B) accruing to the recipient 
is sufficiently large and if the genetic relatedness (R) of 
the recipient to the actor is sufficiently positive. 
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Specifically, when Hamilton's (1963, 1964) rule, 
RB > C, is satisfied. A spiteful behaviour, entailing a 
negative benefit (B < 0) to the recipient and a positive 
cost (C> 0) to the actor, is similarly favoured if RB > C, 
which would require a negative relatedness (R < 0) 
between actor and recipient. 
Relatedness and spite 
Hamilton (1963) argued that under the assumption of 
weak selection the appropriate measure of relatedness (R) 
coincides with Wright's (1922) correlation coefficient of 
relationship. Wright's coefficient is a function of the 
association between individuals and the association 
within individuals with respect to their genes at a given 
locus. Since these associations have popularly been inter-
preted in terms of Malécot's (1948) probability of identity 
by descent, and negative probabilities are not permitted, 
negative relatedness seems to be mathematically imposs-
ible (Hamilton, 1970, 1996; although see Wright, 1969, p. 
178). Yet Hamilton (1963) understood that rela'edness 
(R) was in principle a regression coefficient - a fact which 
is now generally appreciated (reviewed by Seger. 1981; 
Michod, 1982; Grafen, 1985; Queller, 1985, 1992; Frank, 
1998) - and this was first made explicit in his elegant 
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Fig. 1 A classification of social behaviours. 
reformulation of Hamilton's (1970) rule using Price's 
(1970) equation. Specifically, relatedness is the regression 
(slope) of the recipient's genetical breeding value on that 
of the actor (Hamilton, 1970, 1972; Taylor & Frank, 1996; 
Frank, 1997a, 1998). As regressions can be negative as 
well as positive (and zero), relatedness can feasibly take 
any real value (from negative infinity to positive infinity). 
Discussions with Price led Hamilton to acknowledge that 
negative relatedness can plausibly arise between social 
partners, and hence spite can be favoured by natural 
selection (Hamilton, 1970, 1996; Frank, 1995). 
How does negative relatedness arise? Grafen's (1985) 
geometric view of relatedness reveals that relatedness 
between an actor and a potential recipient depends 
crucially upon the genetical composition of the whole 
population. This can be illustrated by assuming that a 
recipient carries the actor's genes with average frequency 
p, and the population frequency of the actor's genes is P. 
If the recipient carries the actor's genes at a frequency 
greater than the population frequency of those genes 
(p > ) then an increase in its reproductive success 
translates into increased frequency of the actor's genes 
in the population, and hence a positive inclusive fitness 
benefit to the actor (RB > 0; Fig. 2a). Conversely, if the 
recipient carries the actor's genes at a frequency lower 
than the population frequency of those genes (p </) 
then an increase in its reproductive success translates 
into decreased frequency of the actor's genes in the 
population, and hence a negative inclusive fitness benefit 
for the actor (RB < 0; Fig. 2b). The point here is that the 
difference between these two situations can arise purely 
due to variation in the frequency of the actor's genes in 
the population (variable ), even with a fixed proportion 
of genes shared between the actor and recipient (fixed p): 
relatedness is relative, with the population as a whole 
providing the reference. 
This also illustrates how negative relatedness can arise. 
As both situations described above involve a positive 
benefit (B > 0) to the recipient, the coefficient of relat-
edness which transforms recipient success into inclusive 
fitness of the actor must be positive in the former 







Fig. 2 The geometric view of relatedness. The actor's genes (shaded) 
are present in the recipient at frequency p and in the population as a 
whole at frequency P . Enhancing the direct fitness of the recipient 
(B > 0) pushes the population gene frequency towards p, and so if 
p > P (a) the frequency of the actor's genes increase, giving a positive 
inclusive fitness benefit (RB > 0) which implies positive relatedness 
(R> 0) between actor and recipient. If p <p (b), then the population 
frequency of the actor's genes decreases, giving a negative inclusive 
fitness benefit (RB < 0) and hence negative relatedness (R < 0). 
When p = (c) the population frequency does not change, giving no 
inclusive fitness benefit (RB = 0) and hence zero relatedness (R = 0). 
Fig. 2b). The other possibility is that relatedness is zero 
when the recipient carries the same frequency of the 
actor's genes as does the population as a whole (p = 
so that relatedness to the average population member 
(and hence to the population itself) is zero (Fig. 2c). 
But, how large a negative relatedness is likely to arise? 
Consider an individual who lives in a population of size N, 
and who is then related to a fraction 1/N of the population 
(i.e. itself) by an amount I and is related to the other 
fraction (N - 1)/Nby an amount R. The relatedness to the 
population as a whole must be zero (Grafen, 1985), and 
hence mustsatisfy (11N) + [(N - 1)/N]R = 0. Rearrange-
ment gives R = —11(N - I), i.e. the average relatedness 
between the actor and its social partners is negative 
(Hamilton, 1975; Grafen, 1985; Pepper, 2000). If the focal 
individual can identify, and refrain from being spiteful to, 
a number of positively related genealogically close social 
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Fig. 3 The average relatedness (R) between population members as 
a function of population size (N), when there is no kin discrimin-
ation. Since relatedness by any member to the population as a whole 
is zero, and this includes positive relatedness to itself, relatedness to 
the other individuals is necessarily negative, specifically R = —Il 
(N - 1). This is minimized at R = —1 when N = 2, but quickly tends 
to zero as N increases towards more plausible values. 
partners (kin discrimination), then the relatedness to 
recipients becomes even more negative (Hamilton, 1975). 
For very small populations (small N; Fig. 3), negative 
relatedness can be nontrivial, and hence individuals 
might be expected to pay reasonable costs in order to 
inflict damage to their social partners. Negative related-
ness (and hence spite) is therefore possible, but this tiny 
population condition caused Hamilton (1971) to regard 
spite as merely the 'final infection that kills failing twigs of 
the evolutionary tree', and not a general phenomenon 
contributing to adaptive evolution (Hamilton, 1996). 
Scale of competition 
However, the situation may not be so bleak for spite. 
There has recently been much interest in how local 
competition between relatives can reduce and even 
remove selection for altruism between relatives 
(reviewed by Queller, 1992; West etal., 2002). This work 
was spurred by the possibility that with limited dispersal 
in a viscous population, individuals would tend to 
associate with kin, so that kin selection theory might 
suggest positive relatedness between social partners, and 
hence conditions favourable for the evolution of altruism 
(Hamilton, 1964, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1996). However, this 
relies on the implicit assumption of density-dependent 
regulation being global (hard selection; Wallace, 1968), 
with no increased competition, due to increased produc-
tivity, within more altruistic groups (Boyd, 1982; Wade, 
1985). In contrast, if density-dependent regulation occurs 
at the level of the social group (soft selection, Wallace, 
1968; see also Haldane, 1924), then the increased success 
of the recipient must be paid for by the group. Without 
kin discrimination, the relatedness of the actor to the 
other members of the group will have been equally raised 
by population viscosity. Hence, population viscosity will 
not necessarily favour indiscriminate altruism (Hamilton, 
1971, 1975; Taylor, 1992a,b). 
This effect of local competition between relatives can be 
incorporated into Hamilton's rule in a number of ways 
(Grafen, 1984; Queller, 1994; Frank, 1998; West etal., 
2002). Queller (1994) reformulated the coefficient of 
relatedness in order to take this into account, giving a new 
measure which he described as 'not just a statement about 
the genetic similarity of two individuals, it is also a 
statement about who their competitors are'. Here, relat-
edness between actor and recipient is a regression as 
before, however it is now defined relative to a reference 
population of competitors, a proportion of which are 
locals, and the remainder being average members of the 
global population. Obviously if all competition is global, 
the reference population is the global population, allow-
ing for positive relatedness between social partners. At the 
other extreme, if all competition is at the level of the social 
group, relatedness to the average member of the social 
group will be zero. Frank (1998) chose not to redefine 
relatedness, but instead introduced a separate scale of 
competition parameter to be incorporated into the benefit 
component of Hamilton's rule in order to predict when 
social behaviours will be favoured by selection. This 
parameter (a) is simply the proportion of competitors 
which are local as opposed to global. Soft selection (local 
competition) had been relatively neglected in social 
evolution theory prior to these developments, and this 
contrasts with population genetics, where it has received 
much attention (Roughgarden, 1979). 
Although the importance of the scale of competition in 
the application of kin selection to altruism is now 
acknowledged (see West et al., 2002 for a recent review, 
and Griffin et al., 2004 for an empirical example), its 
implications for spite are underappreciated. Increasingly 
local competition, as well as disfavouring altruism, can 
enhance selection for spite. Hamilton was correct when 
he stated that spite should be restricted to tiny popula-
tions; however, the 'population' of interest is that of the 
competitive arena. If competition is global, so that there 
is hard selection at the level of the social arena, then 
relatedness is measured with respect to the population as 
a whole. But as competition becomes increasingly local, 
the reference population shrinks towards the size of the 
social arena, which may contain only a few individuals 
(small N) and/or a significant proportion of identifiable 
positively related kin, such that the negative relatedness 
towards the other potential recipients is nontrivial, 
enhancing the selective value of spite. 
Another way of seeing this is by considering a crucial 
difference between altruism and spite. Within a social 
group, individuals with greater altruism than the group 
average have reproductive success lower than the group 
average, but if more altruistic groups are more produc-
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nonaltruists when averaging over the whole population. 
When competition is global, fitness is proportional to 
absolute success, so that altruism can be a winning 
strategy. Increasingly local competition means that 
fitness is increasingly dominated by success relative to 
the social group average, and so altruism'is less favoured. 
Conversely, spiteful behaviour incurs a direct cost and 
reduces the success of social partners, so that more 
spiteful individuals can have higher success relative to 
the group average, but suffer a reduction in absolute 
success. When competition is global and fitness is 
proportional to absolute success, spite cannot be 
favoured, but as competition becomes increasingly local 
fitness is increasingly determined by success relative to 
social partners, so that spite can be a winning strategy. 
Illustrative overview 
So far we have employed the standard approach of taking 
Hamilton's rule to be a given (for example, see Orlove, 
1975) and using this as an entry point into the analysis of 
social evolution. However, it is often more appropriate 
and rigorous to derive the rule using a direct fitness 
approach, particularly when the aim is to resolve prob-
lematic conceptual issues. We use the direct (neighbour-
modulated) fitness maximization techniques of Taylor & 
Frank (1996) and Frank (1998) to derive Hamilton's rule, 
in order to (i) distinguish two different forms of spite, and 
(ii) address the suggestion of Boyd (1982) that spite is 
often actually selfishness because it indirectly increments 
fitness through reducing the intensity of competition. 
The key to this is to distinguish possible direct benefits of 
spite that might accrue to positively related third parties, 
and indirect effects due to relaxed competition. 
Let social groups comprise n equally abundant 'famil-
ies', with kin recognition allowing discrimination of the 
proportion 1/n = k of the social group which are 'kin' 
from the remaining I - k which are 'nonkin'. Spite 
directed at nonkin carries a cost (some function c), inflicts 
a negative benefit upon the victim (b), and also poten-
tially directly benefits (d) individuals within one's family, 
so that personal success might be written as: 
SfocaI = 1 + b[(1 - k)z] - c[x} + d[k(1 - k)y], 	(1) 
where x is the focal individual's spite strategy, y is the 
average strategy of its kin (including itself), and z is the 
average strategy played by the nonkin members of its 
social group. The local average and the average for the 
whole population are given by: 
Sioci = I + k{b[(1 - k)z] - c[y] + d[k(1 - k)y]} 
+(1 —k){b[(1 —2k)z+ky] —c[z]+d[k(1 —k)z]}, 
Sglobal = 1 + b[(1 - k)] - c[] + d[k(1 - k)], 	(2) 
where 2 is the average spite strategy played in the whole 
population. Following Frank's (1998) approach to 
including competition in models of social evolution, 
fitness can be expressed as success relative to that of the 
average competitor, i.e. 
Siocai 
w= 	 (3) 
aS!oca I + ( 1 - a)Sglobal 
where the scale of competition parameter (a) is defined 
as the proportion of competition which occurs locally, i.e. 
at the level of the social group. Selection favours more 
spite whenever marginal fitness is positive (dw/dx> 0). 
As outlined by Taylor & Frank (1996), and Frank (1998), 
marginal fitness is given by the chain rule: 
dw 0w Ow Ow 
(4) 
	
x 	Oy 	Oz 
where @ denotes a partial derivative, and r = dy/dx and 
rz = dz/dx are the slopes of social partner phenotype on 
own phenotype (for kin and nonkin respectively). Assu-
ming only minor variants (x y z ), and denoting 
= db[o]/do, c' = dc[o]/do and d = dd[o]/do, we find 
that marginal fitness is positive (dw/dx> 0) when 
{r—a[kr+(1 —k)r2]}(1_k)b' 
+ {r - a[kr, + (1 - k)r] }k(1 - k)d' 	( 5) 
> {i —a[kr,+(I —k)r]}c'. 
Note that the relatedness to the average competitor 
relative to the whole population is i = 
a[kr + (1 - k)r], and the marginal costs and benefits 
of spite are B=(1—k)b', C=c', and D=k(1—k)d. 
After making these substitutions, rearrangement of eqn 5 
obtains the condition 
re — i - 	r - 
(6) 
1 — r 1—r 
The r terms denote relatedness of individuals with 
respect to their spite phenotypes, relative to the popu-
lation average, . If R is used to denote relatedness sensu 
Queller(1994), i.e. measured relative to the average 
competitor, then eqn 6 is simply 
R1B+R2D>C. 	 (7) 
This is the three-party extension to Hamilton's rule for 
spiteful interactions given by Foster et al. (2000), 
although here it is the consequence of an analysis rather 
than the starting point. R 1 is the relatedness to the 
victims of spite, and R 2 is the relatedness to the third 
party which receives any direct benefits. A major source 
of confusion over Hamilton's rule involves the meaning 
of the terms B and C (and in the above expression, D), 
and so it is worth pointing out that these are not fixed 
parameters - they are marginal values. 
This form of the rule can be used to discriminate 
Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of spite (Hamilton, 
1970, 1971; Wilson, 1975; Foster et al., 2000, 2001). 
Feeling that negative relatedness was implausible, Wilson 
(1975) proposed that spite directed against non-negat-
ively related individuals could be favoured if it also 
delivered a benefit to a sufficiently positively related 
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third party. In terms of the above notation, such 
Wilsonian spite occurs when D> 0 and R 2 > 0, and does 
not require a negatively related victim (R1 < 0). Hamil-
tonian spite occurs when the victim is negatively related 
(R, <0, and hence R 1 B> 0; Hamilton, 1970, 1971), and 
hence a direct benefit to positive relations (D > 0) is not 
always required in order for the spite to be favoured. 
From eqn 6 we can see that: (i) negative relatedness 
depends on the ability to discriminate individuals who 
are less related than the average competitor (so that 
r < 1); and (ii) the magnitude of this negative related-
ness increases as competition becomes more localized 
(increasing a, and hence increasing ). Clearly, there is 
potential for spiteful behaviours to involve both negative 
relatedness to victims and positive benefits to positive 
relations, and hence a mixture of Hamiltonian and 
Wilsonian spite (Foster et al., 2000, 2001). 
Related to this distinction, we can address the suggestion 
of Boyd (1982) that spite is actually less likely to occur 
under local competition, as the resulting relaxed compe-
tition gives an indirect benefit to spiteful individuals, so 
that many cases of spite would in fact be selfishness. 
Equation 7 reveals that the relaxation of competition due 
to spite is absorbed into the negative relatedness term, 
when relatedness is measured relative to the average 
competitor. Boyd's indirect benefit to the spiteful individ-
ual does not make the action selfish, in the same way that 
this indirect benefit accrued to other positive relatives does 
not mean that the spiteful behaviour is Wilsonian. 
It is important to note that the above is not a general 
model for spite, but is rather an example included for the 
purpose of illustration. For instance, we have assumed 
additivity of fitness components, and equally abundant 
families. For this reason, it is always more rigorous to do 
a direct fitness analysis for particular models of interest in 
order to obtain the appropriate Hamilton's rule, rather 
than using the rule as a starting point. 
Biological applications 
Applying the theory to biological examples, we show: 
(i) that previous models which have successfully demon- 
strated selection for spite have tended to implicitly assume 
local competion; (ii) behaviours previously interpreted as 
indirect altruism or Wilsonian spite might turn out to 
involve negative relatedness and hence Hamiltonian 
spite; (iii) spiteful greenbeards are more likely to reach 
their threshold frequency, above which they are favoured 
by selection, when competition is localized; (iv) there are 
several general predictions which will help us identify 
situations where spite is likely to be found, and (v) these 
predictions are amenable to empirical testing. 
Spiteful models assume local competition 
Theoretical models that show that spiteful behaviour can 
be favoured often assume that some or all of competition 
is local. However, this has rarely been acknowledged as 
an important factor contributing to the success of spite. 
For example: 
Reinhold (2003) used an inclusive fitness analysis to 
investigate fatal fighting in fig wasps. This model shows 
selection for spite when competition is completely local. 
Some fig wasps have a lifecycle, such that wingless males 
hatch, mate and die within the confines of the fruit, and 
the mated females disperse to be the foundresses of new 
figs (Hamilton, 1979; Cook etal., 1997). This leads to an 
asymmetric scale of competition, such that males com-
pete locally (for mates) and females compete globally (for 
figs in which to lay eggs), the consequences of which for 
sex allocation theory have been much studied (Hamilton, 
1967; Herre et al.. 2001). In some species, this local 
competition for mates is accompanied by lethal combat 
between heavily armoured males, which have mandibles 
capable of decapitating each other (Hamilton, 1979; 
Murray, 1987; West etal.,. 2001). Reinhold (2003) pre-
dicted that if males could discriminate between relatives 
and nonrelatives (kin recognition) then they would be 
selected to fight with males who are nonrelatives. This 
cannot be explained simply as selfishness because there is 
generally a net direct fitness cost of fighting (the 
difference in the direct fitness component of Reinhold's 
equations 2.1 and 2.2 for the terms T 1 & T2 ). However, it 
can be explained as Hamiltonian spite, because the local 
competition means 'there is a negative relatedness 
towards opponents. Following Reinhold's notation, n 
males compete locally for matings, including a focal actor 
who is related to a proportion y of the other males (his 
brothers) by rand to the remaining (n - 1)(1 - y) males 
(nonkin) by zero. Rescaling such that the focal individual 
is related to competitors on average by zero, we find that 
the relatedness to his brothers is [n(1 - y)r - (1 - 
[(n - 1)(1 - ry)] and to the unrelated males is 
—[1 + (n - 1)ryJ/[(n - 1)(1 - ry)], i.e. a negative quan-
tity. The importance of spite in this system depends upon 
the possibility of kin discrimination between male fig 
wasps, which has yet to be tested for. 
Gardner et al. (2004) presented a model of chemical 
(bacteriocin) warfare between microbes. Bacteriocins are 
the most abundant of a range of antimicrobial com-
pounds produced by bacteria, and are found in all major 
bacterial lineages (Riley & Wertz, 2002). They are a 
diverse family of proteins with a range of antimicrobial 
killing activity including enzyme inhibition, nuclease 
activity and pore formation in cell membranes (Reeves, 
1972; Riley & Wertz, 2002). They are distinct from other 
antimicrobials in that their lethal activity is often limited 
to the same species of the producer, suggesting a major 
role in competition with conspecifics (Riley et al., 2003). 
As bacteriocin synthesis is energetically expensive and 
release can entail death of the producer cell (for instance, 
colicin production by Escherichia coli) production of 
bacteriocins is costly (C> 0). Bactenocins kill susceptible 
bacteria, and hence these recipients suffer a negative 
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benefit (B < 0). Hence bacteriocin production can be 
regarded as a spiteful trait. As kin of the producer cell are 
immune to its bacteriocins, there is effective kin 
discrimination, and the potential for recipients to be 
negatively related to the producer. Specifically, this 
relatedness is R = —( ak)/(1 - ak) where k is the propor-
tion of the social group which are clonal kin of the 
producer, and a is the proportion of competition which 
occurs locally. This reveals the importance of local 
competition in the evolution of spiteful behaviour. 
Specifically, (i) spiteful bacteriocin production is only 
selected for when there is some local competition (a > 0; 
as R = 0 when a = 0), and (ii) as the degree of local 
competition (a) increases the evolutionary stable strategy 
(Maynard Smith Er Price, 1973) is to increasingly allocate 
resources to spiteful bacteriocin production (Gardner 
etal., 2004). 
3. Cytoplasmic Incompatibility (CI), the phenomenon 
whereby maternally transmitted Wolbachia (and other) 
bacteria occurring in male hosts sterilize uninfected 
female hosts upon mating (O'Neill etal., 1997), has been 
interpreted as a form of spite (Hurst, 1991; Foster et al., 
2001). Infected females are compatible with infected 
males, and so there is effective discrimination of carriers 
and noncarriers of the parasite. The question of whether 
it can be favoured by selection has received much 
attention (Prout, 1994; Turelli, 1994; Frank, 1997b). 
Frank (1997b) demonstrated that selection can favour CI 
in structured host populations. In his model, the steril-
ization of uninfected females relaxes competition for the 
infected progeny produced by the group. In particular, 
Frank highlighted the importance of kin associations, so 
that related bacteria are carried by several hosts within 
the group. Less emphasis was given to the assumption of 
density-dependent regulation at the group level, so that 
all competition is local (a = 1). Similar reasoning can be 
applied to the çvolution of such selfish elements as 
maternal-effect lethal distorter genes (Beeman et al., 
1992; Hurst, 1993; Hurst etal., 1996; Foster etal., 
2001), in which the killing of noncarriers relaxes com-
petition among the carriers of the killer allele. 
Hamiltonian and Wilsonian spite 
Equation 7 can be used to discriminate between Hamil-
tonian and Wilsonian forms of spite, and assess their 
relative importance when both occur (i.e. when spite is 
directed at negatively related individuals but also accrues 
a net inclusive fitness benefit by directly enhancing the 
success of positive relations). In particular, using meas-
ures of relatedness that take into account the effects of 
competition, we can reinterpret many putative examples 
of Wilsonian spite as Hamiltonian spite or a mixture of 
the two. For instance, Foster etal. (2000, 2001) present 
two spiteful behaviours presented by the eusocial insects 
which they describe as Wilsonian: worker policing and 
sex allocation manipulation. 
Often in eusocial hymenopteran societies, worker 
individuals do not have the opportunity to mate, but 
nevertheless have functioning ovaries, and can therefore 
produce unfertilized eggs which may develop as haploid 
males (Wilson, 1971; Bourke, 1988). Worker policing, 
the phenomenon whereby workers eat the eggs of other 
workers in their colony (Ratnieks, 1988), is well docu-
mented (Ratnieks Er Visscher, 1989; Foster & Ratnieks, 
2000, 2001; Barron et al., 2001; Foster er al., 2002). 
Foster et al. (2000. 2001) argue that this costly policing 
behaviour enhances the inclusive fitness of the actor as it 
frees up resources for the queen's sons (their brothers), 
to which they are more related than the sons of other 
workers (their nephews), and hence the spite is of the 
Wilsonian form. However, given that competition be-
tween the progeny for resources is within the colony, it is 
appropriate to measure relatedness with respect to this 
local competitive arena when assessing the inclusive 
fitness consequences for this particular behaviour. This 
means that the victim of the policing (a nephew) is less 
related than average (all brothers and nephews) and 
hence negatively related to the actor (i.e. R 1 < 0). 
Consequently, if relatedness is measured at the scale of 
competition, worker policing can be interpreted as 
involving Hamiltonian spite. 
The haplodiploid genetics of the hymenoptera means 
that in eusocial species the workers can be more related 
to their diploid Sisters than their haploid brothers. This 
means that, while the queen prefers equal sex allocation 
among reproductives, the workers would rather there 
was a female bias (Trivers Er Hare, 1976). In some species 
the workers create this bias by killing male progeny 
(Passera Er Aron, 1996; Sundström etal., 1996; Chapuisat 
Er Keller, 1999; Hammond etal., 2003). Foster etal. 
(2000. 2001) suggest this killing of male progeny is 
Wilsonian spite that benefits the colony's female pro-
geny. However, the local competition for resources 
within the colony, plus the fact that males are devalued 
relative to females in terms of relatedness, means that the 
recipient of the spite is negatively related to the actor 
(R 1 < 0). Again, this behaviour may, be reinterpreted 
involving Hamiltonian spite. 
Application of the theory should also allow reinter-
pretation of behaviours which have not been considered 
spiteful (Hamiltonian or otherwise) in the past. Preco-
cious larval development in polyembryonic parasitoid 
wasps (Godfray, 1992; Grbic etal., 1992; Hardy etal., 
1993; Ode Er Strand, 1995) seems to constitute a 
previously overlooked example of spite. Typically, two 
eggs, one male and one female, are laid on or in the 
body of the host insect, which then divide asexually to 
produce a brood of genetically identical brothers and 
genetically identical sisters. Local competition for re-
sources limits the number of adult wasps emerging from 
the host, suggesting that there is scope for negative 
relatedness between the sexes within the brood. Upon 
inspection, some of the larvae that have not emerged as 
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adults are found to have developed precociously, giving 
up their own future reproduction in order to murder 
opposite-sex siblings developing in the same host. 
Asymmetric dispersal (which generates a sex difference 
in the scale of competition), and asymmetric relatedness 
(brothers are more related to sisters than vice versa) 
seem to be responsible for evolutionary resolution of 
this conflict in favour of the sisters, such that most 
precocious larvae are female. 
Local competition can enhance the success of 
spiteful greenbeards 
Greenbeards are phenotypic markers for genetic com-
position that allow individuals to identify positive 
relations more effectively than through discrimination 
of genealogical kin from nonkin (Hamilton, 1964, 1971; 
Dawkins, 1976). A greenbeard gene causes three things: 
(i) a phenotypic trait, (ii) recognition of this trait in 
others, and (iii) preferential treatment of those recog-
nized - see Queller et al. (2003) for an example of a 
single gene which satisfies these three conditions. From 
the perspective of the greenbearded actor, social part-
ners displaying the phenotype carry his gene and hence 
are positively related to him, and those who do not 
display the phenotype do not carry his gene, and are 
therefore negatively related to him, with respect to that 
locus. Greenbeards can therefore increase in frequency 
either by directing altruism towards the positive rela-
tions or else by directing spite towards the negative 
relatidns. However, nontrivial negative relatedness is 
only possible when the greenbeard allele is at a 
substantial frequency in the population, as Hamilton 
(1971) understood, making it difficult to imagine how a 
spiteful greenbeard could initially be selected. This 
problem is not felt by altruistic greenbeards, which 
have maximal relatedness between bearers of the gene 
even when the greenbeard is at low frequency in the 
population. The understanding tht is the arena of 
competition that provides the appropriate reference, 
rather than the population as a whole, means that the 
spread of spiteful greenbeards can be more easily 
understood, and the attainment of the threshold 
frequency does not have to rely upon assumptions 
such as extreme stochastic fluctuations. 
Foster et al. (2000, 2001) discuss the example of the 
red fire ant (Solenopsis invicta; see also Keller & Ross, 
1998 and Hurst & McVean, 1998), in which workers 
with genotype Bb, under the influence of their green-
beard (b) gene, murder negatively related BB queens 
and hence increase the frequency of the b gene in the 
population (homozygotes for the greenbeard gene are 
absent as the bb genotype is lethal). It is easy to see how 
the frequency of the b allele among the small number of 
locally competing queens could, through ampling error, 
exceed the threshold even as the global frequency 
approaches zero. 
Where should we expect spite? 
The extensions to spite theory, and biological examples of 
spite discussed above, suggest several clues as to where 
we should expect such behaviours to occur. Hamilton 
(1970, 1971) noted that spite should be more prevalent 
when actors are in a position to inflict damage to others 
at little cost to themselves, and so it is unsurprising that 
many examples turn up among nonreproductives in the 
eusocial insects, those individuals who have little or 
nothing to lose with respect to their direct fitness (Foster 
et al., 2000, 2001). A major factor which has received 
much attention is the ability to identify one's negative 
relations. This can be achieved through recognition of 
genealogically close individuals (kin discrimination) or 
by means of phenotypic markers for genetic composition 
(greenbeards). We also emphasize that spite should be 
looked for in situations where competition is mostly local 
(among social partners), and in viscous populations. 
Empirical testing of spite theory 
Previous debate over spite has focused primarily on 
whether spite occurs. However, some of the more recent 
examples, such as worker policing in the eusocial insects 
and bacteriocin production by bacteria, provide possibil-
ities for testing whether the relative occurrence of spite 
varies as predicted by social evolution theory. Indeed, 
much of the data from the eusocial insects fits well with 
the predictions of the theory (Chapuisat & Keller, 1999; 
Ratnieks etal., 2001). Here we emphasize two general 
points. 
We used Hamilton's rule to give an overall concep-
tual view. However, if particular cases are to be analysed, 
then it is often much easier and more rigorous to start 
with an equation for direct (neighbour-modulated) 
fitness based upon the relevant biology, and then derive 
predictions (Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998). Ham-
ilton's rule in some form usually appears as a conse-
quence of such an approach, and provides a conceptual 
tool that can be used for interpretation of the results 
(Frank, 1998; Pen & Weissing, 2000; West & Buckling, 
2003; Gardner et al., 2004). 
A relatively general prediction that arises from 
different models is that the incidence of spite should be 
dome shaped in relation to the degree of kinship within a 
social group. If the proportion of kin (including oneself) 
in the group is vanishingly small then no spite is 
favoured, as the nonkin recipients of spite will have the 
same relatedness, on average, as the average group 
member (i.e. zero). Similarily, when the actor associates 
solely with clonal kin, spite is also not favoured, as there 
are no negatively related individuals present. However, 
when the degree of kinship takes intermediate value, 
some degree of spite might be favoured because some 
individuals will necessarily be less related to the actor 
than others, such that some will have below-average 
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(and hence negative) relatedness. This result was found 
in both the bacteriocin (Gardner et al., 2004) and fig 
wasp mortal combat (Reinhold, 2003) examples dis-
cussed above. The relatedness differential also selects for 
spiteful sex allocation manipulation (brothers are less 
related than sisters) and worker policing (nephews are 
less related than sons and brothers) discussed above. As 
well as suggesting where we might find spite occurring in 
nature, these models give predictions that could be tested 
with observational or experimental studies. 
Conclusion 
Spite has been neglected by social evolution theory 
because a common, implict assumption (global compe-
tition) in evolutionary models tends to diminish its 
selective advantage. We have demonstrated that many 
previously analysed behaviours can be readily inter-
preted as involving spite. Furthermore, theory has been 
developed to such a degree that we can make testable 
predictions about where spite is likely to be found and 
how it relates to the degree of competition and kinship 
between social partners. 
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ABsTRACT: Explaining altruistic cooperation is one of the greatest 
challenges faced by sociologists, economists, and evolutionary biol 
ogists. The problem is determining why an individual would carry 
Out a costly behavior that benefits another. Possible solutions to this 
problem include kinship, repeated interactions, and policing. An-
other solution that has recently received much attention is the threat 
of punishment. However, punishing behavior is often costly for the 
punisher, and so it is not immediately clear how costly punishment 
could evolve. We use a direct (neighbor-modulated) fitness approach 
to analyze when punishment is favored. This methodology reveals 
that, contrary to previous suggestions, relatedness between interact-
ing individuals is not crucial to explaining cooperation through pun-
ishment. In fact, increasing relatedness directly disfavors punishing 
behavior. Instead, the crucial factor is a positive correlation between 
the punishment strategy of an individual and the cooperation it 
receives. This could arise in several ways, such as when facultative 
adjustment of behavior leads individuals to cooperate more when 
interacting with individuals who are more likely to punish. More 
generally, our results provide a clear example of how the fundamental 
factor driving the evolution of social traits is a correlation between 
social partners and how this can arise for reasons other than gene-
alogical kinship. 
Keywords: kin selection, neighbor-modulated fitness, repression of 
competition, public-goods game, human evolution, policing. 
Explaining cooperation at all levels of biological complex-
ity remains one of the greatest problems for evolutionary 
biology (Hamilton 1964; Buss 1987; Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary 1995). The question is, Why would an indi-
vidual perform a costly altruistic behavior that benefits 
another individual? The solutions to this problem that 
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have attracted the most attention are when social partners 
are related (kin selection, in a general sense; Hamilton 
1963, 1964, 1970) or when there is some mechanism for 
repressing competition between groups (see table 1), such 
as through repeated interactions/reputation (reciprocity; 
Trivers 1971; Alexander 1979, 1987; Frank 2003), policing 
(Ratnieks 1988; Frank 1995, 2003), and systems of rewards 
or punishments (Oliver 1980; Sigmund et al. 2001). The 
fundamental similarity between all these mechanisms is 
that they involve positive correlations between the behav -
iors played by social partners, which are crucial for the 
evolution of social behaviors (Hamilton 1975; Grafen 
1985; Nee 1989; Frank 1998; Woodcock and Heath 2002). 
Here, we are concerned with whether and how punish-
ment can favor cooperation and how this translates into 
a selective benefit for punishers. The possible role of pun-
ishment has recently attracted much theoretical attention, 
especially with respect to its possible role in favoring co-
operation among humans (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 
1989; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Sober and Wilson 1998; 
Sell and Wilson 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2000). However, 
the mechanism underlying these previous models is often 
not clear, and the models have been developed with little 
reference to related theory such as in the animal punish-
ment literature (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Glutton-
Brock 1998) and Frank's (1998, 2003) recent synthesis of 
social evolution theory. The basic idea is that if punish-
ment is sufficiently frequent and harsh, it can successfully 
maintain cooperative behavior. However, this solution 
forces us to consider the motivation of the punisher. Since 
a behavior that promotes a public good such as cooper-
ation is in itself a second-order public good and is not 
expected to be without cost to the actor, punishment is 
open for exploitation by second-order free-riding individ-
uals who cooperate but who fail to punish defectors (Ol-
iver 1980). Punishment of second-order free riders can be 
invoked, but this opens up the possibility of third- and 
higher-order free riding (Ostrom 1990). Failure to main-
tain participation in a high-level public-goods game un-
ravels participation in the lower levels. At first glance, 
punishment seems not to be a helpful addition to the 
problem of cooperation because all that is achieved is the 
replacement of one public-goods dilemma for another. 
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Table 1: A simple classification of some mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperative behaviors 
Selection pressure Fundamental concept Costs Benefits 
Kin selection Relatedness between social pariners Cost for actor Benefit for recipient 
Reciprocal altruism Repression of competition Cost for actor Future benefit for actor 
Policing Repression of competition Cost for actor Benefits for group 
Punishment Repression of competition Cost for actor Indirect benefit through increased 
and recipient cooperation 
However, it is generally true that punishment is cheap 
relative to the cost of cooperation. Consequently, it has 
been argued that any mechanism invoked to explain par-
ticipation in public-goods games will more easily favor 
punishing (and hence also cooperation) than it would co-
operation alone (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
A Darwinian account of the evolution of cooperation 
through punishment requires that the punisher directly or 
indirectly receives a net benefit through punishing. Al-
though costly punishment can ultimately enhance the di-
rect fitness of the punisher if interactions tend to be ex-
tended or repeated with the same social partner (Frank 
2003; e.g., sanctioning in plant-rhizobium mutualisms: 
Denison 2000; West et al. 2002b, 2002c; Kiers et al. 2003), 
animals including humans punish even when there is no 
mechanism ensuring repeat encounters (Fehr and Gächter 
2002). Genealogical relationship between social partners 
is often considered low or absent, and so kin selection is 
given little attention in the existing literature. The favored 
Darwinian mechanisms that have received the most at-
tention are group selection (Gintis 2000) and cultural 
group selection (Heinrich and Boyd 2001). A recent sim-
ulation study (Boyd et al. 2003) has suggested that since 
the incidence of defection declines as punishment becomes 
more frequent, the costs of punishment decline as it be-
comes common, so that even modest group selection may 
plausibly maintain punishment in humans. 
In this article, we show that the evolution of punishment 
and cooperation may be investigated using the powerful 
direct fitness maximization techniques of Taylor and Frank 
(1996) and Frank (1998). This allows us to c1arif' the 
mechanisms at work and link previous theory to Frank's 
(1998, 2003) general framework. In particular, we link kin 
selection, group selection, and cultural group selection in 
terms of a generalized view of relatedness. We then reveal 
that it is not the relatedness between social partners per 
se that facilitates the evolution of punishing behavior. 
What is crucial is that there is a positive correlation be-
tween the punishment strategy played and cooperation 
received by an individual. Although such an association 
could arise from viscous population structure and inter-
actions between kin, it may arise for other reasons. In 
particular, we demonstrate that even in the absence of 
relatedness it is possible for such an association, due to  
facultative adjustment of cooperative behavior, to maintain 
punishment through selection acting at the level of the 
individual, rendering group selection and elaborate cul-
tural practices unnecessary. More generally, the fact that 
a positive correlation between the behaviors of social part-
ners is the fundamental factor favoring cooperation has 
been obscured by a focus on how this correlation can be 
produced by kinship, through the interactions of close 
relatives (Hamilton 1975; Frank 1998). Our results provide 
a clear example of how such positive correlations can arise 
without kin association. 
Models and Analyses 
Basic Model 
We now present a simple model describing the coevolution 
of cooperation and punishment. This is intended to elu-
cidate the general selection pressures involved—it is the 
simplest model that captures the essentials of the problem. 
We discuss our model in terms of humans because this is 
where much of the recent theoretical literature has been 
focused. However, the implications are general and could 
be applied to a variety of organisms. A role for punishment 
in the evolution of cooperation has been suggested in a 
variety of animals, including insects, birds, primates, and 
other mammals (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). We give 
some specific examples in the discussion when considering 
how our model may be tested empirically. 
For simplicity, we suppose that individuals interact in 
pairs, with one (random) member of the pair being de-
noted player 1 and the other player 2. Player 1 may choose 
to cooperate (e.g., sharing food), in which case she loses 
fitness c and player 2 gains fitness b, or to defect (e.g., 
refusing to share food), such that neither player loses nor 
gains fitness from the interaction. Player 2 may respond 
to defection in two ways: either she punishes (e.g., by 
physically injuring player 1) at a cost a to herself in order 
to reduce player l's fitness by d, or else she forgives (e.g., 
does nothing) in which case neither player gains nor loses 
fitness. The expected direct fitness of a focal individual 
might then be written as 
w = a - cx + bX - (1 - X)ya - (1 - x)Yd, 	(1) 
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where the constant a is baseline fitness, x is the frequency 
with which that individual cooperates, X is the mean fre-
quency of cooperation among her social partners, y is the 
frequency with which the individual punishes, given that 
her partner defects, and Yis the mean punishment strategy 
played by her social partners, that is, the probability that 
the focal individual is punished given that she defects. We 
assume that all competition is global. An important point 
is that punishmnt acts to directly reduce both the fitness 
of the actor and the fitness of her social group. Punishment 
is therefore fundamentally different from the policing 
models of Frank (1995, 1996, 2003) because policing di-
rectly reduces actor fitness but increases group fitness. 
Coevolution of Cooperation and Punishment 
We will consider the simultaneous evolutionary optimi-
zation of cooperation and punishment analogous to the 
evolution of policing analysis of Frank (1995), using the 
direct (neighbor-modulated) fitness maximization method 
of Taylor and Frank (1996) and Frank (1998). A small 
increase in a behavior is favored by selection if the deriv-
ative of fitness with respect to that behavior (termed "mar-
ginal fitness") is >0 and disfavored when this derivative is 
<0. Differentiating the focal individual's fitness function 
(eq. [1]) with respect to her cooperating (x) and punishing 
(y) strategies obtains 
dw
ya) —=—c+Yd+ (b+ 
dx 	 dx 
dY 
d x 	
X)a --(1 - x)d, 	(2a) 
dx 
dw dY 
—  = — " — X)a --(1 — x)d dy 	 dy 
dx 	dX 
	
+ —(Yd—c)+-----(b+ya). 	(2b) 
dy dy 
The terms dX/dx and dY/dy are the coefficients of re-
latedness, with respect to cooperation and punishment, 
respectively, between the focal individual and her social 
partners (Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998). Technically, 
the derivative is of the conditional expectation of the social 
partner's strategy, given the strategy played by the focal 
individual, with respect to the latter. The other derivative 
terms are dy/dx and dx/dy, which are the regression of an 
individual's punishing strategy on its own cooperation 
strategy, and vice versa, and dY/dx and dX/dy, which are 
the regressions of a partner's punishing strategy on its own 
cooperation strategy and a partner's cooperation strategy 
on its own punishment strategy, respectively. 
Let us consider first the origin of cooperation and pun- 
ishment in a population that is otherwise fixed for defec-
tion (-4  0) and forgiveness (i- 0). In such circum-
stances the trait-on-trait regressions are always non-
negative, which is important for interpretation of the an-
alytical results that follows. To see why, consider the re-
gression of cooperation received on cooperation strategy 
played: dX/dx = (X - )/(x — ) Xix. Since coopera-
tion strategies are nonnegative, the numerator (X) is non-
negative, and since the variant by definition plays a dif-
ferent cooperation strategy from the wild type (which plays 
zero cooperation), the denominator (x) is positive. Hence, 
dX/dx ~: 0. The same argument can be used to show that 
this is true for the other trait-on-trait regressions. Assum-
ing only minor variants (x X y Y 5;  Taylor and 
Frank 1996; Frank 1998) and making the substitutions 
— 0 and j' - 0, the marginal fitness with respect to co-
operation (eq. [2a]) reduces to 
dw 	dX dy dY 
—  =  — c+—b--a— --d. 	(3) 
dx dx 	dx dx 
This shows there is ii direct cost (c) and a kin-selected 
benefit (dX/dx x b) of cooperation, plus costs relating to 
the associated increase in costly punishing (dy/dx x a) and 
also in being punished (dYidx x d); see figure 1A. Coop-
eration is maintained even in the absence of punishment 
when Hamilton's (1964) rule dX/dx x b> c holds, so we 
will consider the more interesting situation where it does 
not, such that equation (3) is always negative. 
Similarly, the marginal fitness with respect to punish-
ment (eq. [2b]) is 
dw 	dY dx dX 
—  = —a--d--c+—b. 	(4) 
dy dy 	dy 	dy 
Again, this is easily understood. Punishing incurs a di-
rect cost (a) and indirect costs (dY/dy x d from being 
punished by related individuals and dx/dy x c from the 
correlated commitment to cooperation). The benefit 
dXldy x b is gained through the association between the 
punishment strategy played and the cooperation received 
(see fig. 1B). Only when this is sufficiently large may a 
rare variant with some small frequency of punishing be-
havior be able to invade. In other words, a positive as-
sociation between the punishment strategy played and the 
cooperation received by a focal individual is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the evolutionary origin of 
punishment. 
Result 1. A positive association between punishment 
strategy played and cooperation received is crucial for the 
evolutionary origin of punishing behavior. 
We will now investigate the evolutionary maintenance 











0.4 	0.6 	0.8 	1.0 
Relatedness (r) 





0.0 	0.2 	0.4 	0.6 	0.8 	1.0 
Relatedness (r) 
Figure 1: A, Selective value of cooperation (dw/dx) as a function of relatedness and the resident punishing strategy (5') when there is no association 
between traits (dyldx = dY/dx = 0); dwldx>0 indicates that enhanced cooperation is favored, and dwldx <0 indicates that it is disfavored. Increasing 
relatedness (r) enhances selection for cooperation; in the absence of punishment, cooperation is favored when rb> c. Increasing punishment also 
favors cooperation, so cooperation may be favored even when relatedness is 0, if 5'> dd. B, Selective value of punishment (dw/dy) as a function of 
relatedness and the resident cooperation strategy (.); dwldy> 0 indicates enhanced punishment is favored, anddw/dy <0 indicates that it is disfavored. 
Assuming no assciation between traits (ddy = dXfdy = 0), we see that punishment is always disfavored, that increased relatedness enhances the 
selective disadvantage of punishment, and that increased cooperation reduces the selective disadvantage of punishment. Punishment may be favorable 
if there is a positive association between the punishment strategy played and the cooperation received by an individual (dXldy>0); the broken line 
indicates dXldy = 0.2. For A and B, we assume a = 0.1, b = 2, c = I, and d = 3. 
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j' - 1. Again, the trait-on-trait regressions will all be non-
negative: for example, dXldx = (X - - i) (X - 
l)I(x - 1). Cooperation received (X) cannot be >1, so the 
numerator (X - 1) is :50. Since the cooperation variant 
does not play the wild-type strategy (always cooperate) 
and cannot play a more cooperative strategy than that, the 
denominator (x - 1) is always negative. Hence, dX/dx ~! 
0. Making the substitutions i - 1 and j -b  1, the marginal 
fitness with respect to cooperation (eq. [2a]) is now given 
by 
dw 	 dX 
- = —c+d+— (b+a). 	 (5) 
dx dx 
Here cooperation carries a direct cost (c) and a benefit (d, 
due to avoiding punishment) when punishment of defec-
tors is assured. It also gives kin-selected benefits 
(dX/dx x b and dX/dx x a) due to the correlated co-
operation received from social partners and the fitness 
saved from not having to punish defectors. Punishment 
cannot be an effective deterrent when the fitness of a pun-
ished defector is greater than that of a cooperator, so that 
we will restrict attention to the situation d> c. Here, the 
marginal fitness will always be positive, and so selection 
will act to maintain cooperation. The marginal fitness with 
respect to punishment (eq. [2b]) is 






The costs of punishment include the direct cost ([1 - 
x a) and the kin-selected cost ([1 - x] x dY/dy x d) 
plus the cost incurred by the associated cooperation 
(dx/dy x c). The benefits of punishment are due to the 
correlated decrease in one's own defection and hence the 
frequency with which the focal individual is punished 
(dx/dy x d) and also the correlated increase in coopera-
tion received from social partners (dX/dy x b) and, con-
versely, the fitness saved by not having to punish partners 
(dX/dy x a). If dx/dy = dX/dy = 0 so that there is no 
correlation between the punishment and cooperation 
played by an individual, nor between the punishment 
played and cooperation received, then the marginal fitness 
with respect to punishment is small but negative, and 
hence full punishment is not stable. It is interesting to 
note that relatedness dY/dy works to undermine the sta-
bility of punishment; as an individual's punishment strat-
egy is increased, so too is the punishment received from 
social partners. If the between-trait associations are pos-
itive and of sufficient magnitude, then full punishment  
can be evolutionarily stable. Otherwise, selection will act 
to reduce punishment in the population. 
Result 2. A positive association between punishment 
strategy played and cooperation received is crucial for the 
evolutionary maintenance of punishing behavior. 
We now check to see whether punishment is easier to 
maintain than it is to initially invade an otherwise forgiving 
population, by evaluating dw1dyj1 - dw/dyI 0, that 
is, subtracting the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (4) 
from the RHS of equation (6) to obtain 
	
dY dx 	( dX\ 
d — 	+ all+ — + — I, 	 (7) dy dy dyj 
which is positive, so that RHS equation (4) is less than 
RHS equation (6), and hence the condition for increased 
punishment to be favored (dw/dy> 0) is more easily sat-
isfied in a population of cooperators and punishers than 
in a population of defectors and forgivers. Similarly, the 
RHS of equation (3) is always negative under the relevant 
circumstances (i.e., when dX/dx x b < c), and the RHS of 
equation (5) is always positive, so that the condition for 
enhanced cooperation to be favored (dw/dx> 0) is also 
more easily satisfied in punishing populations than in pop-
ulations rife with defection and forgiveness. 
Result 3. Punishing behavior is more easily maintained 
than it is originally evolved. Note that this assumes that 
relatedness and the between-trait regressions are constants. 
A fully dynamic analysis relaxing this assumption would 
require that we specify a more detailed (and hence less 
general) model and so is not pursued here because we aim 
only to abstract and elucidate the selection pressures in-
volved in the evolution of punishment and cooperation. 
Example: Cooperation as a Facultative 
Response to Punishment 
The Model. We have found that relatedness between social 
partners is not crucial for costly punishment to be favored 
(indeed, increasing relatedness disfavors punishment) and 
that it is another association, the regression of the coop-
eration received on the punishment strategy played, that 
provides the benefit of punishment. To illustrate these 
findings, we examine the evolution of punishment when 
there is no relatedness between individuals (dY/dy = 0) 
and when cooperation is facultatively adjusted to one's 
punishment environment (which we will see can give 
dX/dy> 0). 
We assume that individuals are randomly organized into 
social groups of size N, such that relatedness between 
group members is 0. In each social encounter, individuals 
pair with a random member from their group, with one 
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of the partners playing the role of player 1 and the other 
being player 2. In contrast with the previous model, we 
consider the cooperation strategy of player 1 to be fac-
ultative and hence a function of her punishment environ-
ment. Assuming no partner recognition and therefore no 
adjustment of cooperation to her current partner's pun-
ishment strategy, the cooperation strategy played by the 
focal individual (in half of her social interactions) is ex-
pressed as a function of the average punishment strategy 
played by all of her social partners: x = f(j'). Since each 
of her social partners experiences a punishing environment 
that includes the focal individual (and hence average pun-
ishment strategy among their social partners is 5 + [y - 
j]I[N —  lfl, they will play cooperation strategy X = 
ffi + (y - j')I(N - 1)). 
If individuals cooperate optimally, we expect the func-
tion f( Y) to be such that it maximizes the fitness of player 
1 when player 2 plays punishment strategy Y. It is easy to 
show that this optimum is given by 
0 c>Yd 
f'(Y) = 	if 	, 	 (8) 
1 c<Yd 
such that defection is favored when the cost of cooperation 
outweighs the threat of punishment (c> Yd), and coop-
eration is favored when the cost of cooperation is Out-
weighed by the threat of punishment (c < Yd). This step 
function is both mathematically inconvenient and biolog-
ically unreasonable, so we will use the model of McNamara 
et al. (1997; see also Kokko 2003) to describe nearly op-
timized cooperation as 
f(Y)= 	- 	 = 	 - (9) 
1 + exp (—/e) 1 + exp [—(Yd - c)Ie]' 
where e is the degree of behavioral error and A = 
dwldx = Yd - censures that the frequency of nonoptimal 
behavior declines as its impact on fitness becomes more 
important. The facultative cooperation function (eq. [91) 
approaches the step function (eq. [8]) for vanishing be-
havioral error (e - 0), and for larger error (e > 0), it takes 
a continuous sigmoidal form which flattens out to a con-
stant 1/2 as the error tends to infinity (fig. 2). For math-
ematical convenience, we will assume vanishing (but non-
zero) behavioral error (e - 0). - 
Altering fitness function (eq. [11) for this example 
model, we have the fitness of an individual who plays 
punishment strategy y, in a population with mean pun-
ishment strategy j, given by  




- f(- ~ 
(y—j)\l 
N- 
- d(l — f(j)),. 	 (10) 
The mean fitness of the population is 
iv = a - cf() + bf(j) 
- a(1 - f(.))i - d(l - f(,)), 	(11) 
so we expect a rare variant playing punishment strategy y 
to increase in frequency in a population with mean pun-
ishment strategy 5' when the fitness differential A w = 
w - i' is positive, that is, when 
Aw = b[f(+ (y - _f()] 
) 	
1 
_a[i — f(+ 
(y —) (N i) y
— (1 — f(j>o. (12) 
Origin of Punishment. We first consider the evolutionary 
stability (Maynard Smith and Price 1973) of forgiveness, 
by determining under what circumstances no variant with 
punishment strategy y> 0 can invade a population with 
mean punishment strategy 0. Substituting the coop-








I + exp (fc - [yI(N - l)]d}/c)j' 	
(13) 
Recalling that the behavioral error is vanishingly small 
(e - 0), we find that when the threat of punishment posed 
to social partners of the punishing variant is less than the 
cost of cooperation ([yd]/[N — 1] <c), then equation (13) 
reduces to —y a, which is negative, and hence the rare 
variant cannot invade. This is because defection is the rule 
in the social groups of both the wild type and the variant, 
giving population mean fitness i' a and rare variant 
fitness w a - ya. When the threat of - punishment is 
greater than the cost of cooperation ([yd]/[N - 1] > c), 
then equation (13) reduces to b, which is positive, - and 
hence the rare variant can invade. Here, the rare punisher 
has managed to push her social group over the punishment 
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Figure 2: Frequency with which an individual cooperates (x) as a function of the punishment strategy of its social partners (Y) and the degree of 
behavioral error (e), according to the example facultative model. Values are obtained numerically, assuming c = I and d = 3. The bold lines indicate 
= 0, 0.1, and 0.5. 
egy. The average social group is fully defecting, so 
a, but the rare variant is now a recipient of cooperative 
behavior and only rarely encounters a defector requiring 
punishment, so that her fitness is w a + b. Note that 
although the variant receives cooperation, she maximizes 
her fitness by always defecting (since her unrelated social 
partners are all forgivers) and hence pays no cost of co-
operation. If no y satisfies the above invasion condition, 
then forgiveness is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; 
Maynard Smith and Price 1973). This is assured when 
(N - 1)c> d, so that not even a fully punishing variant 
(y = 1) can invade. Evolutionary stability of forgiveness 
is therefore assured unless 
d>(N— l)c. 	 (14) 
Result 4. In the above model, punishment is unlikely to 
invade forgiveness unless the population is structured into 
very small groups. 
Maintenance of Punishment. To determine whether pun-
ishment is an ESS, we let the wild type adopt the strategy 
of full punishment ( - 1) and consider the success of 
rare variants playing y < 1. Substituting the facultative co-
operation function (eq. [9]) into the fitness differential 
(eq. [12]) obtains 
Aw = bi 
[1 + exp (Ic - [1 - (1 - y)I(N - 1))d}Ie) 
	
11 	1 1 ___________ 
I + exp [(c - d)/c]1 	1 + exp [(c - d)Ie] 
- 
 [
1 - I 	 - Iyl. 	(15) I + exp ({c - [I - (1 - 	- 1)]d}/c)J 
First consider "ineffective punishment" (c> d). When be- 
havioral error is vanishing (e - 0), the fitness differential 
(eq. [15]) reduces to a(1 - y), which is positive, and hence 
the more forgiving variant will always invade. This is be-
cause even when defection is always met with punishment, 
the defector has greater fitness than the cooperator, so that 
in all social groups defection is rife. The resident strategy 
incurs the cost of full punishment, and so the mean fitness 
of the population is fv a - a, whereas the more forgiving 
variant avoids this at least part of the time, giving fitness 
w a - ya. Now consider "effective punishment" (d> c), 
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Figure 3: Maximum group size (N) permitting the evolutionary stability of punishment (j = 1) as a function of behavioral error (c) and the Cost 
of punishing (a), according to the example facultative model, assuming b = 2, c = 1, and d = 3. Upper line, a = 0.01; middle line, a = 0.10; 
bottom line, a = 0.50. 
such that punished defectors receive lower fitness than 
cooperators. The resident now enjoys the benefits of co-
operation and only infrequently encounters erroneous de-
fection requiring punishment. If the rare variant forgives 
to such a degree that her social partners optimize by de-
fection; that is, when c - [1 — (1 - y)I(N - l)]d> 0, the 
fitness differential (eq. [15]) reduces to —(b + ya) since 
she loses the benefits of cooperation and punishes a pro-
portion y of her social partners. This is negative, and so 
the rare variant cannot invade. If the variant's forgiveness 
is not sufficient to warrant a switch to defection among 
her social partners, equation (15) becomes —(b + 
ya) exp {c — [1 - (1 — y)/(N — 1)jdj, which is vanishingly 
small but nevertheless negative, and hence the rare variant 
cannot invade. This is true because with vanishing be-
havioral error ( —+ 0) the frequency of defection in the 
fully punishing group is a vanishing fraction of the fre-
quency of defection in the more forgiving group, so that 
the fitness saved from not punishing so frequently does 
not outweigh the fitness lost through the reduction of 
received cooperation. Relaxation of the infinitesimal error 
assumption (fig. 3) shows that this result is robust, even 
for large social groups. The variant can therefore only 
invade an otherwise fully punishing population when pun- 
ishment is ineffective, so that punishment is an ESS when 
d>c. 	 (16) 
Result 5. In the above model, punishment is maintained 
by selection once it has become common if the cost of 
cooperation (c) is less than the cost of being punished (d). 
Discussion 
Punishment and Cooperation 
We have shown that full punishment can be an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy only if there is a positive associ-
ation between the punishment played and the dooperation 
received by an individual. This could arise if populations 
are viscous so that social partners tend to be genealogical 
relatives, but other mechanisms are possible, for example, 
when individuals facultatively adjust their level of coop-
eration in response to the local threat of punishment. We 
have also provided analytical support for the suggestion 
of Boyd et al. (2003) that the cost of punishment declines 
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as it becomes common in the population and hence pun-
ishing behavior might be maintained more easily than it 
is initially evolved. 
These results suggest three general implications. First, 
it can be easier for some cooperation to evolve by another 
mechanism (e.g., altruism between relatives) and then 
punishment evolve to favor and maintain higher levels of 
cooperation. An analogous conclusion has been made for 
some other mechanisms that do not rely on interactions 
between relatives, such as group augmentation (Kokko et 
al. 2001; Griffin and West 2002). Second, within the spe-
cific context of explaining human cooperation, punish-
ment could have evolved at a time when social structure 
was more conducive to punishment (small groups of in-
teracting individuals). Once common, punishment could 
be retained even when interactions began to occur within 
much larger groups of humans. Third, the opposite fre-
quency dependence is true for systems based on rewarding 
cooperation rather than punishing defection—the cost of 
rewarding escalates as more individuals cooperate, whereas 
we have shown the cost of punishing decreases as more 
individuals cooperate. This might go some way to ex-
plaining why punishment as opposed to rewarding is prev-
alent in nature (e.g., Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). 
How can our model be tested? Our major result is that 
costly punishment can be favored if there is a positive 
association between the punishment played and the co-
operation received by an individual (results 1 and 2). This 
could be hard to test directly, especially experimentally, 
because of linitations on how an individual's level of pun-
ishment could be manipulated. However, some of the fun-
damental assumptions and predictions of our model that 
underly this result could be tested more easily. In partic-
ular, are lower levels of cooperation more likely to lead to 
punishment, as appears to occur in superb fairy wrens 
(Mulder and Langmore 1993), naked mole rats (Reeve 
1992), and Polistes wasps (Reeve and Gamboa 1987)? Sec-
ond, are individuals more likely to cooperate when they 
are punished, as may occur in Polistes wasps (Reeve and 
Gamboa 1987)? Third, do individuals try to signal that 
they cooperate more than they actually do, as occurs in 
white-winged choughs (Boland et al. 1997)? FOurth, do 
systems in which social partners are more related tend to 
display less punishment, analogous with Frank's (1995, 
2003) result that investment into policing correlates neg-
atively with relatedness? 
Relatedness and Kin Selection 
This analysis has made use of the understanding that the 
coefficient of relatedness appropriate to the direct fitness 
formulation of Hamilton's rule is a regression measure 
describing the association between actor and social partner 
phenotypes (reviewed by Seger 1981; Michod 1982; Grafen 
1985; Queller 1985; 1992; Frank 1998). Such associations 
are generally due to genealogical closeness and hence ge-
netic similarity, so that the maximization of neighbor-
modulated or inclusive fitness is popularly referred to as 
"kin selection" (Maynard Smith 1964). Group selection 
can be responsible for the evolution of an altruistic trait 
only insofar as the benefit to the group is large enough, 
the cost to the individual 'is low enough, and there is 
substantial between-group as opposed to within-group 
variation in trait values. Since the proportion of the total 
variance that is attributable to between-group differences 
is the coefficient of relatedness appropriate for whole-
group traits, Hamilton's rule can be used to predict when 
group selection will favor the trait (i.e., when related-
ness x benefit > cost). Thus, kin selection and group se-
lection are mathematically equivalent ways of conceptu-
alizing the same evolutionary process, a point that 
previously has been analyzed in much detail (Price 1972; 
Hamilton 1975; Wade 1985; Frank 1986, 1998; Queller 
1992; Reeve and Keller 1999). Consequently, it is puzzling 
that kin selection has been largely ignored in the human 
altruistic punishment literature on the grounds that re-
latedness is too low, while group selection has often been 
regarded as important (e.g., Gintis 2000). Furthermore, 
because relatedness is a regression of recipient phenotype 
on actor phenotype, it transcends genetics and applies even 
when the cause of phenotypic similarity is simply imita-
tion, for example, as in the cultural group selection pro-
posed by Heinrich and Boyd (2001). In this sense, "kin 
selection" is something of a misnomer because it draws 
attention to only one cause of the statistical association 
that is relatedness, as Hamilton (1975) realized. 
As this analysis has shown, positive relatedness is not 
really the key ingredient for the evolutionary success of 
punishment. Punishing behavior is costly to the individ-
ual and protects the social group from the breakdown of 
cooperation, and hence it has been described as a form 
of altruism (Sober and Wilson 1998). It might then be 
expected that where it is successful, altruistic punishment 
is being maintained by kin selection. However, punish-
ment is quite a different form of public good from co-
operation—it is directly disadvantageous at the group 
level because it reduces the fitness of the focal individual 
and her social partners. The benefit it brings is indirect 
because it merely creates a coercive social environment 
in which cooperation is favored. It therefore differs from 
Frank's (1995, 1996, 2003) recent models of competition-
repression in which investment into policing behavior 
translates directly into enhanced group fitness. In our 
model, punishment is only of selective value when there 
is a sufficiently strong correlation between punishment 
strategy played and cooperation received (dX/dy; fig. 1B). 
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This highlights a fundamental nonequivalence of first-
and higher-order public goods. 
A positive correlation between punishment played and 
cooperation received might arise in a viscous population 
where genealogical kin tend to associate with each other, 
so that the social partners of punishers are also punishers. 
(dY/dy> 0) and therefore punishers are expected to be 
coerced into cooperating more than forgivers (dx/dy> 0). 
This association combines with relatedness to ensure that 
an increase in punishing behavior is associated with 
an increase in the amount of cooperation received 
(dX/dy> 0). The pressure for enhanced punishment is 
therefore not strictly, kin selection but rather something 
more akin to "niche construction" (Odling-Smee et al. 
1996), in the sense that the behavior modifies the social 
environment in such a way as to alter the selective pres-
sures acting upon other traits. It is worth noting that lo-
calized competition in viscous populations adds extra 
complexity to models of kin selection (see Taylor 1992a, 
1992b; Wilson et al. 1992; Queller 1994; Frank 1998; Grif-
fin and West 2002; West et al. 2002a; Gardner and West 
2004 for extensive discussion of its impact on the evolution 
of social behaviors). In our analysis, we have assumed that 
all competition occurs at the level of the whole population, 
and we leave local competition as an open problem for 
the future. 
We may easily demonstrate that relatedness is not nec-
essary for the evolution of costly punishment by consid-
ering mechanisms that generate positive associations be-
tween the punishment played and the cooperation received 
despite zero relatedness, for example, the facultative model 
of cooperation introduced above. We discovered that in 
the absence of relatedness, partner recognition, reputation, 
and any mechanism whereby an individual may bias her 
interactions or tailor her behavior in response to her im-
mediate social partner, punishment might be maintained 
by selection acting directly at the level of the individual. 
This is because when punishment is already frequent, the 
fitness saved by forgiving is minimal and may be over-
whelmed by the concomitant decline in the amount of 
cooperation received because of the decrease in selection 
for cooperation among social partners. This example 
model is intended for illustration only and is designed to 
demonstrate how a net benefit for punishment might be 
achieved even when individuals do not interact with rel-
atives. More complicated scenarios are therefore possible, 
and of particular interest is the effect of enhanced behav-
ioral error (increasing e). Numerical analysis of the ex-
ample model reveals that increasing the frequency of mal-
adaptive behavior reduces the likelihood that individual 
level selection will be able to maintain altruistic punish-
ment in very large groups (fig. 3), although the results 
presented above are qualitatively robust so long as behav- 
ioral error () and the cost of punishing (a) are small. 
The degree to which individuals are expected to behave 
optimally is contentious, but punishment is indeed char-
acterized by its cheapness (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
Conclusion 
We have given analytical support to the suggestion that 
the cost of punishment declines as it becomes a common 
strategy, so that punishment is more easily maintained 
than it is originally evolved. We showed that it is not 
relatedness per se that is important in ensuring that pun-
ishing behavior enhances fitness but rather that a positive 
correlation between punishment played and cooperation 
received by an individual is crucial. We also revealed that 
facultative adjustment of cooperation can give rise to such 
a positive association even in the absence of relatedness 
between social partners. Finally, we demonstrated that the 
direct benefits accrued when cooperation is facultative may 
be large enough for selection acting at the individual level 
alone to maintain punishment among humans, rendering 
elaborate population dynamics and cultural practices un-
necessary. More generally, our results provide a specific 
example of how positive correlations between the behav-
iors played by social partners can arise and favor coop-
eration for reasons other then kinship. Major tasks for the 
future include clarifying the links between punishment and 
reproductive skew theory (Johnstone  2000; Clutton-Brock 
et al. 2001; Langer Ct al. 2004) and developing more spe-
cific models for specific situations or organisms. 
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